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Preface
Despite the fact that international migration is not the fastest growing dimension of globalization
process, it remains the most intensively discussed aspect of global integration. Indeed, in the last
25 years the volumes of international trade and foreign direct investments (expressed in constant
USD) have risen fourfold and sixfold respectively.1 Simultaneously, the number of international
migrants increased by “only” 50% during the last 25 years.2
However, the fact is that the citizens of the most developed countries are extremely concerned
about opening the borders of their countries to immigration. The debate on the consequences
of international migration in the developed countries goes further than the respective discussion
about trade and FDIs. Both voters and decision makers try to identify and evaluate the conse-
quences of immanent processes triggered by in- and out-migration. Economically speaking, an
inflow of foreign workers influences the labor markets in sending and receiving countries. While
opinions in sending countries by and large emphasize the loss of young, talented and skilled
workers (especially when emigrants are strongly positively selected), people in host economies
often fear adverse effects of immigration on the level of wages, the unemployment rate and the
number of beneficiaries of the welfare state. Citizens of the most developed countries are re-
luctant to opening borders for new waves of (even highly educated) migrants, motivating their
choices by protecting their current jobs and their salaries. Even though quantitatively less im-
portant, the fiscal impact is the most opinion-forming one out of all economic implications of
migration. Taxpayers in the rich countries perceive foreigners as net recipients of transfers and
benefits, disregarding the fact that the majority of immigrants contribute regularly to host coun-
try’s welfare state.3
Natives often overlook the positive aspects of an inflow of workers when forming their opin-
ions about immigration. On the one hand, immigrants are consumers, who increase the demand
for domestically produced goods. Broadening the size of market brings substantial benefits
through the entries of new entrepreneurs, which enlarges the number of domestically manu-
factured goods. On the other hand, migrants introduce products from their homelands through
international trade linkages. This increases the variety of goods consumed, which creates new
tastes and induces novel possibilities. Furthermore, a diversified immigration is a source of a
transfer of norms, ideas and knowledge among regions characterized by different backgrounds.
A positively selected immigration is the major source of human capital in countries like Aus-
tralia, Canada and New Zealand.
1 In 1990 the volume of international trade constituted 16.5% of GDP, in 2013 it was more than 31.2%. For the
FDIs this growth even more impressive: 0.9% in 1990 and 2.9% in 2013.
2 Migrants composed 2.9% and 3.2% of total world population in 1990 and 2013.
3 The best summary of these, sometimes contradictory, opinions, is a notion of a “Schrödinger’s immigrant”, who
“lazes around on benefits whilst simultaneously stealing your job”.
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Controversies linked to immigration of foreign workers stem from the fact that, apart from im-
portant economic effects, migration induces non-economic processes, related to social, cultural,
ideological and political spheres. Unlike, for example, international trade or FDIs, an inflow
of people representing other norms, habits and customs affects natives’ perception of living
standards in a multidimensional and complex way. This fact is perfectly visible in the opinion
polls on the attitudes of natives in the developed regions towards immigrants. People express
their fears about the unforeseen impacts of cultural differences, crime and social pressures trig-
gered by immigrants, apart from the aforementioned consequences for labor markets and welfare
states. Moreover, natives in the developed countries are reluctant to inviting low-skilled illegal
migrants and refugees, who may have smaller incentives to assimilate.4 These global trends cre-
ate a need for a thorough investigation of the impact of international migration on the economic
performance in the developed world.
The aim of this thesis is twofold. On the one hand, I focus on the implications of past move-
ments of people for the prosperity of natives and residents living in the highly developed re-
gions. This descriptive part of the thesis (Chapter 1) convinces, that the gains and losses from
international migration have taken non-negligible magnitudes. Moreover, the adverse economic
processes, which are thought to be decisive in social and political debates on the consequences
of migration, are little important in the overall effect. On the other hand, considering the for-
mer results, I propose migration policies that aim at solving currently discussed problems, and
present their consequences for demography and economic performance of selected states. In
Chapter 2, I tackle the issue of further integration of the OECD economies (by removing legal
barriers to migration and trade between the European Union and five partner countries). Sub-
sequently, in Chapter 3, I quantify the long-term consequences of modifying EU’s migration
policy towards the high-skilled foreigners (that is: implementing a version of H1B visa program
and comparing it to a tax concession for the high-skilled immigrants in the EU). Both policies
are evaluated using a novel theoretical approach.
The first Chapter, co-authored with A. Aubry and F. Docquier, discusses the welfare impact of
migration in the OECD countries. We take a positive approach towards quantifying the eco-
nomic consequences of recent migration flows (net migration between 2000 and 2010), and to-
tal stock of migrants in 2010. Moreover, we draw conclusions about the importance of different
channels through which migration affects the wellbeing of stayers. In order to compute all these
effects, we construct a multi-country, general equilibrium model with endogenous prices and
trade flows. The model differentiates between low and high-skilled workers, who can be either
4 The controversies connected with migration may be depicted by current debates in several major recipient coun-
tries. The United States of America, whose share of immigrants surged from 9.1% to 14.3% in the last 25 years,
try to fight illegal migration from Mexico, aim at controlling the quality of immigrants by issuing special types
of temporary visas for the well-educated workers (the H1B program), and give strong incentives for a fast assimi-
lation of diversified newcomers (Green Card program). The governments of Australia, Canada and New Zealand
introduced selective migration programs, as a response to their substantial attractiveness among global emigrants
and the needs of domestic labor markets. Imposing a point system designed to intercept the best candidates, they
actually control the skill dimension of inflowing waves of migrants. Swiss citizens voted on imposing migration
quotas on February 9, 2014. This act aims at restricting immigration from the European Union. The political
forces in the United Kingdom, followed by overwhelming opinions of voters, declare reducing the access of im-
migrants originating from new EU members to the British welfare state. Finally, the EU as a whole has to deal
with a huge number of incoming illegal migrants (and, recently, refugees) from Africa and Asia. The events that
take place every day in many European cities, where thousands of illegal migrants arrive, camp and wait for the
opportunity to cross intra-EU borders, show that this problem is far from being solved. Europe needs to compete in
the global game for talents. By now, the North American and Oceania states visibly overtake the EU in attracting
high-skilled workers. As a response to this disadvantageous trend, in 2009 the European authorities introduced
the Blue Card program which was designed similarly to the H1B visas in the US. Unfortunately, until recently,
this initiative has not gained expected popularity among emigrants, in contrast to the US counterpart.
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natives or foreigners. The main findings convince that flows of 2000-2010 migrants are benefi-
cial for the natives living in the majority of OECD members (especially: Australia, Switzerland,
Canada, Spain and New Zealand), whereas the less attractive countries lose substantially (in this
group we find Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Mexico). On the contrary, total stocks of immi-
grants cause a substantial polarization between the winners (Australia or Luxembourg) and the
losers (Poland or Mexico), which reaches 35 percentage points in terms of our welfare measure.
In both cases of flows and stocks, the extra-OECD migration brings positive welfare conse-
quences for almost all OECD members. In contrast, the intra-OECD movements of workers
have negative welfare implications for the majority of OECD states, which clearly depicts past
and current trends in international migration. The second important contribution of this paper is
the quantification of the relative importance of the channels which constitute the overall welfare
effect of migration. In our approach, we single out the labor market effect, the fiscal effect and
the market size effect of migration (in the robustness check we verify the impact of migration
on the level of TFP). By computing the magnitude of each constituent, we conclude that the
within-country redistributive effects (wage and fiscal effects) are of smaller importance. The
forces that drive our results are related to the elements that distribute the gains and losses among
the countries (TFP and market size effects). In this way we give evidence that the economic
processes, which are quoted by the politicians and citizens as the major threats of migration,
have in fact a less pronounced impact on natives’ welfare. Indeed, the wage and fiscal effect are
quantitatively small, but have a substantial significance in forming social opinions. Furthermore,
the economic phenomena which are less likely to be perceived by people, media and authorities
(the implications of efficiency gains and an increase in the number of varieties consumed) are of
key importance in the distribution of gains and losses from international migration.
In the second Chapter, I extend the theoretical framework from the first Chapter, and evaluate
migration policies in a multi-country general equilibrium model with endogenous migration and
trade. In particular, I quantify the economic impact of removing visa barriers between the Euro-
pean Union and five major partners (Australia, Canada, Japan, Turkey and the US). The results
are compared with a hypothetical trade liberalization between the same five pairs of countries.
I find that free trade causes mutually beneficial, but small welfare effects for the natives in
the analyzed states. Contrary to that, zeroing legal migration costs brings exclusive gains for
the EU, only in the case of cooperation with Turkey and Japan. A migration agreement with
Australia, Canada and the US may have substantially negative consequences for the European
citizens, due to potentially large out-migration. Then, a more academic simulation is conducted,
assuming a full liberalization of migration and trade among all the OECD countries. The results
give evidence that the magnitude of the effect of migration is larger than the one of trade. How-
ever, only a few countries gain from removing visa barriers (notably New Zealand, Australia,
Canada, Switzerland and the US), whereas a reduction of (non-)tariff restrictions is beneficial
for all members of the OECD. Finally, the proposed model gives theoretical evidence about
the relations between migration and trade after imposing exogenous shocks to both types of
barriers. Reinforcing them with simulation results, I show that liberalizing migration increases
bilateral trade flows, while liberalizing trade reduces between-country flows of people. There-
fore, the model relation between these two economic processes depends not only on the general
assumptions, but also on the type of exogenous shock that is imposed in the system.
The third Chapter proposes an innovative modeling technique to identify the global demographic
impact of different migration policies in the EU. The model jointly considers peoples’ endoge-
nous decisions about the country of destination, type of visa to apply for, and the duration of stay.
In consequence, incorporating the geographical, time and skill dimensions of agents’ migration
decisions, the proposed framework provides a micro-foundation for multilateral resistance to mi-
gration (a complex structure of dependencies between migration choice options). The research
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question posed in this paper relates to a single, politically important problem faced by the Eu-
ropean Union that is the capacity of the EU of attracting high-skilled immigrants. The article
proposes two potential solutions. The first one is a visa policy liberalization in the EU, which
considers an implementation of H1B visa, following the US. An alternative to this approach is
a fiscal incentive for potential college-educated immigrants, which comprises in a tax reduction
scheme on their earned income. While the two policies induce similar “talent-stealing” effect
(current migrants substitute other destinations for Europe), they produce various additional im-
plications. The H1B policy causes current immigrants to the EU to change their visas (which
alters the structure of migrants’ duration of stay). Conversely, the fiscal incentive works through
inviting new immigrants to the EU, especially those who previously had not decided to emigrate.
The discrepancy between the two may be of great importance for the policy makers and the au-
thorities in the EU. The former policy is expected to have significant fiscal cost in the long-run
(due to pension expenditures for the medium and long-term foreign workers), whereas the latter
might constitute an immediate burden on national budgets (through a decrease in tax collection
from the current immigrants).
This thesis investigates the nature of contemporary economic processes linked to international
migration. My goal is to draw conclusions about their consequences, and to evaluate relevant
policies aiming at increasing the gains from migration. Considering the fact that the implications
of global movements of people reach far beyond economics, these results should be interpreted
as dealing with only one (out of many) dimension of the problem. However, the three developed
approaches aim at deliberating more than just economic variables, incentives and motives. In
what has been proposed, people are treated as rational individuals, who care about other objec-
tive determinants (such as social costs of moving) and subjective factors (for example individual
preferences towards different destinations, or unexpected costs of emigrating). Combining these
features with the multidimensionality of migration decisions may bring new insights in the lit-
erature on modeling migration flows.
IRES, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, March 2016
Chapter 1
The welfare impact of global migration
in OECD countries
Abstract1
This paper quantifies the effect of global migration on the welfare of non-migrant OECD citi-
zens. We develop an integrated, multi-country model that accounts for the interactions between
the labor market, fiscal, and market size effects of migration, as well as for trade relations be-
tween countries. The model is calibrated to match the economic and demographic characteristics
of the 34 OECD countries and the rest of the world, as well as trade flows between them in the
year 2010. We show that recent migration flows have been beneficial for 69 percent of the non-
migrant OECD population, and for 83 percent of non-migrant citizens of the 22 richest OECD
countries. Winners are mainly residing in traditional immigration countries; their gains are sub-
stantial and are essentially due to the entry of immigrants from non OECD countries. Although
labor market and fiscal effects are non-negligible in some countries, the greatest source of gain
comes from the market size effect, i.e. the change in the variety of goods available to consumers.
Keywords: migration, market size, labor market, fiscal impact, general equilibrium, welfare.
JEL Classification: C68, F22, J24.
1.1 Introduction
International migration has become a sensitive topic in OECD countries. Over the last 50 years,
migration movements have drastically affected the socio-demographic characteristics of the 34
OECD member states.2 They have influenced the skill structure of the labor force (impacting
wage disparities between groups of workers), the age structure of the population (governing
the numbers of net contributors to and net beneficiaries from the welfare state and other public
interventions), and the geographical distribution of consumers (with consequences on the aggre-
gate demand for domestic goods and services, number of entrepreneurs, and product varieties
1 The paper, coauthored with Amandine Aubry and Frédéric Docquier, is accepted for publication in Journal of
International Economics.
2 Some stylized facts are described in Appendix 1.A.
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available to consumers). The welfare impact of global migration results from the complex inter-
actions between these effects. These interactions are unlikely to be fully internalized by public
opinion. They are also imperfectly captured in the academic literature since, with a few excep-
tions, economists have investigated the transmission channels of migration shocks in isolation.
The objective of this paper is to quantify the impact of the current state of global migration
(i.e. inflows of foreigners and outflows of natives) on the welfare of non-migrants living in
each OECD country (representing about 96 percent of the native OECD population), and to
shed light on the main transmission channels. We use a multi-country framework combining
the major economic mechanisms highlighted in the recent literature and accounting for interde-
pendencies between them and between countries. This allows us to assess the relative impor-
tance of each channel. The model is parametrized to fit the economic and socio-demographic
characteristics of the 34 OECD countries and the rest of the world, as well as the trade flows
between them in the year 2010. We then use counterfactual repatriation simulations to iden-
tify the between-country and within-country effects of global migration, distinguishing between
intra-OECD migration and extra-OECD migration, and between the recent migration flows and
the total stocks of migrants.
Assessing the welfare impact of international migration is important. Indeed, recent surveys re-
veal that worries about migration are on the rise. A majority of respondents in OECD countries
see immigration and emigration as sources of problems.3 While the perceived channels through
which emigration operates are rarely reported, those pertaining to immigration are better docu-
mented. In particular, public opinions reflect two major economic concerns, i.e. adverse labor
market and fiscal effects of immigration. European Social Survey data for the year 2014 show
that only 26.0 percent of European respondents believe that immigrants contribute positively to
public finances, and only 35.9 percent think that immigrants create new jobs for natives.4 In
the Transatlantic Trends on Immigration 2010, 56 percent of Americans think that immigrants
take jobs away from the native-born, while 44 percent of Europeans think that immigrants bring
down the wages of citizens.5 These public views are likely to be based on a simplistic vision
of the functioning of the economy (e.g. fixed labor demand, perfect substitutability between
natives’ and migrants’ characteristics, immigrants receiving generous welfare benefits, etc.) and
a biased estimation of the magnitude of migration flows.6
The academic literature does not support such perceptions. However, the channels of transmis-
sion of migration shocks have usually been studied in isolation, relying on one-country, partial
equilibrium frameworks. First, the labor market literature investigates how citizens’ wages and
employment react to international migration. These effects will be referred to as the labor mar-
ket effects of migration, henceforth. Recent studies of these labor market effects usually rely
on models of aggregate supply and demand for labor, which leave out entrepreneurship and
tax responses (see Battisti et al., 2014, Borjas, 2015, Docquier et al., 2014, Ottaviano and Peri,
2012). They show that the wage and employment responses to immigration and emigration
3 In 2014, the Transatlantic Trends on Immigration (see http://trends.gmfus.org/) showed that 58 percent of Euro-
pean citizens considered immigration as a problem and not as an opportunity. In the US, this percentage amounted
to 31 percent. Worries were particularly important in the case of immigrants from developing countries; in Eu-
rope, 56 percent of respondents expressed concerns about extra-EU immigrants, while only 43 percent worried
about intra-EU migration. Similarly, 57 percent of Europeans and 28 percent of Americans viewed emigration as
a problem.
4 On a scale from 0 to 10, these respondents valued a positive contribution of immigration ranging from 6 and 10.
See http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.
5 See http://trends.gmfus.org/.
6 For example, Canadians, Americans and Europeans estimate that 37, 35 and 24 percent of their population are
immigrants, while the actual shares are 20, 14 and 11 percent, respectively. The differences between the perceived
and actual shares cannot be explained by illegal migration or by second-generation immigrants.
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are governed by the differences in the socio-demographic characteristics of the native and mi-
grant populations, as well as by the elasticities of substitution between groups of workers as
defined by age, education and origin. Second, migrants also contribute to national budgets and
collect social transfers. These effects will be referred to as the fiscal effects of migration, hence-
forth. Studies of the fiscal impact of migration use accounting models with exogenous wages
and prices, or general equilibrium models with simple labor market interactions (see Chojnicki,
2013, Chojnicki et al., 2011, Dustmann and Frattini, 2014, Dustmann et al., 2010, Storesletten,
2000).7 Third, international migration affects the aggregate demand for goods and services in
the receiving and sending countries. In a monopolistic competition context, the aggregate de-
mand determines firms’ entry and exit decisions and in turn, the numbers of entrepreneurs and
goods available to consumers. These effects will be referred to as market size effects of mi-
gration, henceforth. They have been understudied in the literature. Borrowing concepts from
the recent trade literature, Iranzo and Peri (2009) or Di Giovanni et al. (2015) investigated the
welfare impact of market size in a love-of-variety environment à la Krugman (1980) without
taxation and with a simple labor market structure. Finally, immigrants and emigrants usually
differ from non-migrants in terms of education. Hence, migration directly impacts the aver-
age level of schooling in the origin and destination countries, with possible consequences on
the level of the total factor productivity. Such TFP effects are more controversial. They have
been analyzed in a limited number of empirical studies and mainly pertains to the mobility of
high-skilled workers.8
A growing consensus on how to formalize and quantify some of these effects has emerged due to
the development of new theoretical foundations and the availability of migration data. However,
these effects are interdependent and deserve to be studied jointly. Little is known about their
relative magnitudes and their interactions. For example, changes in total factor productivity af-
fect wages, the demand for goods and trade flows. Simultaneously, changes in wage inequality
and prices directly influence the fiscal impact of migration, through labor income and consump-
tion tax revenues. In addition, geographical disparities in the production of goods govern the
interactions between countries through the incentives to trade. Assessing the welfare impact
of migration on non-movers requires accounting for these interactions between countries and
between the transmission channels.
The analysis proposed in this paper combines three major transmission channels of migration
shocks into an integrated, multi-country model. It ignores the societal implications of immigra-
tion (not or indirectly related to economic variables), on which there is no clear consensus in
the literature (see Alesina et al., 2013, Borjas, 2015, Collier, 2013). Our setup is an extension of
the model proposed by Krugman (1980), augmented with eight classes of individuals (working-
age and old, college and non-college educated, immigrants and natives), redistributive taxes
and transfers, and complex labor market interactions between natives and migrants. It accounts
for the market-size effects initially underlined by Iranzo and Peri (2009) or Di Giovanni et al.
(2015). The latter use a love-of-variety, monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous
firms à la Melitz (2003) to study the implications of global migration for developed and devel-
oping countries. Although Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) provide important contributions
to the literature on firm heterogeneity, we assume that firms are homogeneous in each country
7 In a recent comparative study, the OECD (2013) shows that the fiscal effect of immigration varies across countries;
its sign and magnitude are strongly affected by the uncertain effect of migration on public consumption.
8 For example, Peri et al. (2013) found that immigration flows of scientists, technology professionals, engineers and
mathematicians have a significantly positive effect on the wages of college-educated non-migrants in the U.S., and
almost no effect on the less educated.
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and disregard both the production of intermediate goods and the remittances sent by migrants to
their country of origin.9
Our contribution to the existing literature is threefold. First, we combine the labor market,
fiscal and market size effects described above in an integrated framework, accounting for the
interaction between them. A special attention is devoted to the fiscal effect of migration, which
has been disregarded in Iranzo and Peri (2009) and Di Giovanni et al. (2015). The fiscal effect
will prove to be important in some countries. We will also account for schooling externalities
in our robustness analysis. Second, we calibrate the model to perfectly fit the economic and
demographic characteristics of the 34 OECD countries and those of the rest of the world, as
well as the trade flows between them in the year 2010. In particular, distinguishing between
eight classes of individuals, our model captures the effect of migration on the age structure of
the population. Third, we consider richer numerical experiments. We analyze the effect of
total migration versus recent migration (i.e. migrants who arrived between 2000 and 2010) and
distinguish between intra-OECD and extra-OECD migration. This allows us to quantify the
effect of each channel, to identify the dominant ones, and to compare the between- and within-
country redistributive effects of migration.
The effect of global migration on welfare is computed using two counterfactual experiments: a
repatriation of recent migrants to their home countries, and a repatriation of the total stock of
migrants (as if the legal barriers for migration, for example the visa costs, had been infinitely
large over the last ten years or over the last century, respectively). We quantify the overall
economic impact for the high-skilled and the low-skilled non-movers, and identify the relative
contribution of the three main channels described above: the labor market, market-size, and
fiscal effects.10 We also account for schooling externalities in the robustness section.
Using estimated elasticities from the empirical literature, we show that recent migration flows
induced many winners and a few losers among OECD citizens.11 As stated above, we distin-
guish between 8 groups of individuals per country. The set of winners represents 69.1 percent
of OECD non-migrant population aged 25 and over. This share increases to 83.0 percent if
one considers the 22 countries whose GDP per capita was above USD 30,000 in the year 2010.
Contrary to popular perceptions, winners mainly reside in net immigration countries; their gains
can be important and are essentially due to the entry of immigrants from non-OECD countries,
which has a drastic effect on market size. Losers mostly reside in net emigration countries;
welfare losses are smaller (except in relatively poorer countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Estonia
or Poland) and are essentially due to the (intra-OECD) emigration of their nationals. However,
for these traditional emigration countries, we overestimate the magnitude of the losses because
we disregard remittance inflows (accounting for 2.1, 0.8 and 0.2 percent of GDP in the year
2010 in Mexico, Poland and Turkey, respectively). Although labor market and fiscal effects are
important sources of variability across countries, the market-size effect is a significant source
of welfare gains. On average, the market-size effect increases the welfare of all workers by 1.0
9 Assuming heterogeneous firms and intermediate inputs has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand,
this might provide a more realistic representation of macro and micro features highlighted by the recent trade
literature. On the other hand, it requires to define firm preferences towards intermediate goods and demand a
precise calibration of the parameters of the distribution of firm productivity and size. The former is difficult to
model in a one-sector framework and usually imposes a strong assumption of identical preferences for consumers
and firms. The literature is still in its early stages concerning the latter and, due to data limitation, has essentially
focused on the United States.
10 In general, our analysis focuses on the welfare impact on the non-movers, because this is the group that has the
voting power and decides on migration and fiscal policies.
11 In a previous version of this paper, we calibrated the model on the year 2000, and simulated the effects of a
repatriation of the 1990-2000 migration wave. Similar results were obtained, available upon request.
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percent in the OECD, whereas the average fiscal effect equals 0.4 percent, and the average labor
market effect equals 0.1 percent for college graduates and 0.2 percent for the less educated.12
Very similar results are obtained if trade is ruled out, if we change the fiscal rule, or if we
let the elasticities of substitution between varieties vary within the range of values provided in
the empirical literature. Larger effects can be obtained if we allow for schooling externalities
on total factor productivity, or if we change the elasticity of substitution between native and
immigrant workers in production. In addition, we also evaluate the effect of global migration
stocks as if all past waves of migration had been nil. Although the average magnitude of the
effect becomes greater and we identify more losers, the market-size effect remains important. It
increases the welfare of all workers by 2.6 percent in the OECD. This is greater than the average
fiscal effect (1.2 percent) and the average labor market effect (0.2 percent for the less educated
and -0.4 percent for college graduates). In line with Di Giovanni et al. (2015), we find that the
market size is instrumental to explaining the welfare consequences of migration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we present the theoretical
model. The quantitative analysis is provided in Section 1.3. It describes the calibration strat-
egy, our benchmark findings, and the results of a large set of robustness checks. Section 1.4
concludes.
1.2 Theoretical model
We develop a static, multi-country model endogenizing the economic effect of global migration
(i.e. inflows of foreigners and outflows of natives) on the welfare of non-migrants in OECD
countries. Three channels of influence are taken into consideration in the benchmark model:
the labor market effect, the fiscal effect, and changes in the mass of horizontally differentiated
products available to consumers. We model the competitive labor market effect as in Docquier
et al. (2014), the fiscal effect as in Storesletten (2000) or Chojnicki et al. (2011), and the market-
size effect using the “love-of-variety” model of Krugman (1980). The latter endogenizes the
mass of varieties produced in a country as a function of the market size. By changing the mass
and the type of consumers in origin and destination countries, migration affects the aggregate
demand for goods, the mass of entrepreneurs, and the available product diversity. The “love-
of-variety” model has been used extensively to quantify the large effect of the trade-induced
growth in product variety on welfare (see Broda and Weinstein, 2006). Although the model
has no physical capital, we model the effect of migration on firm creation and entrepreneurship
investments (each entrepreneur incurs a fixed cost of entry).13 Countries are interdependent: the
economic effects are propagated across countries through endogenous trade flows.
Our model is static and includes C countries indexed by c ∈ {1, 2, ..., C}. Each country is
populated by 8 groups of individuals. We denote the individual’s skill/origin type by m ∈
{H,L, h, l} and the individual’s cohort by a ∈ {w, r}, and we assume that all agents have
identical preferences. Total population in country c is made of LTw,c working-age individuals
and LTr,c retirees. Each group is divided into four types of individuals: L
L
w,c and L
L
r,c low-skilled
natives, LHw,c and L
H
r,c high-skilled natives, L
l
w,c and L
l
r,c low-skilled immigrants, and L
h
w,c
12 In an earlier version of this paper, we quantified the impact of global migration between 1990 and 2000 and
obtained very similar conclusions. Overall, most OECD citizens benefited from South-North migration, intra-
OECD migration was a zero-sum game, and the market size effect was instrumental to explaining these effects.
13 Capital adjustments are rapid in open economies. Ortega and Peri (2009) find that an exogenous inflow of immi-
grants increases one-for-one employment and capital stocks in the receiving country in the short term (i.e. within
one year), leaving the capital/labor ratio unchanged.
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and Lhr,c high-skilled immigrants. We use superscript S when aggregating high-skilled natives
and foreigners (H,h), and subscript U when aggregating the less educated (L, l). Individuals
are assumed to be homogeneous within each group; we thus disregard heterogeneity based on
unobservable characteristics, and assume that all immigrant workers in a given skill cell are
perfect substitutes on the labor market.
The demographic structure is considered as exogenous, since we aim to quantify the “causal”
impact of migration flows on income (as in Di Giovanni et al., 2015, Docquier et al., 2014).
Within a skill and age cell, individuals differ only in terms of income and place of residence,
governing their access to local and foreign varieties. In this section, we describe the preferences
and technologies used to endogenize consumers’ and firms’ decisions. We then characterize the
monopolistically competitive equilibrium of the global economy.
1.2.1 Preferences and consumers’ decisions
The preferences of a representative consumer of type m ∈ {H,L, h, l} and cohort a ∈ {w, r}
living in country c are identical across types of consumers. They are described by a CES utility
function over a continuum of varieties indexed by k:
Uma,c =
∑
j∈C
∫ Bj
0
qma,cj(k)
−1
 dk
 −1 , (1.1)
where qma,cj(k) stands for the quantity of variety k produced in country j and consumed in
country c by an agent of typem and cohort a, andBj is the mass of varieties produced in country
j. Varieties are imperfect substitutes, characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution equal
to  > 1.14
Labor supply is exogenous and we do not model savings decisions, assuming that each indi-
vidual consumes her income entirely.15 Workers’ nominal income is the sum of group-specific
net wages and public transfers; retirees only receive public transfers. Hence, the utility function
(1.1) is maximized subject to a static budget constraint:
∑
j∈C
∫ Bj
0
p˜cj(k)q
m
a,cj(k)dk = ω˜
m
a,c, (1.2)
where p˜cj defines the gross price of variety k produced in country j and consumed in c. In partic-
ular, every consumer pays a consumption tax in her country of residence, hence: p˜cj(k) = (1 +
υc)pcj(k), where υc is the consumption tax rate in country c and pcj(k) is the before-tax price of
good k. Variable ω˜ma,c represents the net nominal income of an individual of typem and cohort a
14 We follow the traditional model of Krugman (1980) by supposing that foreign and domestic products enter sym-
metrically in the utility function and are subject to the same elasticity of substitution.
15 The elasticity of labor supply to wages is usually found to be small (Evers et al., 2008). However, endogenizing
labor supply matters if the participation rates of natives and immigrants are strongly different. A recent OECD
report (OECD, 2015) indicates that immigrants from developing countries exhibit smaller participation rates than
natives in Europe (in particular, low-skilled women from Muslim countries). Although these immigrants represent
a small fraction of the working-age population, accounting for differences in participation rates can attenuate
the magnitude of the labor market and market size effects. Dealing with heterogeneous participation rates is a
non-trivial extension, which requires a more general utility function with leisure, and calibrating origin-specific
preference parameters (i.e. relaxing the hypothesis of homogeneous preferences).
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who lives in country c. The CES preferences induce that she spends all her income on consump-
tion, and every available variety faces a positive demand (i.e. limqma,cj(k)→0 ∂U
m
a,c/∂q
m
a,cj(k) =
∞).
The demand function derived from the first-order condition of this maximization problem is
written:
qma,cj(k) =
P −1c
p˜cj(k)
ω˜ma,c, (1.3)
where Pc denotes the ideal price index in country c and is defined as:
Pc =
∑
j∈C
∫ Bj
0
p˜cj(k)
1−dk
 11− . (1.4)
The latter expression reflects the underlying love-of-variety property of the CES utility function.
Given that  > 1, a greater mass of varieties tends to lower the value of the ideal price index
and to increase the individual’s welfare (keeping the consumer’s expenditure unchanged). Intu-
itively, under CES preferences, the ideal price index can be seen as an indicator of (optimized)
costs of living. Indeed, the individual’s indirect utility function is given by:
Uma,c =
∑
j∈C
∫ Bj
0
(
P −1c
p˜cj(k)
ω˜ma,c
) −1

dk
 −1 = ω˜ma,c
Pc
, (1.5)
with ∂Pc∂Bj < 0 and so
∂Uma,c
∂Bj
> 0.
From eq. (1.3), we derive the demand function faced by each firm in country c, qc(k), and the
total expenditure function in country c, Xc:
qc(k) =
∑
j∈C
∑
m,a
Lma,jq
m
a,jc(k) and Xc =
∑
m,a
Lma,c
∑
j∈C
∫ Bj
0
p˜cj(k)q
m
a,cj(k)dk. (1.6)
1.2.2 Technology and firms’ decisions
In each country c, there is a mass Bc of firms that operate on a monopolistically competitive
market. Therefore, strategic interdependencies between firms are ruled out. Production requires
labor, which is supplied inelastically by the four types of imperfectly substitutable workers. The
labor market is perfectly competitive, so that each type of worker is remunerated according to her
marginal productivity. Obviously, in countries with restrictive institutions, many factors hamper
wage adjustments, which result in adjustments in the employment rate (see Angrist and Kugler,
2003, Aydemir and Kirdar, 2013, Glitz, 2012). This issue mainly pertains to low-skilled workers
living in European countries, where wage rigidities are stronger. In our general equilibrium
setting, there is no unemployment and we do not deal with the heterogeneity between employed
and unemployed workers, conjecturing that the effect of migration on the aggregate wage bill
(and on market size effects) does not depend too much on the type of labor market adjustment.16
16 Endogenizing unemployment would also affect the fiscal impact of migration (through unemployment benefits).
This effect is expected to be small. On average, unemployment benefits represent 1.24 percent of GDP in OECD
countries. Most of the fiscal cost of immigration is driven by the effect of migration on old-age, health and public
education expenditures.
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Contrary to Di Giovanni et al. (2015), we assume that firms are homogeneous in productivity
within a country and that labor is the unique production factor.
Each firm maximizes its profit, which then leads to the decision to enter the market or not, and
what price to set once in. For the sake of clarity, we separately describe the two related sides
of the profit maximization problem, i.e. the minimization of the unit cost of production for a
given level of output, and the determination of the optimal price and output. We first describe
the former, which enables us to highlight the labor demand for each type of worker, as well as
the aggregate labor demand. We continue with the latter which allows us to derive the pricing
rule and the optimal output per firm.
1.2.2.1 Production function
The production function of firm k in country c is defined as a nested CES combination of labor.
The upper-level production function determines the quantity of high-skilled and low-skilled
workers needed to produce yc(k), and is specified as:
yc(k) = Ac ¯`
T
c (k) = Ac
(
θSc
(
¯`S
c (k)
)σS−1
σS +
(
1− θSc
) (
¯`U
c (k)
)σS−1
σS
) σS
σS−1
, (1.7)
where Ac is the country-specific level of total factor productivity (TFP), ¯`Tc (k) is total employ-
ment in efficiency units by firm k, which divides into ¯`Sc (k) and ¯`
U
c (k), total employment of
high-skilled and low-skilled labor in efficiency units. Each factor is defined in terms of effi-
ciency units to account for the inherent productivity of each type of worker and the benefits
resulting from the interactions between workers. The elasticity of substitution, σS ∈ (1,∞),
captures the imperfect substitutability between workers of different education levels. Parameter
θSc reflects the relative productivity of high-skilled labor.
Moreover, it is well documented that conditional on education, immigrants and natives are im-
perfect substitutes. Recent papers (such as Manacorda et al., 2012, Ottaviano and Peri, 2012)
find imperfect degrees of substitution between these two types of workers. To account for this,
we define the efficient labor supply for each level of education as a CES function of native and
immigrant employment:
¯`U
c (k) =
[
θMc
(
`Lc (k)
)σM−1
σM +
(
1− θMc
) (
`lc(k)
)σM−1
σM
] σM
σM−1
, (1.8a)
¯`S
c (k) =
[
θMc
(
`Hc (k)
)σM−1
σM +
(
1− θMc
) (
`hc (k)
)σM−1
σM
] σM
σM−1
, (1.8b)
where the country-specific θMc is a parameter of relative productivity of national workers, and
σM ∈ (1,∞) is the elasticity of substitution between national and foreign workers. We constrain
the native-immigrant elasticity to be the same across education levels. Indeed, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no consensus on the elasticities of substitution within each group once we
relax this constraint. For instance, Card (2009) finds that less-educated immigrants and natives
are closer to perfect substitutes than skilled immigrants and natives. Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
report opposite results.
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1.2.2.2 Optimal labor demand
The before-tax nominal wage rate for a worker of type m ∈ {H,L, h, l} is denoted by wmc .
Since the labor market is competitive, firms take wmc as given. The ideal (composite) wages of
efficient low-skilled and high-skilled workers, denoted byWUc andW
S
c , and the ideal composite
aggregate wage, denoted by Wc, result from the cost minimization described below. Since high-
skilled workers are, on average, more productive, we have WSc > W
U
c ; and within each skill
category, nationals are usually better paid than immigrants (reflecting, for instance, the imperfect
transferability of skills across countries): wHc > w
h
c and w
L
c > w
l
c.
The optimal labor demand allocated to the production process is determined by a two-stage
cost minimization. First, for a given production level yc(k), each firm chooses the optimal
combination of high-skilled and low-skilled workers that minimizes the total labor cost:
min
¯`S
c (k),
¯`U
c (k)
WSc
¯`S
c (k) +W
U
c
¯`U
c (k)
s.t. Ac
(
θSc
(
¯`S
c (k)
)σS−1
σS +
(
1− θSc
) (
¯`U
c (k)
)σS−1
σS
) σS
σS−1 ≥ yc(k).
The first-order conditions determine the optimal demand for efficient low-and high-skilled work-
ers in firm k:
¯`S
c (k) =
yc(k)
Ac
(
θScWi
WSc
)σS
and ¯`Uc (k) =
yc(k)
Ac
(
(1− θSc )Wc
WUc
)σS
, (1.9)
where Wc is the ideal labor cost index, defined as:
Wc =
[(
θSc
)σS (
WSc
)1−σS
+ (1− θSc )σS
(
WUc
)1−σS] 11−σS . (1.10)
Equations (1.9) show that the demand for each type of worker increases with yc(k), and de-
creases with the composite labor cost for this type of worker. Due to the imperfect substitution
between inputs, the labor demand for each skill level is a function of all input prices (through
the aggregate wage index Wc). Hence, the higher the elasticity of substitution between the two
types of workforces, σS , the higher the demand for the relatively cheaper type of labor.
Second, each firm chooses the optimal combination of national and foreign workers within each
education category, taking the total supply of efficient high- and low-skilled labor as given (see
eq. (1.9)). Firms solve the following cost minimization for high-skilled workers:
min
`Hc (k),`
h
c (k)
wHc `
H
c (k) + w
h
c `
h
c (k)
s.t.
(
θMc
(
`Hc (k)
)σM−1
σM +
(
1− θMc
) (
`hc (k)
)σM−1
σM
) σM
σM−1
≥ ¯`Sc (k).
The optimal labor demand for skilled natives and migrants is then equal to:
`Hc (k) =
¯`S
c (k)
(
θMc W
S
c
wHc
)σM
=
yc(k)
Ac
(
θScWc
WSc
)σS (θMc WSc
wHc
)σM
, (1.11)
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and
`hc (k) =
¯`S
c (k)
(
(1− θMc )WSc
whc
)σM
=
yc(k)
Ac
(
θScWc
WSc
)σS ((1− θMc )WSc
whc
)σM
, (1.12)
where WSc is the remuneration of the ideal high-skilled labor cost composite described by
eq. (1.9), which we refer to as the ideal wage index for the high-skilled:
WSc =
[(
θMc
)σM (
wHc
)1−σM
+
(
1− θMc
)σM
(whc )
1−σM
] 1
1−σM . (1.13)
The labor demand and wage index for low-skilled natives and migrants are derived in a symmet-
ric way and lead to the following ideal wage index:
WUc =
[(
θMc
)σM (
wLc
)1−σM
+
(
1− θMc
)σM
(wlc)
1−σM
] 1
1−σM . (1.14)
The homogeneity of firms induces that `Sc (k) = `
S
c and `
U
c (k) = `
U
c for all k. For the sake of
clarity, we will then drop index k henceforth. Summing these values across all firms gives the
aggregate labor demand for each type of worker.
The cost minimization problem described above determines the optimal unit cost of production
for each firm:
Cc =
wHc l
H
c + w
h
c l
h
c + w
L
c l
L
c + w
l
cl
l
c
yc
=
Wc
Ac
, (1.15)
as well as the labor demand for the share of the workforce allocated to the production process
and the total labor demand in the economy.
Notice that not all human resources are devoted to the production process, since each firm in
country c faces a fixed entry cost, fc, to enter the domestic market.17 We follow the “new trade”
literature by expressing fixed costs in units of efficient labor composite.18 These costs can be
interpreted as an investment that a firm must make to explore the market and differentiate its
product. Therefore, the aggregated demand for labor also includes the one for workers who are
employed for investment purposes. The amount of efficient labor required to create a mass Bc
of firms (i.e. the fixed cost of entry) equals Bcfc. Their total cost amounts to BcfcWc. The
total share of efficient labor devoted to creating firms is then ξ ≡ fcBcWc
WcL¯Tc
= 1 and the remaining
share 1−ξ (i.e. −1 ) of workers is employed to produce the final good.19 Therefore, the efficient
labor per firm, ¯`Tc , can be written as:
¯`T
c =
− 1

L¯Tc
Bc
, (1.16)
17 We assume that firms have perfect information about the costs of entry, thus they will be indifferent between
paying the one-time investment cost f¯c and the amortized, discounted, per-period portion of this cost fc = f¯c/dc.
In a dynamic framework, dc would be the expected age of a firm operating in country c.
18 Expressing fixed costs in units of efficient labor has an impact on the size of the global gains from migration.
Indeed, Iranzo and Peri (2009) formalize entry costs as a fixed amount of output that cannot be sold. They obtain
a stronger effect of migration on productivity since, on average, migrants move to more efficient economies with
lower fixed costs. Measuring fixed costs in units of output complicates the model and would reinforce our main
conclusion that the between-country effects exceed the within-country ones.
19 We assume that both the marginal entrepreneur and the marginal worker are remunerated identically, so that these
two agents are indifferent between being employed and starting a firm.
Chapter 1. The welfare impact of global migration 11
Consequently, given that the share of labor allocated to firm creation is constant, the total effi-
cient labor demand in the economy is defined as:
L¯Tw,c = Bc
(
fc + ¯`
T
c
)
.
The labor market clearing conditions imply that the aggregate labor demand for each type of
worker m ∈ {L,H, l, h} equals the exogenously given country endowment Lmw,c.
LLw,c = L¯
T
w,c(1− θSc )σS
(
θMc
)σM
(Wc)
σS
(
WUc
)σM−σS
(wLc )
−σM ,
LHw,c = L¯
T
w,c
(
θSc
)σS (
θMc
)σM
(Wc)
σS
(
WSc
)σM−σS (
wHc
)−σM
, (1.17)
Llw,c = L¯
T
w,c(1− θSc )σS (1− θMc )σM (Wc)σS
(
WUc
)σM−σS
(wlc)
−σM ,
Lhw,c = L¯
T
w,c
(
θSc
)σS
(1− θMc )σM (Wc)σS
(
WSc
)σM−σS
(whc )
−σM .
1.2.2.3 Optimal price and output
The firm’s profit maximization determines the price and quantity produced per firm. Each firm
produces a differentiated product and the love-of-variety assumption implies that each variety is
consumed. At the same time, since we assume a continuum of firms, the effect of the pricing
rule of each firm on the demand for another product is negligible. Therefore, each firm faces a
residual demand curve with a constant elasticity of substitution equal to  and then chooses the
same markup /(− 1) which yields the following pricing rule:
pc =

− 1Cc =

− 1
Wc
Ac
, (1.18)
whereCc is the marginal cost of production defined by eq. (1.15). Moreover, a firm from country
j can export its product to country c, but faces an iceberg trade cost τcj > 1 ∀ c 6= j if it does so.
Hence, the before-tax price paid by consumers in country c for the goods produced in country i
equals to pcj = pjτcj ∀c 6= j. Due to the love-of-variety property of the preferences, each firm
exports to all foreign markets as long as the trade cost is finite.
The output per firm, yc, is determined by profit maximization and the free entry condition.
Indeed, when gains are positive, new firms enter the market, causing profits to fall, until they are
driven to zero. In equilibrium, the profit of each firm is equal to zero:
pic = (pc − Cc) yc −Wcfc = 0. (1.19)
By replacing the price by its value defined in eq. (1.18) in the zero profit condition, we derive
the output per firm:
yc = (− 1)Acfc. (1.20)
Finally, we compute the mass of varieties Bc produced in economy c as a function of country
size. To do so, we define the total production in economy c, that is Bcyc. We then substitute
eq. (1.16) for ¯`Tc into eq. (1.7) and equalize it to the value defined in eq. (1.20):
Bcyc = BcAc ¯`
T
c = Ac
− 1

L¯c = Bc(− 1)Acfc.
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The mass of varieties produced in a given country is then equal to:
Bc =
L¯Tw,c
fc
. (1.21)
This result is similar to the one derived by Krugman (1980). The equilibrium number of firms
in a particular country is proportional to the size of the country (measured here in efficiency
units), L¯Tc , and inversely proportional to the fixed cost, fc. In line with the recent literature
(see Helpman et al., 2008), we assume a country-specific entry cost. Therefore, a reallocation
of the population across countries may change the aggregate mass of varieties. Indeed, if the
workforce moves to countries with a lower entry cost, the aggregate mass of varieties increases,
potentially enhancing global welfare.
Given the zero profit condition, the goods market clearing condition implies that the total spend-
ing Xc defined in eq. (1.6) equals the value of domestic production. Finally, by aggregating the
country-pair-specific expenditures, pcjqcj from eq. (1.3), we obtain a simple representation of
the exports from country j to country c as a function of the trade cost τcj :
Xcj
Xj
=
Xc (Pc/τcj)
−1∑C
i=1Xi (Pi/τci)
−1 . (1.22)
1.2.3 Government
Fiscal policy consists of two tax rates (a consumption tax rate υc, and a labor income tax rate
tc), a vector of type- and age-specific levels of public spending per inhabitant, Gma,c, and a vec-
tor of type- and age-specific transfers per inhabitant, Tma,c. The consumption tax rate increases
the price of a good by a factor of 1 + υc, as shown in eq. (1.2). Natives and immigrants are
taxed at the same rate, but differ with respect to their impact on public finances. Typically, Gma,c
includes final public expenditures, assumed to be identical for all groups of residents, and chil-
dren’s education expenditures, which are only allocated to working-age parents and vary with
their education level and origin (immigrants versus natives). Public transfers Tma,c include public
health expenditures, family allowances, pension benefits, unemployment and other welfare pay-
ments; their amounts vary with age, education and origin. Public consumption and transfers are
not taxed. Our fiscal bloc is a static version of Storesletten (2000) and Chojnicki et al. (2011),
except we do not link pension benefits to wages and we rule out budget deficits.
Working-age individuals consume their net-of-tax labor income and transfers, whereas retirees
do not work and only consume the transfers they receive from the government. We have:
ω˜mw,c = w
m
c (1− tc) + Tmw,c ∀m,
ω˜mr,c = T
m
r,c ∀m.
As far as public consumption is concerned, we assume that the government allocates public
spending between goods as consumers do (see eq. (1.3)). In the benchmark scenario, we also
assume that υc, Gma,c and T
m
a,c are exogenous for all a, m, c, and that the labor income tax rate tc
adjusts to balance the government budget, as in Chojnicki et al. (2011). The budget constraints
is written as:∑
m
Lmw,ctcw
m
c +
∑
m
Lmw,cυc(1− tc)wmc +
∑
m,a
Lma,cυcT
m
a,c =
∑
m,a
Lma,cT
m
a,c +G
m
a,c (1.23)
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In the benchmark scenario, we consider that the amount of public goods provided by the govern-
ment is constant per person. This means that the aggregate production of public goods increases
with population size (e.g. national defense, justice, and public infrastructure). Assuming a con-
stant amount per person, we avoid large fiscal externalities linked to changes in population size.
In line with Storesletten (2000) or Chojnicki et al. (2011), public consumption does not directly
affect utility or productivity.
In the robustness check, we will consider an alternative scenario, assuming that all public spend-
ing is fixed, i.e. is not affected by population size (consider for example national defense or
foreign affairs). Therefore, immigration allows sharing the cost of these goods among a greater
number of individuals (a positive fiscal externality of migration), while emigration has the op-
posite effect. We will also consider a scenario with adjustments in the consumption tax rate,
instead of the income tax rate.
1.2.4 Monopolistic competitive equilibrium
In the benchmark scenario, we have:
Definition 1.1. For a set of common parameters {, σS , σM}, a set of country-specific param-
eters {θSc , θMc , Ac, fc, υc, Tma,c, Gma,c}c∈C , the matrix of country-pair trade costs [τcj ]c,j∈C , and
country-specific numbers of people in the young and old generations, Lma,c, the monopolistically
competitive equilibrium is a set {wmc ,Wc,WSc ,WUc , Cc, qc, pc, Pc, Bc, tc}c∈C and [Xcj ]c,j∈C
such that the following conditions are satisfied: (i) consumers maximize their utility, (ii) firms
maximize profits, (iii) the goods and factor markets clear, (iv) profits are equal to zero, and (v)
the government budget is balanced in each economy c ∈ C. These conditions are reflected by
the set of equations (1.3), (1.4), (1.10), (1.13), (1.14), (1.15), (1.17), (1.18), (1.21), (1.22),
and (1.23).
When budget constraints are balanced and the goods and factor markets clear, the Walras law
guarantees the equilibrium of the balance of payments for each country c (i.e.
∑
j Xcj =∑
j Xjc ∀c ∈ C). Alternative scenarios with endogenous total factor productivity, alternative
fiscal rules or an absence of trade will be considered in the robustness checks.
1.2.5 Disentangling welfare changes
The proposed model enables us to decompose the indirect utility function of working-age indi-
viduals and retirees of type m in country c, defined as the net income deflated by the ideal price
index in eq. (1.5), as follows:
∆Umw,c
Umw,c
=
wmc (1− tc)
wmc (1− tc) + Tmw,c
[
∆wmc
wmc
+
∆(1− tc)
(1− tc)
]
− ∆Pc
Pc
,
∆Umr,c
Umr,c
= −∆Pc
Pc
.
The total change in welfare is then divided into four components altered by migration, the three
main effects at work and a fourth one capturing general equilibrium interdependencies between
them:
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(i) The labor market effect is the most common channel highlighted in the literature. A change
in the size and in the composition of the labor force must affect the nominal wages of hetero-
geneous agents (wmc ), due to the fact that low- and high-skilled workers, as well as natives and
migrants, are imperfect substitutes. By changing the skill structure of the labor force, migration
changes the marginal productivity of non-migrant workers. In particular, low-skilled immigrants
increase the wages of high-skilled workers and reduce the wages of their counterparts. Emigra-
tion leads to opposite effects.
(ii) The fiscal effect forms another channel which is identified in our model. Using eq. (1.23), we
quantify the extent to which migration affects the labor income tax rate (tc). The latter operates
through a change in the number of beneficiaries and contributors to the fiscal scheme. The fiscal
effect pertains to all workers but not to retirees, as we assume constant transfers per person.
(iii) The market-size effect operates through changes in the mass of entrepreneurs and varieties
produced in all countries. This induces variations in the ideal price index (Pc), a weighted com-
bination of domestic and foreign prices. Other things equal, an increase in the mass of varieties
produced in country c leads to a fall in the price index, as reflected in eq. (1.4). Moreover,
global migration may increase the total available mass of varieties, if the population moves to-
wards more efficient economies (i.e. countries with lower entry costs or higher productivity), as
shown in eq. (1.21). Therefore, in the presence of trade, the sending countries could gain from
migration if the aggregate mass of varieties increases. Due to the presence of trade costs, this
increase in demand is biased towards domestic varieties (at least if the wage differences across
countries do not offset this advantage).
(iv) As nominal wages affect marginal costs and prices, interdependencies arise between chan-
nels. The difference between the total effect and the sum of the labor market, fiscal and market-
size effects, taken in isolation, is referred to as the general equilibrium effect.
To quantify the relative magnitude of each transmission channel, we proceed as follows. First,
for each type of worker, the labor market effect is computed as the change in the nominal wage
caused by global migration. Given the interdependencies between the transmission channels,
wage responses affect prices (through eq. (1.18)) and the income tax rate (through the fiscal
base). To calculate the magnitude of the market-size and fiscal effects, we need to neutral-
ize these interdependencies using partial equilibrium simulations. Second, we thus isolate the
market-size effect by computing the response of the price index induced by the change in aggre-
gate demand, keeping nominal wages and tax rates constant (therefore, the government budget
constraints and labor market equilibria are violated). Third, we isolate the fiscal effect by com-
puting the change in the income tax rate, keeping nominal wages and the mass of varieties
constant (i.e. violating the government balances). Finally, the general equilibrium effect is com-
puted as a residual (i.e. difference between the total welfare change and the sum of the three
other effects taken in isolation).
1.3 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the parameters of the model, using country-specific data and in-
sights from the existing literature, and then describe the results of our numerical experiments.
We explain our calibration strategy and examine its relevance in Section 1.3.1. Section 1.3.2
discusses our benchmark results. Finally, we conduct a large set of robustness checks in Section
1.3.3.
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1.3.1 Parametrization
We calibrate our model for the 34 OECD countries and the rest of the world (ROW), the aggre-
gation of all non-OECD countries, for the year 2010. This section describes our data sources
and the approach used to calibrate the common and country-specific parameters.
Population data – Our model is static and our objective is study how the size and the structure
by age and education of international migration affects the economy and the welfare of citizens
in the OECD countries. We combine two data sources that allow us to characterize the effects of
the stocks of recent and older migrants on the structure of the population in the year 2010. Ob-
viously, other aspects of immigrants are likely to affect their contributions to the economy (such
as the quality of education, age of arrival, return intentions, fertility, longevity, etc.) and are
disregarded here. We use population data from the United Nations.20 The database documents
the total and immigrant populations of all countries by age group and by year. We extracted
the 2000 and 2010 data for each OECD member state and we aggregated the rest of the world.
We distinguish between the two age categories in our model, individuals aged 25 to 64 (the
working-age group) and individuals aged 65 and over (the retirees).
As for the education structure of the population, we use the Database on Immigrants in OECD
countries (DIOC) described in Arslan et al. (2015). The data are collected by country of des-
tination and are mainly based on population censuses or administrative registers. The DIOC
database provides detailed information on the demographic characteristics, level of education
and labor market outcomes of the population of OECD member states. For the 2000 and 2010
census rounds, we extract information about the country of origin, age, and educational attain-
ment. This allows us to quantify the bilateral stocks of immigrants from all world countries and
the numbers of non-migrants in all OECD countries by education (college graduates and the less
educated) and by age (25 to 64, and 65 and over).21 These DIOC stocks are then rescaled to
match the aggregate population data of the United Nations, giving our measures of Lma,c. For the
rest of the world, we do not distinguish between natives and residents and use the population
data from the United Nations, and the education data from Barro and Lee (2013).
Table 1.B1 in the Appendix 1.B gives the structure of the population aged 25 and over for
all OECD member states in the year 2010. As far as emigration is concerned, we estimate
the number of emigrants from each OECD member state by aggregating the bilateral stocks
of migrants across destinations, by education level and age. Clearly, the size and structure of
the population would have been different if all migrants had been unable to leave their home
country. For each OECD country, Table 1.B2 shows the impact of global migration stocks (i.e.
stocks of immigrants and emigrants) on the proportion of foreigners, on the old-age dependency
ratio, and on the share of college graduates in the labor force in the year 2010.
As far as migration flows are concerned, we proceed as in Docquier et al. (2014) or Artuc
et al. (2015), and proxy net migration flows over the period 2000-2010 by taking the difference
between the stock in 2010 and the stock in 2000. As individuals usually move at a young age,
we only consider the difference in the stock of migrants aged 25 to 64. The size and structure
of the population would have also been different if these recent immigrants and emigrants had
20 See: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimatesage.shtml.
21 Censuses sometimes account for undocumented immigrants, at least in some countries like the US. This is not the
case in Europe. The Clandestino database gives lower-bound and upper-bound estimates of the stock of illegals
in EU countries (see Kraler and Rogoz, 2011). These percentages are usually low. In addition, these data do not
have any information on the origin, education levels, and age of migrants. For these reasons, we chose to ignore
illegal migration.
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been unable to move. For each OECD country, Table 1.B3 shows the impact of the 2000-10
net migration flows on the proportion of foreigners, on the old-age dependency ratio, and on the
share of college graduates in the labor force. Finally, Figure 1.B2 compares the effect of global
migration stocks (horizontal axis) and global migration flows (vertical axis) on population size,
old-age dependency, and human capital. Although the effects of the stocks exceed by far the
effects of the flows, they are strongly correlated (correlation rates of 0.70, 0.51 and 0.53 for
population, dependency and human capital, respectively).
Fiscal data – To calibrate fiscal policy, we combine three databases. First, comparable aggre-
gate data on public finances are obtained from the Annual National Accounts harmonized by the
OECD.22 These database reports aggregate public revenues and public expenditures by broad
category, as percentage of GDP. As for revenues, we distinguish between taxes based on income
(including social contributions and taxes on personal and corporate income), taxes based on con-
sumption (VAT and excise duties), and other taxes. As for expenditures, we distinguish between
social protection expenditures, education expenditures, and government consumption. For the
rest of the world, we average the fiscal data from Brazil, China, and India. Since our model rules
out the possibility of a budgetary deficit or surplus, we rescale all items so that the total govern-
ment budget is equal to the mean of the observed shares of public revenues and expenditures in
GDP for the year 2010. Second, we use the Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) of the OECD
to decompose social protection expenditures by program.23 The SOCX database includes inter-
nationally comparable statistics on public social expenditures at the program level, as well as
net social spending indicators. We extract data on expenditures linked to sickness and disability,
pension benefits, family and children, unemployment and other transfers, as percentage of total
social protection expenditures.
Finally, we disaggregate education expenditures and all social protection expenditures by edu-
cation level, age group, and legal status (natives versus foreigners) using the European Union
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) provided by Eurostat for European coun-
tries, and the fiscal profiles used in Chojnicki et al. (2011) for the United States. We extract
personal characteristics (such as country of birth, year of birth, and highest level of education
attained), data on social benefits (sickness benefits, disability benefits, survivor benefits, old-age
benefits, unemployment benefits, and education-related allowances), and the sampling weight
of each individual.
We compute the amount of benefits received by the representative individual from the eight
groups of residents distinguished in our model, and rescale each profile to match the aggregate
level obtained from the SOCX database. The resulting profiles capture cross-country differences
in the fiscal treatment of immigrants, their demand for social benefits (depending on age, age
of arrival, education, fertility, intentions to return etc.), and their eligibility to welfare programs.
For Canada, and Australia, we use the US profiles.24 For other countries, we use the average
OECD profiles, rescaled to match the aggregate public finance data of the country.
Table 1.B4 in the Appendix 1.B characterizes the fiscal policy of each OECD member state, as
percentage of GDP. Column 1 gives the aggregate amount of fiscal revenues and expenditures
under the balanced budget assumption. Columns 2 and 3 report the shares of income and con-
sumption taxes in GDP (used to calibrate tc and υc). Columns 6 to 9 give the structure of public
expenditures. General public spending and education expenditures in columns 4 and 5 form the
government consumption. To compute theGma,c profiles, we assume a constant amount of public
22 See https://data.oecd.org/
23 See https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/social-spending.htm
24 On the effect of age of arrival and (endogenous) return intentions, see Kirdar (2012).
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spending per inhabitant and use the EU-SILC profiles to allocate education expenditures across
the four groups of working-age adults. As for the Tma,c profiles, we aggregate health, old-age,
unemployment and family benefits, which are allocated across groups of individuals using the
EU-SILC profiles. We also include the residual category in column 10, which combines residual
transfers minus residual taxes. For these other net transfers, we assume a constant amount per
inhabitant.
The last two columns illustrate the net fiscal contribution of working-age individuals (column
11) and immigrants (column 12) for the year 2010. In all countries, public intervention involves
a fiscal redistribution from working-age individuals to retirees, which varies between 5.0 per-
cent of GDP in New Zealand and 17.5 percent in Luxembourg (the OECD average equals 10.8
percent). The last column gives the fiscal impact of the total stock of immigrants in 2010. It is
positive in 20 countries and negative in 14 countries, under the benchmark assumption that gov-
ernment consumption is proportional to population size. The fiscal impact varies between -1.2
percent of GDP in Chile to 5.0 percent in Switzerland (the OECD average equals 0.3 percent).
Common parameters – The model includes three common parameters, {, σS , σM}. The
elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods, , is estimated in the range of 3 to 8.4 by
Feenstra (1994). We take  = 4 as a benchmark value. As far as elasticities of substitution
between groups of worker are concerned (σS and σM ), we follow Docquier et al. (2014) and
use their intermediate value: σS = 1.75 and σM = 20. We consider alternative levels in the
robustness analysis.
Other parameters – The model also includes other parameters that vary across countries or
country pairs. These include {fc, θSc , θMc , Ac}c∈C , and bilateral trade costs [τcj ]c,j∈C .
As for the fixed cost of entry, fc, we use the Doing Business database and the World Devel-
opment Indicators from the World Bank (2010). We construct a synthetic indicator using three
proxies for the cost of entry: the number of days needed to fulfill the formal requirements to
establish a firm, the cost of starting a business (as percentage of GDP per capita), and the share
of new firms registered. For a given fc, we have ∆Bc/Bc = ∆L¯Tc /L¯
T
c from eq. (1.21). The
level of the entry cost is important for the rest of the calibration (it affects income per capita and
prices), but has no influence on the price and wage responsiveness to migration shocks. With-
out loss of generality, we normalize our synthetic indicator by its minimum value, obtained for
Norway, since the model considers homothetic preferences and production. The values obtained
for the other countries vary in the range of 1 to 3.64. For the rest of the world, we computed a
GDP-weighted sum of the 33 largest non-OECD countries. The firm preferences for each group
of workers (i.e. θSc , θ
M
c ) are computed to match the data on income disparities by education
level and origin. The data on the wage ratio between college graduates and the less educated are
taken from Hendricks (2004), while the data on the wage ratio between immigrants and non-
migrants come from Büchel and Frick (2005). Combining these sources with data on relative
population shares, we compute the firms’ preference parameters that match the actual labor in-
come shares in each country. Finally, the TFP residuals, Ac, are calibrated to fit the levels of
nominal GDP. Our macroeconomic data and country-specific parameters are provided in Table
1.B5 in the Appendix 1.B.
Wages and total factor productivity determine the unit cost of production, the price of domestic
goods (from eq. (1.15) and eq. (1.18)), and the total expenditures, Xc. Hence, the matrix
of bilateral costs, τcj , can be calibrated to match the matrix of adjusted trade flows between
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countries (adjustments are needed to balance exports and imports).25 These calibrated trade
costs are instrumental to spreading shocks across countries; we consider them as exogenous.
Validation – Our parametrization strategy consists in calibrating country-specific parameters
and trade costs so as to perfectly match the observed demographic, fiscal and economic charac-
teristics of countries and trade flows. We use all the degrees of freedom of the data to identify the
parameters needed. Consequently, our model is exactly “identified” and cannot produce a test
of its assumptions. In order to establish the relevance of our parametrization method, we exam-
ine whether our identified parameters exhibit realistic correlations with the related explanatory
variables, or reasonable properties:
• Our estimates of the fiscal impact of immigration exhibit a correlation of 0.45 with the
levels reported in Table 3.7 in OECD (2013), although the OECD does not impose a
balanced budget and constant tax rates across individuals.
• In our model, the variable Bc may be interpreted as an indicator of market size, and is
highly correlated with the population level observed (correlation of 0.99).
• The TFP levels can be compared to the measures of labor efficiency.26 The cross-country
correlation between the TFP variable Ac and the actual data on labor productivity is equal
to 0.72. One has to remember that the computed residual and TFP values incorporate
more than just the level of technology or labor productivity. For instance, they may be
affected by the quality of institutions, infrastructure, legislation, education, social capital,
etc.
• The nominal wages predicted by the model are in line with the actual data. The composite
wage rates Wc are correlated with the cross-section average annual wages reported in the
OECD database. The correlation is 0.85.
• Finally, our bilateral trade costs, calibrated to match the bilateral trade flows, are well
correlated with the traditional determinants of trade barriers. We have regressed our τcj
on standard bilateral variables that affect the volume of exports, obtaining very similar
results to those of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Silva and Tenreyro (2006), and
other gravity-like analyses of international trade.27
1.3.2 Benchmark results
To quantify the impact of migration on welfare, we compare the observed utility levels, as
defined in eq. (1.5), with counterfactual utility levels obtained when recent migrants were sent
25 The correlation between our predicted bilateral trade flows and the actual (unadjusted) data equals 0.99. It is not
equal to one because we adjust trade flows to balance exports and imports, and we constrain τcj to be larger than
or equal to one.
26 We consider the GDP per hour worked from the OECD database.
27 In our regression, the set of controls includes geographic distances between any two countries and dummies for
common border, common language, colonial ties, and the existence of a free trade agreement. The data are taken
from the CEPII gravity dataset. The estimates of our OLS regression are equal to 0.156 for distance, -0.324
for common border, -0.215 for common language, -0.258 for colonial ties, and -0.025 for free trade agreements.
They are all significant at the 1 percent threshold and the R2 equals 0.200. Similar results are obtained when
country-fixed effects are included.
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back to their home countries. For each type of worker, the change in utility is expressed as a
percentage deviation from the non-migration counterfactual:
∆Uma,c
Uma,c
=
(
Uma,c
)
Reference
− (Uma,c)Counterfactual(
Uma,c
)
Counterfactual
.
Hence, a positive difference implies a welfare gain due to global migration, while a negative one
implies a welfare loss.
In the benchmark analysis, the counterfactual consists in repatriating all the migrants that arrived
to their destination countries between 2000 and 2010. There are three reasons to focus on
recent migration flows, instead of stocks. First, recent migrants are less assimilated and are
likely to exhibit a stronger complementarity to native workers on the labor market. On the
contrary, the immigration stock includes old waves of better assimilated immigrants who are
now in retirement or have gradually become closer substitutes to natives on the labor market
(by way of comparison, we simulate the effect of repatriating the total stock of migrants in
Section 1.3.3). Second, recent empirical studies on the interactions between immigrants and
native workers are usually based on recent flows of workers (see Card, 2009, Docquier et al.,
2014, Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). Finally, recent legal migrants are younger and more educated
than older immigrants. Focusing on newer immigration enables us to shed light on the current
patterns of global migration.
The benchmark results are depicted in Figure 1.1. Countries are sorted in descending order
with respect to the average (or total) welfare effect. In Figure 1.1a, we first provide the aver-
age welfare impact of global migration for non-migrants, and its distribution by individual type
(low-skilled workers, high-skilled workers, and retirees). Figure 1.1b then focuses on the av-
erage welfare impact and distinguishes between intra-OECD and extra-OECD migration flows.
Finally, we apply the welfare decomposition method described in Section 1.2.5 to disentangle
the welfare impact on college-educated and less educated workers (see Figures 1.1c and 1.1d).
Winners and losers from global migration – Figure 1.1a identifies the winners and losers
from recent global migration flows. The average effect on non-migrants is positive in 28 OECD
countries, nil in France, and negative in 5 traditional countries of emigration. The greatest gains
are obtained in Spain (8.1 percent), Australia (7.9 percent), Canada (4.6 percent), Switzerland
(4.6 percent), Ireland (4.4 percent), and New Zealand (4.3 percent). Welfare losses are obtained
in Turkey (-0.5 percent), Slovakia (-1.7 percent), Mexico (-1.8 percent), Estonia (-3.8 percent),
and Poland (-3.8 percent). As stated above, we disregard remittances and overestimate the
losses incurred in the latter countries. The magnitude of the average effect is highly correlated
with the incidence of migration flows on population size (correlation of 0.91) and on the old-
age dependency ratio (correlation of -0.89). On the contrary, it is poorly correlated with the
migration-induced variation in the skill structure of the labor force (correlation of 0.20 with the
change in the proportion of college-educated workers).
Within countries, the welfare effects are heterogeneous across types of individuals. They are
positive for retirees in 31 countries (exceptions are Mexico, Estonia, and Poland). In our bench-
mark scenario, retirees do not work and only consume the transfers they receive from the gov-
ernment. They are only affected by the change in the ideal price index, which varies with the
domestic market size and availability of additional varieties of foreign goods.28 On the con-
trary, the effects on workers are also affected by fiscal and labor market effects (i.e. changes in
28 This assumption will be relaxed in the robustness section, in which we consider a scenario with endogenous
consumption tax rates.
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income tax rates and wages). Global migration is beneficial for college-educated natives in 28
countries (the same countries as above), and for the less educated in 22 countries only. Overall,
we identify many winners and a few losers. More precisely, there are seven countries combin-
ing average welfare gains and welfare losses for the less educated. These are countries where
recent migration flows are not too large (excluding strong market-size effects), and where recent
migration has reduced the proportion of college graduates in the labor force (Israel, Belgium,
Korea, Chile, Japan, Germany, and Iceland). Nevertheless, with the exception of Iceland and
Germany (-1.0 percent in utility), the welfare losses for the low-skilled are close to zero.
Moreover, our simulations indicate that recent global migration flows have increased the average
utility of non-migrants by 1.1 percent in the OECD (and by 0.8 percent if older cohorts of
migrants are included in the average), and have decreased the average utility of those left behind
by 0.3 percent in the rest of the world. Overall, a large majority of non-migrants in OECD
countries have benefited from recent migration flows. With a few exceptions, the within-country
effects are limited compared to the between-country ones. The correlation rates between the
average and group-specific welfare impacts are equal to 0.81 for college-educated workers, 0.91
for less educated workers, and 0.98 for retirees.
Intra-OECD vs Extra-OECD – In Figure 1.1b, we focus on the average welfare effect of
migration flows (i.e. between-country disparities) and distinguish between intra-OECD and
extra-OECD migration flows. Extra-OECD migration basically consists of an inflow of immi-
grants from non-OECD countries. On the contrary, intra-OECD migration is a zero-sum game
involving net immigration and net emigration countries. Another difference is that intra-OECD
migrants are on average more educated than extra-OECD migrants.
It comes out that the effect of extra-OECD migration is positive in 32 countries; the exceptions
are Poland and Estonia (average welfare effects of -0.3 and -2.7 percent, respectively), two
countries which send a substantial number of emigrants to Russia or other Eastern European
destinations. As far as intra-OECD migration is concerned, we identify 17 winners and 16 losers
(the effect is nil in Sweden). The effect is negative in traditional emigration countries (Turkey,
Slovakia, Hungary, Mexico, Estonia, and Poland), but also in Canada, New Zealand, Portugal,
Belgium, Korea, Chile, Japan, Iceland, Germany, and France. Welfare losses are usually small;
the largest effect is obtained in New Zealand (-1.2 percent), Iceland (-0.7 percent), and Belgium
(-0.6 percent). The gains are larger and mostly concentrated in a few countries (3.7 percent in
Switzerland, 2.0 percent in Spain, 1.9 percent in Ireland, 1.3 percent in Norway, and 1.2 percent
in Australia and Austria).
Overall, extra-OECD migration flows increase the average utility of non-migrants by 1.2 percent
in the OECD (and by 0.9 percent if older cohorts of migrants are included in the average), and
decrease the utility of those left behind by 0.3 percent in the rest of the world. Intra-OECD
migration flows decrease the average utility of non-migrants by 0.1 percent in the OECD. Hence,
the bulk of welfare gains from global migration is driven by extra-OECD migration, in line with
Di Giovanni et al. (2015) or Iranzo and Peri (2009). As stated above, extra-OECD immigration
is usually perceived in opinion poll surveys as a massive inflow of uneducated people trying to
gain access to the labor markets and welfare systems of rich countries; intra-OECD migration
is less frequently seen as problematic. As far as the economic effects are concerned, popular
perceptions are clearly at odds with the predictions of our model.
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Transmission channels – In Figures 1.1c and 1.1d, we disentangle the welfare impact on
college graduates and less educated non-migrants using the decomposition method explained
in Section 1.2.5. The residual general equilibrium effects are not reported here. Many studies
conducted on the United States or on a few European countries have demonstrated that the labor
market and fiscal effects of migration are relatively small. Our simulations show that these
effects can be much larger in other countries.
The standard deviation in the market-size effect equals .013, to be compared with .022 and
.014 for the labor market and fiscal effects, respectively. The labor market and fiscal channels
are important sources of heterogeneity across countries. However, the market-size effect is the
main source of welfare gains. Our simulations reveal that, on average, it increases the welfare
of all workers by 1.0 percent in the OECD. This is greater than the average fiscal effect (0.4
percent) and the average labor market effects (0.2 percent for college graduates and 0.1 percent
for the less educated).29 In addition, the correlation between the market-size and total effects is
large (0.85 for college-educated workers and 0.84 for the less educated).
Overall, focusing on the 28 countries where global migration has improved the welfare of college
graduates, the market-size effect is dominant in 14 cases (to be compared with 11 cases for the
labor market effect, and only 3 cases for the fiscal effect). Similarly, focusing on the 22 countries
where global migration has improved the welfare of the less educated, the market-size effect is
dominant in 16 cases (to be compared with 5 cases for the labor market effect, and 1 case for
the fiscal effect). As the market-size effect affects the utility of all the residents of a given
country identically, we conclude that the between-country consequences of global migration
exceed the within-country ones. The market-size and love-of-variety mechanisms have been
largely disregarded in the literature on the welfare consequences of migration (exceptions are
Di Giovanni et al., 2015, Iranzo and Peri, 2009). Our results suggest that market size is an
important missing ingredient in the existing literature.
1.3.3 Robustness checks
In this section, we conduct three types of robustness checks. First, we assess the robustness of
our results to three mechanisms included or not in our model. We simulate the model without
trade flows, with schooling externalities, or under alternative fiscal rules. Second, we analyze the
sensitivity of our results to the choice of two important elasticities: the elasticity of substitution
between goods in the utility function (governing the preference for variety), and the elasticity
of substitution between native and immigrant workers in the production function (governing
complementarities on the labor market). Figure 1.2 depicts the results of these two sets of
robustness checks. Third, we simulate the welfare effect of a repatriation of the total stock of
migrants (instead of recent migration flows) to their home country. The results of the stock
simulation are depicted in Figure 1.3.
The role of trade – International trade is a channel through which the market-size effect is
propagated across countries. A change in the mass of varieties in one country (due to a migration
shock) affects the mass of varieties available in all of its trade partners, ceteris paribus. Hence,
international trade is likely to mitigate the redistributive effects of global migration. To control
for the role of international trade in propagating the gains from migration, we conduct the same
counterfactual simulations assuming a closed-economy framework. We set all the pair-specific
29 On average, the residual general equilibrium effect equals 0.2 percent.
Chapter 1. The welfare impact of global migration 23
trade costs to infinity (τcj = ∞ ∀c 6= j), such that the bilateral trade flows are zeroed before
the shock (Xcj = 0 ∀c 6= j). Then, we simulate the effects of the repatriation counterfactual.
Figure 1.2a compares the welfare changes under autarky with those in the benchmark. We notice
that the welfare effects with and without trade are almost identical. This is because our model has
a single production sector, which aggregates the tradable and non-tradable sectors. Therefore,
our calibrated trade costs are rather high. Distinguishing between a tradable and a non-tradable
sector could increase the differences between the two scenarios (i.e. with and without trade)
if market-size effects are larger in the tradable sector (i.e. if product differentiation is more
important in the tradable sector). Moreover, in the absence of trade, both welfare gains in the
most attractive countries and welfare losses in emigration countries are greater. Hence, existing
trade flows slightly smooth the welfare impact of global migration.
Schooling externalities – Our benchmark model assumes exogenous levels of TFP. However,
recent evidence of a schooling externality on TFP has been identified at the country level (e.g.
Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005, Vandenbussche et al., 2006), or at the metropolitan level (Ace-
moglu and Angrist, 2000, Ciccone and Peri, 2006, Iranzo and Peri, 2009, Moretti, 2004a,b). We
thus simulate a variant of our model in which the economy-wide TFP level, Ac, is a concave
function of the average proportion of high-skilled workers in the economy, κc:
Ac = A¯cκ
λ
c , with κc ≡
LHw,c + L
h
w,c
LTw,c
, (1.24)
where λ is the elasticity of Ac with respect to κc, and A¯c is an exogenous scale factor. As in
De la Croix and Docquier (2012), we use λ = 0.3. This roughly corresponds to the average
elasticity of Ac to κc in a simple cross-country OLS regression.
The results are presented in Figure 1.2a. Not surprisingly, schooling externalities change the
magnitude of the effect in countries where global migration affects human capital. The gains are
greater in countries such as Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and New Zealand, while the losses
are more important in Belgium, Iceland, Germany, Israel, or Slovakia.
Assessment of the fiscal impact – In our benchmark simulation, the average fiscal impact
amounts to 0.4 percent: it is smaller than the average market-size effect, but greater than the
labor market effect. To assess the robustness of our results to the fiscal rule and to the cali-
bration of the fiscal bloc, we consider three variants of fiscal policy. First, we assume that the
income tax rate is constant and that the consumption tax rate adjusts to balance the government
budget (see eq. (1.23)). Under this variant, labeled as “VAT adjusted”, retirees are affected
by the fiscal adjustment. Second, we assume that all public consumption expenditures (except
education) are constant. Under this variant, labeled as “Less congestion”, homothetic changes
in population size induce variations in the tax rate. Finally, we introduce an exogenous income
tax gap, tgc , between immigrants and natives (i.e. t
mig
c = tnatc + t
gap
c ) and calibrate it so that our
initial equilibrium in 2010 perfectly fits the estimated fiscal impact of immigration provided in
Table 3.7 in OECD (2013). As stated above, in the benchmark, the correlation rate between our
estimated fiscal impact of immigration and the OECD estimates was equal to 0.45. This variant
is labeled as “As OECD”. The results are depicted in Figure 1.2b. They are strongly robust to
the choice of the fiscal rule and to the calibration of the initial fiscal impact of immigration,
however they are more sensitive to the relationship between the amount of public spending and
the population size. Not surprisingly, welfare gains are larger when a fraction of public spend-
ing is not affected by immigration. On the contrary, welfare losses are greater in net emigration
countries under this scenario.
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Sensitivity to parameters – We now investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to
the calibration of the parameters. In Figure 1.2c, we let , the elasticity of substitution between
varieties in eq. (1.1), vary between 3 and 7 (the benchmark value equals 4). This virtually
covers the range of values provided in Feenstra (1994). In Figure 1.2d, we let σM , the elasticity
of substitution between native and immigrant workers in eq. (1.8a-1.8b), vary between 15 and
25 (the benchmark value equals 20).
Even though a higher (lower) value of  weakens (strengthens) the sensitivity of price indexes
to shocks in the mass of varieties (which directly influences the magnitude of the market-size
effect), our results are extremely robust to changes in . As far as labor complementarities are
concerned, greater effects are identified when σM is smaller. The lower the substitution between
different labor types, the stronger the reaction of efficient labor composites to the changes in
supplies of workers, and the more dispersed the welfare effects of these shocks.
Global migration stocks – Finally, we consider a last counterfactual, which consists in repa-
triating the total stock of migrants (whatever their year of entry) to their source countries. This
allows us to assess whether the negative opinions about immigration and emigration reported
in opinion polls could be motivated by adverse effects of older waves of migration. The results
of the stock simulation are depicted in Figure 1.3, which follows exactly the same structure as
Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.3a identifies the winners and losers from global migration stocks.30 The average wel-
fare impact is positive in 24 OECD countries (against 28 for the flow simulation) and its mag-
nitude is usually greater than in the benchmark. The largest gains are obtained in Luxembourg,
Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and Ireland. Welfare losses are obtained in Poland, Mexico,
Slovakia, and Turkey, but also in richer countries such as Iceland, Korea, France, and Portugal.
The magnitude of the average effect is highly correlated with the incidence of migration flows on
population size (correlation of 0.77) and on the old-age dependency ratio (correlation of -0.32).
The welfare effects are heterogeneous across types of individuals. They are positive for re-
tirees in 33 countries (the only exception is Mexico). Global migration is beneficial for college-
educated natives in 22 countries, and for the less educated in 27 countries. Welfare losses are
small, except in traditional emigration countries (including Portugal), but as stated above, we do
not account for remittances.
The correlation rates between the average and group-specific welfare impacts are equal to 0.96
for college-educated workers, 0.98 for less educated workers, and 0.87 for retirees. This con-
firms that with a few exceptions, within-country effects are limited compared to between-country
effects.
Figure 1.3b distinguishes between intra-OECD and extra-OECD migration flows. As in the
benchmark, extra-OECD migration increases the average welfare of non-migrants in 33 coun-
tries (the exception is Poland), whereas intra-OECD migration induces 14 winners and 20 losers.
Overall, extra-OECD migration stocks increase the average utility of non-migrants by 2.4 per-
cent in the OECD, and decrease the utility of those left behind by 1.7 percent in the rest of the
world. Intra-OECD migration stocks decrease the average utility of non-migrants by 0.6 percent
in the OECD. Again, the bulk of welfare gains from global migration are driven by extra-OECD
migration.
30 Figure 1.B3 in the Appendix 1.B compares the average welfare impact of migration stocks and migration flows.
The correlation rate between these effects is equal to 0.71.
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Figures 1.3c and 1.3d disentangle the welfare impact on college graduates and less educated
citizens using the decomposition method explained in Section 1.2.5. For the stock simulation,
the standard deviation in the market-size effect equals 0.034. For college graduates, standard
deviations in fiscal and labor market effects equal 0.050 and 0.034; and for the less educated,
they equal 0.057 and 0.030, respectively. However, the market size remains the main source of
welfare gains. On average, it increases the welfare of all workers by 2.6 percent in the OECD.
This is greater than the average fiscal effect (1.2 percent) and the average labor market effect
(0.2 percent for the less educated and -0.4 percent for college graduates). The correlation be-
tween the market-size and total effects is large (0.84 for college-educated workers and 0.79 for
the less educated). Overall, focusing on the 22 countries where global migration has improved
the welfare of college graduates, the market-size effect is the dominant effect in 14 cases. Simi-
larly, focusing on the 27 countries where global migration has improved the welfare of the less
educated, the market-size effect is the dominant effect in 20 cases. This confirms that the market
size is instrumental to explaining the welfare consequences of migration.
1.4 Conclusion
The current economic and demographic situation faced by many OECD countries has kindled
debates over the economic impact of migration. Natives in developed countries predominantly
see immigration as a source of adverse economic effects, not as a stimulus for greater competi-
tiveness and welfare gains. This is especially the case for immigration flows from less developed
countries. The academic literature has not confirmed these presumptions. Isolated studies of the
labor market and fiscal impacts of migration have shown that the economic effects are rather
small and presumably positive in many countries. However, with a few exceptions, the existing
literature has imperfectly captured the complex interactions between the economic mechanisms
through which global migration affects the welfare of non-migrants.
To assess the welfare impact of the current state of global migration (i.e. immigration of for-
eigners and emigration of natives) on OECD citizens, we develop a multi-country model that
combines three economic transmission channels of migration shocks: the labor market effect,
the fiscal effect, and the market-size effect. Borrowed from the trade literature, the latter arises
from the relationship between the size of the aggregate demand (influenced by population move-
ments) and the variety of goods available to consumers in a monopolistic environment with fixed
entry costs.
Our integrated, open-economy model enables us to account for the interactions between these
channels, as well as for the interdependencies between countries. It can be calibrated to per-
fectly fit the economic and demographic characteristics of the 34 OECD countries and the rest
of the world, and the trade flows between them in the year 2010. We use the model to evaluate
the utility level of non-migrant OECD citizens under the current allocation of the world popula-
tion, and under a counterfactual allocation with no recent migration (as if the last decadal wave
of migration had been nil). We show that recent global migration flows induced many winners
and a few losers among OECD citizens. The group of winners represents 69.1 percent of the
OECD non-migrant population aged 25 and over; this percentage increases to 83.0 percent if
one only considers the 22 countries whose GDP per capita was above USD 30,000 in the year
2010. Although labor market and fiscal effects are non negligible in some countries, the greatest
source of welfare gains comes from the market-size effect. It follows that the between-country
consequences of global migration exceed the within-country ones. Welfare gains are obtained
for virtually all citizens in traditional immigration countries. Welfare losses are essentially due
28 Migration, Human Capital, and Growth in a Globalized Economy
to the (intra-OECD) emigration of a country’s nationals. Using the estimated elasticities from
the empirical literature, we find that the market size is instrumental in explaining the welfare
consequences of migration. It is an important missing ingredient in the majority of studies on
the welfare consequences of migration. Still our model with homogeneous preferences and
competitive labor market structures leaves out a discussion of the employment effects of inter-
national migration. Accounting for labor market rigidities and origin-specific determinants of
labor participation rates could help us refining the magnitude of the labor market, market size
and fiscal impact of migration. We leave these challenging issues for further research.
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Appendices
1.A Stylized facts 1960-2010
Concerns about migration have been correlated with the evolution of the magnitude of migration
flows. Some stylized facts are provided in Figure 1.A1. On the one hand, the average share of
immigrants in the population of OECD economies increased from 4.4 in 1960 to 9.5 percent in
2010 (see the bold line in Fig. 1.A1a). In particular, the average share of immigrants originating
from developing countries increased from 1.4 to 5.6 percent.31 By the year 2010, the proportion
of foreigners in the population exceeded 10 percent in 21 countries, and was above 20 percent
in 5 countries (Australia, Canada, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Switzerland). On the other
hand, the evolution of emigration has been less spectacular in OECD countries. On average, the
ratio of the stock of emigrants to the population only increased from 3.0 to 3.9 percent between
1960 and 2010 (see the bold line in Fig. 1.A1b). However, disparities across countries are
important. By the year 2010, five OECD member states exhibited emigration rates above 10
percent (Ireland, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, and Portugal) and 12 others exhibited
rates above 5 percent. In most cases, emigrants are much more educated than those left behind,
as shown in Artuc et al. (2015).
Such migration movements have a strong incidence on the socio-demographic characteristics of
the 34 OECD member states. In Fig. 1.A1c, we focus on net migration flows (entries minus
exits) observed between 2000 and 2010, and compute the effect of these flows on three variables
of interest, the size of the population aged 25 and over, the old-age dependency ratio (i.e. ratio
of the population aged 65+ over the population aged 25-64), and the proportion of college grad-
uates in the population aged 25-64. The effect of migration flows on population size is positive
in 29 cases and negative in 5 cases only (it varies between -7.5 percent in Estonia and 12.5 per-
cent in Spain). It is negatively correlated with the effect on the dependency ratio, which varies
between -4.5 percent in Spain and 2.8 percent in Estonia. As far as human capital is concerned,
the effects are very heterogeneous. Recent migration flows increased the proportion of college
graduates in six immigration countries (Australia, Canada, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Switzer-
land, and the United Kingdom) and Estonia (due to low-skilled emigration flows). It decreased
human capital in 14 countries (Spain, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Israel, Finland, Slovenia, Iceland,
Denmark, Belgium, Germany, Korea, Slovakia, and Poland), and induced negligible effects in
the 13 other cases. Figure 1.A1d illustrates the effect of total migration stocks on the same vari-
ables of interest. With a few exceptions, the effects on old-age dependency and human capital
are similar to those of migration flows. On the contrary, the effect on the size of the population
aged 25 and over is much larger (it varies between -13.9 percent in Mexico to 45.1 percent in
Australia).
By changing the size and structure of the population, immigration and emigration are sources of
welfare costs and benefits for non-movers. Through the structure of the labor force, migration
flows affect the relative wages of high-skilled and low-skilled workers, as well as the income
gap between natives and older migrants. Through changes in the age and education structures
of the population, they affect the number of net contributors to (and net beneficiaries from) the
welfare state and other public interventions. Labor mobility also affects the geographic distri-
bution of workers and the aggregate demand for domestic goods and services, which alters the
number of entrepreneurs and products available for consumption in all countries. Skill-biased
migration can also influence the speed of knowledge accumulation and innovation, governing
the evolution of total factor productivity (TFP). The welfare impact of global migration results
from the complex interactions between these effects.
31 More pronounced changes were observed in the richest OECD member states whose GDP per capita was above
USD 30,000 in the year 2010.
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1.B Data appendix
Tables:
• 1.B1: Population size and structure in 2010 in the OECD member states
• 1.B2: Effect of migration stocks on the population structure
• 1.B3: Effect of 2000-10 migration net flows on the population structure
• 1.B4: Fiscal policy in the OECD member states
• 1.B5: Macroeconomic data and calibrated, country-specific parameters
Figures:
• 1.B2: Socio-demographic impact of 2010 migration stocks (X-axis) and 2000-10 migra-
tion flows (Y-Axis) as percentage of deviation from the no-migration counterfactual
• 1.B3: Average welfare impact of 2010 migration stocks (X-axis) vs 2000-10 migration
flows (Y-Axis) as percentage of deviation from the no-migration
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(A) Effect on population size
(B) Effect on the dependency ratio
(C) Effect on the proportion of college graduates in the labor force
FIGURE 1.B2: Socio-demographic impact of 2010 migration stocks (X-axis) and 2000-10
migration flows (Y-Axis) as percentage of deviation from the no-migration counterfactual.
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FIGURE 1.B3: Average welfare impact of 2010 migration stocks (X-axis) vs 2000-10 migra-
tion flows (Y-Axis) as percentage of deviation from the no-migration counterfactual.
Chapter 2
Trading Goods or Human Capital: The
Gains and Losses from Economic
Integration
Abstract1
The chapter quantifies the economic consequences of liberalizing migration in the OECD and
compares them to a hypothetical liberalization of trade across the OECD. Firstly, I investigate the
bilateral migration and trade agreements between the EU and Australia, Canada, the US, Turkey,
and Japan, which are of major importance in the current political debate. Secondly, I show
that the overall impact of reducing all legal restrictions on migration in the OECD is moderate
(1.6 percent in real GDP), whereas the gains from zeroing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade
among all the OECD economies are slightly lower (1.1 percent in real GDP). Less restrictive
trade leads to a reduction in inequalities among countries, while free migration is beneficial for
only a couple of rich economies, and increases the disparities among the OECD members. In
addition to theoretical findings, the numerical results allow to examine the relations between
trade and migration. Their direction (either substitutability or complementarity) depends on the
type of shock imposed in the system.
Keywords: migration, international trade, computational general equilibrium, liberalization.
JEL: C68, F22, J24.
2.1 Introduction
The members of the OECD constitute one of the world’s most integrated economic systems.
Despite this fact, reducing the legal barriers for goods’ and population mobility, at the regional
and global levels, is currently a negotiated issue within political and economic forums. Both
decision-makers and scientists discuss intensively the possibility of implementing policies that
would deepen the consolidation of the OECD economic area in terms of labor movement and
international trade. This chapter provides quantitative arguments for this debate. I investigate
1 The paper is revised for publication in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
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the economic consequences of a hypothetical partial and full economic integration among the
OECD countries, understood as removing the formal visa barriers for international migration,
and tariff and non-tariff restrictions for international trade.
Until recently, many political and economic actions have already been undertaken to facili-
tate the international flows of goods. As early as in 1960, the European Free Trade Agree-
ment was established by the western-European nations. This path-breaking treaty encouraged
other authorities to develop local trade agreements and to strengthen the regional integration of
economies. On the contrary, multi-country free migration unions are rather rare (apart from the
EU states or the bilateral Australia - New Zealand treaty), indicating that the liberalization of
migration is not a commonly preferred policy. Today, during the ongoing discussions about the
liberalizing of trade, capital flows (and, possibly in the future, migration) between the European
Union and other major partners (the United States, Canada, Japan or Turkey) the question of
gains from abandoning the legal trade (and migration) barriers is being re-investigated. In fact,
in 2014 the EU concluded the dialog on a vital agreement with Canada which removes tariff
and non-tariff barriers to trade for more than 99 percent of products. Simultaneously, intensive
bilateral negotiations with the US, Japan and Turkey give rise to the expectation that consecutive
treaties would be signed in the future.2 Turkey is the only non-EU country which is involved
in bilateral discussions concerning the elimination of visa barriers.3 The academic literature
on the evaluation of the proposed trade and migration policies is limited, which suggests that
the arguments for or against entering into particular partnerships are more political rather than
economic. This chapter tries to fill this research gap by providing an assessment of economic
consequences of international agreements, using a multi-country model of migration and trade.
The research questions addressed in this chapter oscillate around analyzing the economic effects
of liberalizing migration and trade. In particular, the main goal is a quantitative assessment of
a hypothetical reduction of formal visa restrictions across the OECD, relative to the potential
gains from removing (non-)tariff barriers among the OECD countries. According to the current
political strategy of the EU, I shall consider the scenarios of regional migration and trade agree-
ments between the EU and five potential partners (Australia, Canada, Japan, Turkey and the US).
Several simulations are run, in order to assess the economic implications for the natives living
in Europe and in the partner countries. The results of these exercises show that preferential
trade agreements have a moderate impact on the macroeconomic performance of the European
economies. Furthermore, they are mutually beneficial for both partners. By contrast, a liber-
alization of migration barriers induces more visible effects, which are positive for destinations
(namely: Australia, Canada and the US) and harmful for sending countries (that is Turkey and,
to a lesser extent, Japan). The gains from migration are exclusive, which implies that in some
cases the natives in the EU may lose significantly.
Another scenario assumes the elimination of visas and (non-)tariff barriers among all the OECD
economies. Interestingly, the results demonstrate that the first policy produces substantially
positive consequences for only a few states,4 whereas a full liberalization of trade is advanta-
geous for all the OECD members. However, at the aggregate, migration liberalization has once
again stronger effects than the intra-OECD free trade agreement. Assuming the benchmark
parametrization, the former scenario brings an overall gain of 1.6 percent in terms of the real
GDP of the OECD, whereas the latter increases real GDP by 1.1 percent. The main conclusion
2 Details on the currently negotiated agreements between the EU and all the partners mentioned in this chapter may
be found on the European Commission’s web page.
3 The document called “Roadmap towards a visa-free regime with Turkey” is published on the EC website.
4 The gains in real wages above 1 percent are obtained for: New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the
US.
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from these exercises may be summarized as follows. The removal of legal barriers to migration
and trade among the OECD countries has roughly similar aggregated economic effects, but has
various distributive consequences for the particular states. What is more, a shock imposed on
one phenomenon causes an endogenous reaction of the other.
This study differs from the previous ones in several aspects. In order to quantify and compare
the effects of hypothetical liberalization policies, a general equilibrium model is proposed. I as-
sume endogenous migration and trade among 34 OECD countries and the Rest of the World,
heterogeneous labor (low/high-skilled and domestic/foreign workers) and homogeneous firms
within a given country. In the simulations, the wages, prices, trade and migration flows, and the
masses of varieties of goods are endogenized. I base on the approach towards modeling interna-
tional trade, inspired by Di Giovanni et al. (2015) and developed in Aubry et al. (2014). Global
flows of migrants are described using a random utility model in the spirit of McFadden (1984),
which was implemented for a global economy by Docquier et al. (2015). The proposed frame-
work enables to conduct analysis of various liberalization policies concerning both international
trade and migration. The novelty of this approach consists in the possibility of comparing the
relative magnitudes of both phenomena in a unified, multi-country, general equilibrium frame-
work. Secondly, I use alternative calibration strategies to the ones presented in Di Giovanni
et al. (2015) (concerning international trade module) and Docquier et al. (2015) (when it comes
to modeling international migration). Finally, I take advantage of the possibility to model trade
and migration simultaneously, and I contribute to the literature on relations between migration
and trade (see Felbermayr et al., 2012). The nexus between flows of goods and flows of people is
investigated in a general equilibrium context, making use of analytical and numerical methods.
The results show that substitutability or complementarity between the two phenomena depends
on the type of shock introduced in the system (either to bilateral migration or trade costs).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related litera-
ture. In Section 2.3 the theoretical model is introduced. Section 2.4 discusses the data, and
the calibration procedure. The results of simulations are delivered in Section 2.5. Section 2.6
summarizes some robustness checks, and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
The literature on the consequences of liberalizing migration is fairly scarce. There are some
extremely optimistic estimates of gains (at the world level) from global reduction in barriers
to labor mobility, which range from over 40 percent to even 150 percent in terms of welfare
(Clemens, 2011, Hamilton and Whalley, 1984, Iregui, 2003, Klein and Ventura, 2007, 2009,
Moses and Letnes, 2004). However, the recent evidence by Docquier et al. (2015) gives rise to
a conjecture that these huge benefits are only illusory, since the existence of bilateral, private
(non-visa) migration costs diminishes the overall gains up to 7-18 percent at most. According to
their approach, the liberalization of migration means reducing the legal (visa) barriers for labor
mobility. Using a dynamic model, with endogenous fertility and education, Delogu et al. (2014)
find that in the short run the effects of global liberalization of labor movements may bring up to
20 percent in GDP per capita. The long term impact of free migration is substantially greater,
and amounts at 50 percent of GDP per worker in the next 50 years. Di Giovanni et al. (2015)
construct a multi-country model with exogenous migration and endogenous trade, including
remittances. They find that the realized levels of migration are beneficial for both receiving as
well as sending countries (the welfare impacts are up to 5 to 10 percent).
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Plenty of theoretical and empirical studies quantify the macroeconomic consequences of lib-
eralizing trade in the global context. Estimates range from practically no positive effects to
benefits of a magnitude of several percentage points (Anderson and Yotov, 2011, Francois et al.,
2005). Some developments of the New Trade Theory magnify these results.5 Eaton and Kortum
(2002) and Caliendo and Parro (2014) depart from the monopolistically competitive framework
by proposing a Ricardian model with which they evaluate the counterfactual scenarios of elimi-
nating geographical and tariff barriers to trade. In the literature, there is a consensus that bilateral
trade tariffs constitute a small fraction of contemporary trade barriers. The majority is due to
the non-tariff restrictions. For instance, Anderson and Neary (2003, 2005) and Looi Kee et al.
(2009) quantify tariff and non-tariff barriers for international trade and compute the potential
gains from removing both types of restrictions.
In recent years, we observe an intensification of the debate concerning the liberalization of both
trade and migration between the United States and the European Union. The potential gains
from reducing all trade barriers between these two partners were calculated by the CEPR for the
European Commission.6 A report published by Francois et al. (2013b) states that the benefits
from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) for the EU are estimated at the
level of 150 billion dollars (each year), whereas the US would get about 130 billion dollars.7
The increase in GDP in the rest of the world’s countries may reach almost 130 billion dollars.
The authors conclude that EU exports to the US would rise by 28 percent, which translates into
a 6 percent increase in total EU exports. A report by Ecorys for the European Commission
(Francois et al., 2013a) finds that the elimination of all (tariff and non-tariff) barriers between
the two parties would bring growth 0.7 percent for the EU and 0.3 percent for the US in terms
of GDP in five years. When it comes to individual incomes, the changes are similar to the
previous results: 0.8 percent for the EU and 0.3 percent in terms of lifetime earnings. Trade is
also expected to increase. Exports from the EU would rise by 2.1 percent, while exports from
the US would go up by 6.1 percent. Additionally, the report elaborates on the effects of TTIP
for different sectors of both economies. The recent paper by Aichele et al. (2014) estimates the
economic consequences of imposing the TTIP in a Ricardian model grounding on Eaton and
Kortum (2002). By considering various scenarios of deep and shallow integration, the authors
investigate the general equilibrium implications of reducing both tariff and non-tariff barriers
to trade. In a multi-country and multi-industry model, they find that the long-run changes in
per capita income range between 2.1 percent to 2.7 percent for the EU and the US respectively.
On top of that, signing the transatlantic trade partnership would bring positive consequences
for the rest of the world, at the level of 1.3 percent. Unfortunately, there is a lack of similar
quantitative arguments for the discussion concerning liberalization policies between the EU and
other partners considered in this chapter. Moreover, no estimates are available for the potential
consequences of liberalizing migration between the EU and the US.
2.3 The model
Consider a multi-country version of the model developed by Krugman (1980).8 I set up a system
of N , one-sector economies in which skill-heterogeneous labor is the only input for production.
5 The literature proposed a wide range of trade externalities, such as: firm heterogeneity, endogenous markups,
TFP externatities, (Arkolakis et al., 2012, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2013, Feenstra, 2010, Markusen, 2013,
Melitz, 2003, Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008, Melitz and Redding, 2014, 2015, Melitz and Trefler, 2012)
6 For more information, see the memo by EC: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-211_en.htm
7 Expressed as the changes in nominal GDP, these gains equal 1 percent for the EU and 0.8 percent for the US.
8 The equations of the model and the definition of competitive equilibrium are outlined in Appendix 2.B.
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An individual consumes a basket of horizontally differentiated goods, each of which is produced
by a single manufacturer. In every country a continuum of homogeneous firms operates on a
monopolistically competitive market. The general equilibrium in the system of N economies
comprises an equalization of labor demand and supply, setting the mass of entrepreneurs and
clearing the goods market which makes the trade flows balanced in every country.9
A similar model is proposed by Di Giovanni et al. (2015), who assume two-sector economies
(traded and non-traded goods), heterogeneous firms and a differentiation between the short-
run and long-run impact of (exogenous) migration shocks. The authors also include the flows
of remittances.10 A simplified version of the model developed in this chapter is presented in
Aubry et al. (2014). In contrast to what is analyzed in Di Giovanni et al. (2015) and Aubry
et al. (2014), I concentrate here on endogenous flows of both migration and trade, triggered
by the liberalizations of legal (reducible) barriers to migration and trade. These two papers
quantify the welfare impact of actual migration flows, disregarding individuals’ endogenous
decisions about migration. In the proposed approach, the key assumption is that individuals can
freely choose their place of living, by comparing real wages and bilateral migration costs across
countries, as in Docquier et al. (2015). In contrast to Docquier et al. (2015), I take into account
endogenous trade flows in a general equilibrium framework, whereas these authors construct a
partial equilibrium model without trade. Therefore, considering this approach, a shock to any
bilateral, legal migration barrier or any bilateral tariff or non-tariff barrier to trade, induces cross-
country labor reallocation, in the sense that some agents respond to it via migration. Finally, the
relations between migration and trade after imposing exogenous shocks in the global economy
are investigated.
2.3.1 Preferences and demand
An agent, who is characterized by either low or high education level (labeled by superscripts
s ∈ {l, h} for non-college or college-education respectively), born in country j, and living in
country i, strives to maximize her nested utility function, given by:
U sij = ln
[(
1− csij
)
usi
]
+ ξsij , (2.1)
where csij describes the skill-specific, effort to migrate from country j to country i. Following
Docquier et al. (2015), all those country-pair-specific values are decomposed into the cost of
obtaining a visa (a legal barrier) and other private costs. The additive term ξij is an individual-
specific and country-pair-specific stochastic variable, which stands for the subjective taste for
emigrating from country j to i. Furthermore, the inner utility function, usi , represents the gain
from consuming a bundle of goods by a resident in country i. Assume that the agent’s prefer-
ences towards different consumption goods are homothetic, and are mapped by a CES utility
9 Having in mind the conclusions from Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) and Melitz and Redding (2015), I nev-
ertheless decided to consider a relatively simple approach towards modeling international trade due to several
arguments. Firstly, I propose a framework that is certainly characterized by a unique general equilibrium. Adding
endogenous migration to a model with TFP externalities to trade may lead to multiple equilibria. Then, I would
like to calibrate the model imposing the minimal number of parameter values. With many sectors and a distri-
bution of firms’ TFP, one would need another set of cross-demand elasticities and distribution parameters which
are not well identified for all the countries of interest. Finally, using this approach, one is able to draw simple
analytical solutions concerning the relations between trade and migration.
10 Since in this model I deal only with developed countries, and the migration shock is an intra-OECD one (so that the
North-North migration is predominantly affected) the flows of remittances are of less importance in comparison
to the sample used by Di Giovanni et al. (2015).
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function defined over a set of continuum varieties available in the destination country.11 There-
fore, consumers of type s in country i maximize the explicit inner utility function:
usi =
[
N∑
n=1
∫ Bn
0
xsin(k)
−1
 dk
] 
−1
, (2.2)
where xsin(k) stands for the amount of variety k produced in country n, exported to country i,
and then consumed by an individual, who belongs to group s. Bn is the measure of the set of
varieties manufactured in country n, and  represents the elasticity of substitution between any
two varieties.
Solving for the individual’s indirect utility function, and plugging it into (2.1), one obtains that
the optimal utility depends on the real wage net of bilateral migration cost. This value measures
the welfare of a particular type of worker living in country i:12
U sij =
 ln
[
wsi
Pi
]
+ ξii, if j = i,
ln
[(
1− csij
)
ws−i
Pi
]
+ ξij , if j 6= i.
(2.3)
The aggregate variable: Pi is a country-specific measure of a cost of consumption baskets opti-
mally chosen by all individuals living in country i. Thus, it may be interpreted as an indicator
of prices in i, or simply a price index.
2.3.2 Production and firms
In each economy i there is a continuum of homogeneous firms that choose to produce differ-
ent varieties of the consumption good (indexed by k ∈ [0, Bi]). Consider a monopolistically
competitive framework under the assumption of a single input required for production (which
is heterogeneous labor). Low/high-skilled and natives/migrants are imperfect substitutes, which
leads to a nested CES production function (for further details see Appendix 2.B). Firms decide
about the demand for different types of workers by solving a cost minimization problem, and
select the optimal input of low or high-skilled, native or foreign labor, taking the equilibrium
11 A CES utility function over differentiated consumption goods is general enough to capture the love for variety,
through an imperfect substitution of goods. Since the elasticity of substitution between all goods is identical across
all the pairs of countries (unconditionally on the origin of a particular variety), one can relate  to the elasticity of
trade value with respect to the trade cost τij , see eq. 2.4. Although this parameter is aggregated across all goods,
the literature provides its precise measure, which, indirectly, allows to draw conclusions about the value of . The
same type comment (related to the empirical quantification of the parameters that represent elasticities) relates to
the definitions of production function and efficient labor supply.
12 This measure of welfare of natives and migrants considers not only the gains due to changes in nominal remu-
nerations and the price effects of migration, but also the updating of idiosyncratic values of ξij . Therefore, a full
measure of welfare change (not only due to quantifiable economic determinants, represented by real wages, but
also to unobservable components - that is the fact that one has an opportunity to live in a country j which she
prefers more than her homeland: ξij > ξii) would be equal to conditional expected utility from living in country
i. Following De Palma and Kilani (2007), who prove a stronger property of equalization of conditional distribu-
tions across choices, this variable is equal to: E(Usi ) = ln
∑N
k=1 expU
s
ik. In this chapter, I concentrate only on
the economic effects of migration, disregarding the potential gains from this ‘‘better match’’ between people’s
preferences towards destinations and countries. Therefore, from now on, the term ‘‘welfare gains’’ refers to the
gains in real wages only.
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wages as given.13 After maximizing operational profits, exploiting the information on the con-
sumers demand, they decide on the level of prices, and set them equal to a constant margin plus
the marginal cost of production.
Countries are characterized by entry barriers for the entrepreneurs. In order to run their pro-
duction, each firm has to spend a certain amount on (human) resources paid out exclusively for
non-production purposes. Since the entry is free, in the equilibrium, the operational profits are
equal to the value of the fixed cost. After aggregating across all firms in country i, one obtains
the following expression: Bi = L¯Ti /fi, where L¯
T
i stands for the supply of efficient labor in
country i (which is a nested CES composite of all types of workers employed for both produc-
tion purposes and to cover the entry cost) and fi is the fixed cost of entry expressed as a number
of efficient labor units.
In the equilibrium, the consumption good market clears and trade is balanced in each country.
Individuals are not allowed to save and all the firms earn zero profits, so that the total wage
bill equals the value added (GDP) Xi = WiL¯Ti . Considering the balanced trade condition, one
arrives at a well known formulation of the gravity equation:
Xij
Xj
=
Xi (Pi/τij)
−1∑N
n=1Xn (Pn/τnj)
−1 , (2.4)
which imposes that the ratio of exports from country j to i to the GDP level in country j is a
function of country i’s size, its price level and the bilateral costs of trade τij . Finally, the labor
market clears, which is equivalent to determining the equilibrium wages for each labor type:
(wli, w
h
i , w
l
−i, w
h
−i respectively).
14
2.3.3 Endogenizing migration decisions
Let us now define the process of endogenous cross-country labor flows as a consequence of
individual reactions to economic incentives. The decision concerning the choice of the country
of residence is reached by comparing the real wage levels net of migration costs (see eq. 2.3).
In particular, as in the previous analysis, the utility is a sum of a deterministic and a random
component. The first term is equivalent to the value of indirect utility (derived in the previous
section) net of migration cost. As such, the bilateral cost of migration is expressed as a share of
real income which is lost due to moving expenditures or legal restrictions. Notice that ∀i, s csii =
0. Explicitly, I assume that each person is perfectly informed about the quality of life in all of
the analyzed countries and the effort attributed to potential emigration.
The last term in the utility function (2.3), that is the random component: ξij , models individual
tastes towards emigration that are different across individuals. Assume that ξij is drawn from
a Type I Extreme Value Distribution (EVD) with a zero location parameter (mode) and scale
13 The wages are determined in such a way that variable unit cost of production equals the marginal cost. Marginal
costs are identical across firms in a given country i: ci(k) = ci = Wi/Ai, taking Ai as a country-specific,
exogenous TFP level. As a robustness check, the TFP factor is assumed to be modeled as a Lucas externality
(Lucas, 1988) - dependent on the share of high-skilled workers in population.
14 The model does not assume unemployment among native and foreign workers. This simplification is motivated
by the fact that, with constant share of people who search for jobs in all groups, the probability of being employed
would be incorporated in the wage rate. Since there are mixed evidence about the actual unemployment rates in
different groups of immigrants - generally higher (lower) in the group of low-(high-)skilled workers - I decided to
reduce the scope of this chapter by not explicitly considering labor market frictions.
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parameter set to 1/µ.15 Thus, an individual faces a problem of choosing a destination country,
taking into consideration the objective welfare measures (real wages less migration costs) and
subjective propensity towards living in a particular state (stochastic, individual-specific term).
This problem boils down to a discrete choice program analyzed by McFadden (1984). Applying
the McFadden’s theorem, the probability that a person of skill s, who is born in country j,
migrates to country i is equal to:
pisij = Pr[U
s
ij = max
n∈N
(
U snj
)
] =
exp
(
U sij
)
∑N
n=1 exp
(
U snj
) . (2.5)
Concentrating on the aggregated, equilibrium stocks of migrants, letM lij (M
h
ij) denote the num-
ber of low-skilled (high-skilled respectively) people born in country j, who emigrated and live
in country i. In the same manner, the number of natives who actually live in their country of
birth, j, is expressed by: M sjj for s ∈ {l, h}. Using the above-derived probabilities to migrate
and the exact form of the logarithmic utility function, one can calculate the ratio of emigrants
from j to i to stayers in j:
M sij
M sjj
=
(
ws−i/Pi
wsj/Pj
(
1− csij
))µ
. (2.6)
The higher the real wage ratio between the destination i and the source j, the larger the actual
share of migrants from j to i. These figures are dependent not only on the bilateral (nominal)
wages, but also on the price indexes in both countries.16 Using the data on bilateral migration
and the country-specific endogenous nominal wages and price indexes, one can solve eq. (2.6)
for csij . It is possible to identify fully the matrix of bilateral (skill-specific) migration costs for
a given scale parameter µ (which represents in fact the elasticity of the ratio of migrants with
respect to the net real wage ratio). Further decompositions of migration costs and the choice of
the actual value of µ will be investigated in the following section.
2.4 Modeling strategy
In this section, I discuss the calibration of the model. First, I shall present a short summary of
parametrization, followed by the calibration algorithm. Then, I will describe the identification
of migration and trade liberalization policies.
2.4.1 Data and values of parameters
The model is calibrated to represent the state of the world economy in the year 2010. This
choice is dictated by the availability of international migration data. The comprehensive dataset
describing global, skill-specific, cross-country stocks of workers is provided by Artuc et al.
(2015). Since it dates back to 2000, I have decided to restrict the sample of destination countries
to the OECD economies, and use the 2010 DIOC database published by the OECD. However,
15 It can be proved that standardizing the distribution of the stochastic term ξ˜ij to unit scale parameter is equivalent
to considering a modified utility function with parameter µ: V sij = µ ln
[(
1− csij
)
usij
]
+ ξ˜sij . The EVD is chosen
in order to ensure that the maximum of random variables ξij has also an EVD.
16 This means that the country’s location in the global international trade network plays an important role in deter-
mining migration. It is a consequence of the fact that, according to eq. (2.B6), Pi is a function of the bilateral
trade costs between country i and all of the countries that export to i.
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the DIOC dataset does not provide a full migration matrix of all the OECD countries (it partially
lacks data on immigration to Austria, Chile, Israel, South Korea and Turkey). Therefore, I have
filled in those missing observations using the number of migrants from the UN migration dataset
by Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and the skill structure from Artuc et al. (2015).
Three types of exogenously given parameters can be distinguished in the proposed model: (1)
the common; (2) the country-specific; (3) and the country-pair-specific values. The first group
of parameters is identical for all the countries in the analyzed system. The values are taken from
the literature and are rather consensual, as described below.
The elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods, , is estimated by Feenstra (1994) in
the range of 3 to 8, and by Broda and Weinstein (2006). In the theoretical framework at work,
this parameter determines the elasticity of trade with respect to trade barriers (see equation 2.4),
which, as in the model by Krugman (1980), equals 1 − . According to the recent findings by
Simonovska and Waugh (2014), a drop in bilateral trade barriers by 1 percent increases the trade
flows on average by 2.79 to 4.46 percent. This implies that  ∈ [3.79; 5.46]. Considering all
these estimates, in the benchmark parametrization I assume that  = 4. However, two robustness
checks are run, taking  = 2 and  = 6. For the elasticities of substitution between different
types of labor (either σS - between low-skilled and high-skilled or σN - between natives and
immigrants, the definition of production function is available in Appendix 2.B) I take the values
reported by Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and assumed by Docquier et al. (2014), that is: σS = 1.75
and σN = 20. In order to see the importance of these parameters for the final results, I also
consider: σS = 0.9 and σS = 2.6, as well as σN = 10 and σN = 30.17 The parameter
describing the sensitivity of migration flows to the ratio of real income, µ, is assumed to be
equal to 1 in the reference scenario. As a robustness check I take µ = 0.7 (in line with some
of my estimations, and identical to the value obtained by Bertoli et al. (2013)), which makes
individuals less responsive to exogenous shocks. Similarly, I verify what the results would be,
if µ was equal to 1.3.
As for the second group of parameters, I take the country-specific shares of value added provided
by different types of labor. The values of shares of high-skilled (θSi ) and the shares of migrants
(θNi ) are calculated using the data describing the wage ratios between either the low/high-skilled
workers or migrants/natives taken from Hendricks (2004) and Büchel and Frick (2005) respec-
tively.
The country-pair-specific parameters are those that describe the bilateral costs of migration (for
low and high-skilled separately) and the iceberg costs of trade. These values are fitted using the
general equilibrium conditions: the random utility eq. (2.6) for migration costs, and the system
of gravity eq. (2.4) for trade. Then, the obtained total costs of migration and trade are decom-
posed into their reducible and non-reducible parts, using econometric techniques described in
the following sections. All in all, the calibration process is perfectly identified. The number
of unknown parameters is exactly equal to the number of equations, and there are no additional
degrees of freedom. For a detailed description of calibration algorithm, please consult Appendix
2.C.
17 Imperfect substitution between all types of workers gives a richer wages effects after the shocks to local labor
markets. Assuming perfect substitution between natives and foreigners would force the wages in two groups to
be equal, and would rule out all the general equilibrium adjustments on labor markets. Quantitative effects of
assuming different elasticities are depicted in Appendix 2.E, Table 2.E2.
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2.4.2 Decomposition of migration costs
The total cost of migration is a combination of several aspects of migration decisions.18 Keeping
in mind its standard, microeconomic interpretation (as a sum of individual moving, visa and
psychological costs), this figure can be modeled from a macroeconomic perspective. What is
proposed as the reference identification strategy, is an estimation of the impact of legal migration
barriers on the actual bilateral migration flows.19 Let us consider the logarithm of eq. (2.6):
ln
(
M sij
M sjj
)
= µ ln
(
ws−i/Pi
wsj/Pj
)
+ µ ln
(
1− csij
)
. (2.7)
The goal is to calculate the extent to which 1− csij is explained by the legal migration costs (that
is all the migration barriers which are designed by the authorities to restrict migration flows, i.e.
the visa costs). Assume that these limitations may be described by a dummy variable which
indicates the existence of restrictions to free mobility of people. If the binary indicator V isaij
takes the value of 1, then there are legal restrictions to migrate permanently from country j
to country i. On the contrary, V isaij = 0 may be interpreted as a free mobility agreement
between countries j and i (for example as it is defined in the EU or between Australia and New
Zealand). To identify the extent to which formal migration barriers influence bilateral migration
decisions, several estimations of eq. (2.7) are provided (see Table 2.1 for the cost ascribed to the
low-skilled and Table 2.2 for the case of the high-skilled).
Apart from the real wage ratios and a visa dummy, the bilateral cost of migration is determined
by the distance between sending and receiving countries, common language, border and country-
specific characteristics captured by fixed effects. As a by-product of these estimations, one can
explicitly identify the sensitivity of migration with respect to the wage ratio, µ. Considering the
results, I decided to impose µ = 1 in the benchmark scenario and validate the robustness of
results by assuming two alternative values: µ = 0.7 and µ = 1.3.
The panel data cover all the OECD country-pairs in years 2000 and 2010. The stocks of mi-
grants are identical to those used in the calibration procedure, whereas the real wage ratios are
the outcomes of model calibration (for both years separately). Standard gravity variables are
taken from the CEPII database by Head and Mayer (2013). To control for time effect, a binary
indicator of year is also added (taking the value Y ear2000 = 1 for year 2000). The estima-
tion has been done using a standard fixed effect OLS estimator, as well as the Poisson Pseudo
Maximum Likelihood (Anderson, 2010, Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004, Silva and Tenreyro,
2006). The first four columns of Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 report the coefficients of OLS esti-
mation with or without origin and destination fixed effects. The last four columns present the
results of PPML estimations.
18 Since the model is static and represents a long-run equilibrium those values should be interpreted more like costs
of living abroad, rather than costs of moving abroad. Consequently, visa costs would be computed as a part of the
total costs of living in a foreign country.
19 An alternative way of identifying migration costs is proposed by Docquier et al. (2015). The costs are calibrated
using the data from Gallup Survey which is conducted in almost 150 countries. The authors are particularly
interested in the responses to the questions about people’s preferences to emigrate and their choices of potential
destination countries. The problem with Gallup data is that the Gallup Institute asks about the intentions for
migration, and not whether the decision is actually reached, so there is no way of verifying that a potential migrant
has actually emigrated. Furthermore, in the data I find positive stocks of intra-EU potential migrants. Since
everyone may migrate freely across all the EU countries, one cannot account these people as being restricted by
legal barriers.
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TABLE 2.1: Estimation of legal bilateral migration cost for the low-skilled
Dependent variable: ln
(
M lij/M
l
jj
)
Dependent variable: M lij/M
l
jj
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS PPML PPML PPML PPML
Log wage ratio 1.096*** 0.689*** 0.696*** 0.674*** 0.928*** 0.735*** 0.723*** 0.781***
(0.055) (0.085) (0.080) (0.079) (0.010) (0.181) (0.129) (0.138)
Log distance -0.423*** -0.680*** 0.047 -0.737***
(0.061) (0.071) (0.108) (0.124)
Visa -0.916*** -1.003*** -0.807*** -0.402*** -0.728*** -1.758*** -1.214*** -0.518**
(0.139) (0.131) (0.124) (0.129) (0.282) (0.303) (0.263) (0.254)
Border 1.632*** 2.258*** 1.528*** 1.731*** 1.835*** 0.961***
(0.240) (0.165) (0.179) (0.476) (0.176) (0.218)
Language 2.435*** 0.735*** 0.642*** 1.413*** 1.063*** 1.221***
(0.201) (0.159) (0.156) (0.325) (0.141) (0.156)
Year2000 -0.809*** -0.734*** -0.776*** -0.857*** -0.245 -0.148 -0.202 -0.281**
(0.107) (0.082) (0.077) (0.076) (0.195) (0.227) (0.139) (0.140)
Constant -5.239*** -6.846*** -7.223*** -1.601** -7.045*** -3.613*** -4.602*** -0.763
(0.464) (0.279) (0.264) (0.642) (0.863) (0.591) (0.539) (1.097)
Origin FE NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Destination FE NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Observations 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244
R-squared 0.320 0.636 0.678 0.691 0.251 0.353 0.674 0.700
Note: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, standard errors in parenthesis. Log wage ratio is a log of the ratio of
wages for the low-skilled in the destination and in the source. Log distance is a log of a weighted distance between
the destination and the source. Visa, Border, Language are binary indicators that take the value 1, if the destination
and the source impose a visa, share a common border, or have the same official language, respectively. Year2000 is
a dummy for year 2000. Source: own calculations.
The reference regressions in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are depicted in columns (8). These models are
estimated using the PPML technique and they consider all the relevant explanatory variables
and origin/destination fixed effects. Introducing a full free migration agreement would increase
the share of bilateral migrants by more than 100 percent.20 In the easily interpretable case of
fixed effect OLS regression (column 4), the elasticity of migration share with respect to the
distance is close to −0.7 for the non-college educated and slightly lower for the high-skilled
(−0.6). The elasticity of migration share with respect to the real wage ratio is very close to
the reference value of the corresponding parameter µ = 1, without accounting for origin and
destination fixed effects (column 1). Otherwise, this sensitivity takes values near 0.7. Highly
skilled workers are less responsive to those monetary incentives. They are also less vulnerable to
the visa restrictions, although the official language in the destination country seems to be more
important in their migration decisions.21
20 This is because in all the cases the impact of migration barriers on the ratio of migrants to stayers (taking
the average value of coefficient Visa across all eight estimates) is: exp(0.918) ≈ 2.5 for the low-skilled and
exp(0.724) ≈ 2 for the college educated.
21 Another way of specifying migration costs would be to take into consideration the fact that several receiving coun-
tries developed selective migration policies. More precisely, Australia, New Zealand and Canada have introduced
point systems which enable the screening of candidates for immigration in terms of their skill level, knowledge
of official languages and their background on the labor market. In effect, these procedures allow the destination
countries to admit those workers who are suited for the requirements of local labor markets. After accounting for
another dummy variable point system, the results of regressions for both education levels stay unchanged. The
point system dummy takes negative values and is significant in PPML regressions for both types of workers. Its
magnitude ranges from −0.3 to −1.4 for the low-skilled and −0.4 to −1.6 for the high-skilled, meaning that the
potential gains from liberalizing migration for Australia, Canada and New Zealand may be up to 2 times higher
than in the reference scenario.
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TABLE 2.2: Estimation of legal bilateral migration cost for the high-skilled
Dependent variable: ln
(
Mhij/M
h
jj
)
Dependent variable: Mhij/M
h
jj
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS PPML PPML PPML PPML
Log wage ratio 0.975*** 0.417*** 0.427*** 0.400*** 0.648*** 0.819*** 0.672*** 0.669***
(0.061) (0.104) (0.100) (0.098) (0.079) (0.205) (0.169) (0.169)
Log distance -0.265*** -0.591*** 0.217*** -0.107
(0.061) (0.068) (0.074) (0.131)
Visa -0.791*** -0.843*** -0.687*** -0.335*** -0.709** -1.031*** -0.770*** -0.627***
(0.138) (0.123) (0.118) (0.123) (0.299) (0.268) (0.225) (0.231)
Border 1.140*** 1.626*** 0.992*** 0.929*** 1.073*** 0.952***
(0.239) (0.157) (0.170) (0.360) (0.224) (0.266)
Language 2.478*** 0.846*** 0.765*** 1.758*** 1.355*** 1.361***
(0.199) (0.151) (0.148) (0.301) (0.181) (0.182)
Year2000 -1.139*** -1.039*** -1.073*** -1.142*** -0.385** -0.355** -0.355** -0.367**
(0.106) (0.077) (0.074) (0.073) (0.161) (0.171) (0.140) (0.145)
Constant -5.230*** -5.776*** -6.099*** -1.213** -7.060*** -4.142*** -4.539*** -3.761***
(0.461) (0.261) (0.251) (0.611) (0.560) (0.266) (0.282) (1.026)
Origin FE NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Destination FE NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Observations 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244
R-squared 0.262 0.651 0.681 0.692 0.143 0.423 0.532 0.544
Note: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, standard errors in parenthesis. Log wage ratio is a log of the ratio of
wages for the low-skilled in the destination and in the source. Log distance is a log of a weighted distance between
the destination and the source. Visa, Border, Language are binary indicators that take the value 1, if the destination
and the source impose a visa, share a common border, or have the same official language, respectively. Year2000 is
a dummy for year 2000. Source: own calculations.
The above estimates are in line with the latest results presented in the literature. In the paper by
Bertoli and Moraga (2013) the authors regress the quarterly migration rate to Spain in 1997 -
2009 on real GDP p.c. and visa requirement dummy. The magnitude of their coefficient, which
ranges from −0.5 to −1.3, is very close to the values obtained in the analyzed regressions.
Grogger and Hanson (2011) estimate the linear version of equation (2.7). They find that the
explained variable (which is the log ratio of emigrants in the destination to the population in the
source) depends significantly on both visa requirement and Schengen dummies. The estimates,
taking the difference in pre-tax real wages as the main regressors, are equal to 0.335 and 0.430
respectively. Finally, Beine et al. (2011) determine the importance of migration diasporas on
bilateral migration flows using a gravity representation and controlling for belonging to the
Schengen Area. Their estimates of a Schengen dummy range from 0.06 to 0.60 for the migration
flows to the OECD countries in 2000.
The migration liberalization scenarios are designed as follows. Migration costs between selected
pairs of countries with visa requirements are reduced by a value corresponding to the estimated
Visa coefficients, normalized by the Log wage ratio coefficient (see Table 2.3). In the sim-
ulations, I consider three independent scenarios in terms of the impact of abolishing the legal
barriers on the overall migration cost (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for exact values). The reference
scenario (let us call it MID for middle values) assumes the liberalization parameter is equal to
−0.663 for the low-skilled and −0.937 for the high-skilled. Then, to be able to get the im-
pression of the sensitivity of results with respect to these values, I consider two other scenarios
(labeled by MIN for minimal values and MAX for maximal values) in which I take the lower
and upper bound of the legal migration barrier estimate. After updating migration cost matrices,
one can generate new equilibrium migration stocks.
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TABLE 2.3: The parametrization of the sensitivity of migration cost to legal migration barriers
Estimated Low-skilled High-skilled
Parameter MIN MID MAX MIN MID MAX
Visa coefficient µcvisaij -0.402 -0.518 -1.214 -0.335 -0.627 -0.770
Log wage ratio coefficient µ 0.674 0.781 0.723 0.400 0.669 0.672
Migration liberalization parameter cvisaij -0.596 -0.663 -1.679 -0.838 -0.937 -1.146
Source: own calculations.
2.4.3 Decomposition of trade costs
The second type of counterfactual simulation is related to trade liberalization. Once again,
the aim is to identify the part of the bilateral trade cost which is the consequence of formal
restrictions. Following Anderson and Neary (2003, 2005), apart from considering the tariffs
imposed on imported goods, I also analyze the non-tariff barriers for trade (which, according
to recent findings, constitute the majority of contemporary trade restrictions). To identify them
I use the estimates by Looi Kee et al. (2009) who compute implied tariff rates that would be
equivalent (in terms of the value of import/export) to the observed non-tariff barriers. These
numbers represent the average across all importers/exporters from/to a particular country.
The identification strategy assumes estimating the impact of legal trade barriers by using simple
regressions. However, the dependent variable is now the (logarithm of) bilateral trade cost, τij ,
which was numerically fitted to match the trade data. Apart from the tariff and non-tariff restric-
tions, I regress it on the logarithm of the distance between exporting and importing countries (to
control for distance-related transportation costs), common border, language and year dummy.
The reference regression in Table 2.4 is labeled with (8).
Both legal barriers (the sum of tariff and non-tariff restrictions) and the distance raise the bilat-
eral trade cost. An increase in the barrier equivalent by 1 percentage point enlarges the bilateral
trade cost by 0.6-0.9 percent. The elasticity of τij with respect to the distance oscillates around
0.2 and 0.4. Common border and common language facilitate trade by decreasing its bilateral
cost.
The result above matches well with the estimates of the impact of trade liberalization on bilateral
trade flows in the literature. What I obtain in the equilibrium is an aggregate increase of 17
percent in trade flows among the OECD countries after simulating the reference scenario.22
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) estimate the impact of free trade agreements on trade for 136 countries
in 1990 at the level of 66 percent in a standard OLS model and 20 percent using the Poisson
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood method Olivero and Yotov (2012) construct a dynamic gravity
model for the Eurozone. Using a GMM estimator they find that the free trade agreement raises
the bilateral trade by 14 percent. Helpman et al. (2008) estimate gravity equations for the set
of bilateral trade flows between 158 countries in year 1986. With a two-stage method, they
find that a free trade agreement increases the trade flows on average by 41 percent (in a probit
model), 13 percent (in a nonlinear least squares model) and 27 percent (assuming a polynomial
model). Finally, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) quantify the implications of free trade agreements
on bilateral trade using a 1960 - 2000 panel data for 96 potential trading partners. According
to their results, an access to a free trade region may increase the trade from 14 percent (OLS
estimate without fixed or time effects) to 100 percent (OLS with time and bilateral fixed effects)
in 10 years.
22 After including trade with the rest of the world, the change goes down to 8 percent.
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TABLE 2.4: Estimation of formal bilateral trade cost
Dependent variable: ln τij Dependent variable: τij
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS PPML PPML PPML PPML
Tariff and 0.922*** 0.035 1.603*** 0.622*** 0.711*** 0.470** 1.512*** 0.837***
non-tariff barriers (0.181) (0.133) (0.156) (0.113) (0.248) (0.194) (0.195) (0.144)
Log distance 0.213*** 0.334*** 0.143*** 0.360*** 0.216*** 0.367*** 0.127*** 0.374***
(0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018)
Border -0.304*** -0.122*** -0.203*** -0.054** -0.415*** -0.039 -0.293*** 0.047
(0.067) (0.032) (0.062) (0.028) (0.087) (0.077) (0.082) (0.071)
Language -0.277*** -0.158*** -0.196*** -0.075*** -0.379*** -0.194*** -0.261*** -0.097**
(0.055) (0.028) (0.051) (0.024) (0.063) (0.047) (0.058) (0.041)
Year2000 -0.094*** -0.025 -0.108** -0.089***
(0.032) (0.016) (0.043) (0.024)
Log trade -0.075*** -0.027*** -0.088*** -0.038***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Constant 0.207 -1.003*** 1.867*** -0.430*** 0.478*** -1.410*** 2.437*** -0.423***
(0.132) (0.114) (0.144) (0.105) (0.168) (0.163) (0.179) (0.154)
Origin FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Destination FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244
R-squared 0.221 0.855 0.341 0.893 0.111 0.818 0.228 0.877
Note: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, standard errors in parenthesis. Tariff and non-tariff barriers is a percent
equivalent of formal trade barriers from Looi Kee et al. (2009). Log distance is a log of a weighted distance between
the destination and the source. Border, Language are binary indicators that take the value 1, if the destination and
the source share a common border, or have the same official language, respectively. Year2000 is a dummy for year
2000. Log trade is a log of bilateral trade flow. Source: own calculations.
The simulations of the trade liberalization are conducted in the same way as the preceding
ones. Again, I assume three scenarios, characterized by a small, medium and large sensitivity
parameter, which is now the semi-elasticity of trade cost in respect of the level of tariff and
non-tariff barriers (see Table 2.4 for all the values). Table 2.5 summarizes the values of this
parameter. In order to liberalize trade I set all tariff and non-tariff equivalents to 0. This would
immediately decrease the values of τij for those country pairs, which have no preferential trade
agreement. Consequently, as it was the case while liberalizing migration, there is no change in
the policy parameter among the EU countries.
TABLE 2.5: The parametrization of sensitivity of trade cost to tariffs
Estimated Parameter MIN MID MAX
Trade liberalization parameter τij 0.470 0.837 1.512
Source: own calculations.
2.5 The results of simulations
In this section, I investigate the economic consequences of several liberalization policies con-
cerning migration and trade across the OECD countries. Firstly, I quantify the impact of liber-
alizing flows of goods and people between the EU and five partners (Australia, Canada, Japan,
Turkey and the US). This exercise allows to assess the profitability of these regional agreements
for the countries in question. It would also highlight the potential threats in terms of the changes
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in the natives’ real wages, owing to a possibly substantial movement of people across the de-
veloped economies. Secondly, I impose a liberalization policy among all the OECD countries,
separately in terms of migration and trade. Since this scenario is less likely to take place in
reality, I consider the obtained results more as an academic discussion. However, I then use it
to examine the relations between migration and trade, after imposing exogenous shocks in the
analyzed economic system.
2.5.1 The implications of regional migration and trade agreements
Internal cohesion and external cooperation with international partners is one of the most em-
phasized goals of the European Union. Being one of the world’s largest economies in terms
of gross value added, the EU is a crucial trade partner and a popular destination for emigrants
from many developed and developing countries. Consequently, the potential gains from liberal-
izing trade have always been expected to be significant. The outcomes of freeing up migration
flows have never been estimated for the EU alone, and there is no consensus even concerning
the direction of this effect, not to mention its magnitude. Having said this, the question of gains
from liberalizing migration and trade between the EU and other significant partners has to be an-
swered, not only for the sake of economic curiosity, but also in order to be aware of the potential
consequences of future European policy. The aggregated results after designing hypothetical,
preferential trade and migration agreements are gathered in Table 2.6.
TABLE 2.6: Aggregated gains from liberalizing trade and migration between the EU and Part-
ner countries:
Migration
EU Partner country
GDP Popul wli/Pi w
h
i /Pi Imp Exp GDP Popul w
l
i/Pi w
h
i /Pi Imp Exp
TUR 0.56% 0.50% 0.12% 0.26% 0.43% 0.40% -4.73% -3.68% -1.14% -0.80% -1.90% -2.17%
JPN 0.04% 0.03% 0.02% -0.03% -0.17% -0.19% -0.18% -0.10% -0.10% 0.10% -0.03% -0.08%
AUS -0.70% -0.43% -0.27% -0.18% -0.65% -0.62% 15.95% 10.44% 4.63% 2.76% 7.39% 7.44%
CAN -0.70% -0.44% -0.31% 0.20% -0.70% -0.71% 9.99% 6.54% 3.66% 0.48% 4.73% 4.82%
USA -1.50% -0.98% -0.61% 0.56% -1.58% -1.59% 1.74% 1.59% 0.64% 0.30% 0.04% 0.12%
Trade
EU Partner country
GDP Popul wli/Pi w
h
i /Pi Imp Exp GDP Popul w
l
i/Pi w
h
i /Pi Imp Exp
USA 0.25% 0.03% 0.22% 0.23% 1.84% 1.72% 0.29% 0.04% 0.26% 0.26% 10.62% 10.58%
TUR 0.07% 0.00% 0.07% 0.07% 0.44% 0.34% 1.00% 0.07% 0.93% 0.88% 37.87% 39.41%
JPN 0.07% 0.01% 0.07% 0.07% 0.44% 0.49% 0.27% 0.01% 0.27% 0.26% 10.73% 9.68%
CAN 0.04% 0.00% 0.03% 0.03% 0.12% 0.11% 0.64% 0.13% 0.52% 0.45% 4.48% 4.23%
AUS 0.02% 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% 0.17% 0.80% 0.20% 0.59% 0.57% 11.34% 6.51%
Note: The table provides the percent changes in real GDP, total population (low-skilled and high-skilled natives/im-
migrants), real wages of low-skilled natives and high-skilled natives, value of imports and exports after liberalizing
migration and trade between the EU and other partners, considering MID scenario. Source: own calculations.
In terms of liberalizing migration flows, the only two scenarios which are beneficial for the EU
are the partnerships with Japan and Turkey. As it is reported in the upper part of Table 2.6, a
free migration agreement between the EU and Turkey would induce a substantial wave of new
immigrants to the EU (more precisely: an inflow of mainly low-skilled workers to Germany,
Austria and the Netherlands). This strong shock may have some adverse consequences for the
country of origin. The model predicts that Turkish real GDP would drop by over 4.7 percent,
and the stayers would lose about 1 percent of their real wages. Simultaneously, the economic
effects for the EU are significantly positive: 0.6 percent in terms of GDP and 0.1-0.3 percent
when accounting for native’s wages. After liberalizing migration between the EU and Japan,
the economic implications are insignificant. In fact, one can observe a slight net inflow of
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immigrants to the EU; however the wage impact of this process is less than 0.03 percent (positive
for the low-skilled and negative for the high-skilled).
In the three remaining cases, the EU loses after liberalizing migration, which is an expected re-
sult, because Australia, Canada and the US are the net receivers of European emigrants. Indeed,
the real GDP, population and real wages of EU natives drop significantly after liberalizing migra-
tion with Australia. Many people from the EU (almost 2 million) are now deciding to emigrate
which, due to a negative market size effect, has an adverse impact on the economic conditions
in Europe. And, to the contrary, Australia gains tremendously in terms of the aggregated output,
the real wages of natives and international trade with all OECD partners.
A similar case is Canada, which has introduced a point system to attract quality workers from
abroad. Thus, the consequences of liberalizing migration are qualitatively (and apparently quan-
titatively) close to what is reported in the former scenario. The only difference with respect to
the case of Australia is that the high-skilled workers in the EU are about to gain. This is a direct
consequence of a more selective migration flow to Canada. Once again, the EU’s partner gains
substantially from liberalizing migration, considering all the macroeconomic indicators.
The liberalization of migration between the EU and the US is harmful for the European econ-
omy. The real GDP may plunge by 1.5 percent, and the real wage of low-skilled stayers would
drop by 0.6 percent. Because emigration to the US is expected to be highly skill-biased, the
supply of college-educated labor in the EU shrinks, bringing large positive effects for the high-
skilled stayers (over 0.5 percent in real wage). On the contrary, the US gain over 1.7 percent in
terms of real GDP and the natives are better off by 0.3-0.6 percent.
Moving to the second part of results, depicted in the bottom part of Table 2.6, liberalizing trade
is beneficial for both counter-parties, in all of the analyzed cases. The observed gains are almost
equally distributed across skill levels, since the overall price indexes are decreasing after lower-
ing the trade costs, without imposing large shifts in the skill-specific nominal wages. Freeing the
exchange of goods increases the real GDP’s and the real wages in the EU and the US by almost
0.3 percent. Notice that both partners experience an additional inflow of labor. Their relative
attractiveness is visibly improved, which results in more people keen on emigrating either to the
EU or the US.
Trade liberalization between the EU and Turkey increases the Turkish GDP by 1 percent. Since
the EU is the largest trade partner for Turkey, its exports and imports surge. Consequently,
lower costs of trading, along with a greater variety of products, directly reduce the price index,
which translates into higher real wage ratio for all Turkish citizens. The EU experiences only a
slight effect in terms of real GDP and real wages. The natives in the EU member countries may
gain less than 0.1 percent in terms of their real wages. A quantitatively similar result may be
observed after imposing an EU-Japan trade agreement. However, reducing the legal barriers to
trade causes the real wages in Japan to rise by about 0.3 percent, which is not that pronounced
as in the case of Turkey due to less intensive trade linkages between the two economies.
Since the barriers to trade between the EU and Australia and Canada are rather negligible in
comparison to large transportation costs, the potential gains from freeing trade are close to none
for the EU and moderate for the two partner countries (0.6-0.8 percent in real GDP and about
0.5 percent in natives wages). Notice that the magnitudes in the trade scenarios are significantly
smaller than the ones observed in the case of migration liberalization.
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2.5.2 Liberalization of migration and trade across the OECD
Let us now move to a more academic topic of a full liberalization of migration and trade among
all the OECD countries. The removal of migration barriers causes a substantial increase in
population mobility across the OECD. The number of immigrants in all the member countries
rises from 110 to 137 million people (9 million of these 27 million new immigrants are college-
educated). This means that in the reference scenario the share of immigrants in the OECD
goes up from 10.83 percent to 13.54 percent. The main destinations are the US (16 million),
Canada, Australia and Germany (2.5, 2.2 and 1.4 million respectively). The highest increases in
the number of immigrants, as a share of actual populations, are observed in Switzerland (14.8
percent), Australia, New Zealand and Canada (9-12 percent).
The largest outflows of workers are reported for Mexico (9 million) the UK, Korea, Turkey and
Germany (about 2 million each). However, in relative terms, the largest losses can be observed
for Mexico (-11.2 percent), Portugal, Turkey and the UK (about -5 percent). Table 2.7 gathers
the aggregated results for all three scenarios. In all these cases, the liberalization of migration
is positive for the overall level of real GDP in the OECD, but harmful for the EU economy.
Considering the reference scenario of liberalizing migration among all the OECD countries, the
total real GDP in the OECD increases by 1.60 percent.
TABLE 2.7: Aggregated gains from liberalizing migration
EU OECD
GDP Lli L
h
i L
l
−i L
h
−i Imp Exp GDP L
l
i L
h
i L
l
−i L
h
−i Imp Exp
MIN -2.08% -1.47% -6.93% 5.68% 8.10% -1.94% -1.85% 1.39% -2.16% -4.62% 20.22% 24.96% -0.94% -0.94%
MID -2.41% -1.69% -8.06% 6.50% 9.48% -2.22% -2.10% 1.60% -2.48% -5.39% 23.20% 29.10% -1.05% -1.05%
MAX -6.25% -7.08% -11.63% 27.96% 10.40% -4.97% -4.62% 4.64% -9.38% -7.76% 87.80% 43.36% -2.19% -2.19%
Note: The table provides the percent changes in real GDP, population of natives (low-skilled and high-skilled),
population of immigrants (low-skilled and high-skilled), value of imports and exports in the EU and the OECD after
liberalizing migration across all the OECD countries, considering 3 scenarios: MIN, MID and MAX. Source: own
calculations.
This shows that, accepting all the assumptions of the model, the potential gains from reducing
the migration barriers are not negligible. In the MAX scenario, these overall benefits rise up to
4.64 percent. The European Union, on the contrary, encounters serious losses after abandoning
visa restrictions. In the benchmark case, real GDP drops by -2.41 percent, whereas in the MAX
scenario the loss is -6.25 percent. These severe consequences are due mainly to the large outflow
of Europeans to the North American and Oceania countries. Indeed, even though the population
of residents increases, the exodus from the EU is decisive. Finally, both imports and exports
decrease after imposing a no-visa policy. Let us concentrate on the results obtained from the
reference scenario (MID), depicted on Figure 2.1. The detailed, country-specific outcomes are
available in Table 2.A1 in Appendix 2.A.
In the analysis, light is shed on the overall effect on the aggregated wage index, as well as
skill and origin specific real wages and populations of all types of workers. The first striking
observation is that the majority of OECD countries lose after the liberalization of migration.
The ultimate winners are New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the US, with an
increase in overall welfare indexes ranging from 1.7 to over 4.5 percent. The residents of Mexico
observe a decrease in their real wages by 3.2 percent. In the majority of countries, especially
the losing ones, high-skilled workers are relatively better off (that concerns both natives and
immigrants); therefore the within-country inequalities increase. A simple explanation may be
the positive selection of new emigrants. An intensive outflow of the high-skilled workers from
the drained countries automatically raises the nominal wages of the high-skilled stayers (as a
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FIGURE 2.1: The aggregated consequences of liberalizing migration among all OECD coun-
tries.
Source: own calculations.
consequence of an imperfect substitution between non-college and college-educated labor). An
extreme example may be Chile, where the low-skilled natives lose 1.19 percent and the high-
skilled gain 3.66 percent.
All of the analyzed countries experience an outflow of their citizens, which is an expected con-
sequence of freeing up labor mobility. Therefore, in order to provide post-liberalization benefits,
not only a country needs to attract new immigrants, it also has to discourage natives from em-
igrating. For example, large exoduses of high-skilled workers take place in all the winning
countries. Despite this, the natives in Australia or Canada gain about 1-4 percent. Potential
losses from emigration are more than compensated for by new waves of immigration. Mediter-
ranean and Eastern European countries, on the contrary, which experience substantial emigra-
tion, are not the most popular destinations for new immigrants from other OECD countries.
Consequently, the real wages of natives decrease after liberalization.
To sum up this part of results: the necessary condition for providing benefits from migration
liberalization is to retain the stock of (mainly high-skilled) workers, either by convincing them
not to emigrate, or by inviting their close substitutes from abroad. Otherwise, the emigration of
well educated people causes an increase in within-country inequality. Furthermore, the model
predicts a continuous brain-drain effect from the relatively poorer to the relatively wealthier
economies. The benefits caused by the liberalization of intra-OECD migration are concentrated
in only a few countries, so the cross-country inequality comes to be more pronounced. The key
message for the remaining OECD members is that they need to provide incentives which would
accelerate the accumulation of human capital.
A full liberalization of international trade in the OECD is a potentially desirable scenario. In
fact, the actual barriers to trade among the most developed economies are rather small; new
agreements have been reached in the recent years, and many more are still to be negotiated. In
the results, I study three trade liberalization scenarios which allow us to assess the sensitivity
of the model with respect to trade liberalization parameter. In the reference (MID) case, the
countries that increase their trade the most (imports and exports change in the same way due to
balanced trade requirement) are Mexico (40 percent), New Zealand and Canada (about 30 per-
cent). Large positive deviations may be observed for the emerging economies such as Turkey
and Chile (27 percent). On the contrary, the well integrated European economies: Belgium,
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Luxembourg or Norway see their trade value raising by less than 1 percent. Zeroing trade barri-
ers results in the migration of an additional 0.5 million workers in the OECD. Table 2.8 shows
the aggregated gains from liberalizing trade, which are positive for the EU and the OECD.23
TABLE 2.8: Aggregated gains from liberalizing trade
EU OECD
GDP Lli L
h
i L
l
−i L
h
−i Imp Exp GDP L
l
i L
h
i L
l
−i L
h
−i Imp Exp
MIN 0.27% -0.01% -0.04% 0.16% 0.09% 2.04% 2.25% 0.55% 0.01% 0.00% 0.22% 0.38% 8.84% 8.84%
MID 0.50% -0.03% -0.08% 0.30% 0.16% 4.05% 4.46% 1.07% 0.03% 0.01% 0.41% 0.73% 17.00% 17.00%
MAX 1.03% -0.06% -0.16% 0.61% 0.32% 8.40% 9.20% 2.24% 0.07% 0.02% 0.78% 1.49% 34.73% 34.73%
Note: The table provides the percent changes in real GDP, population of natives (low-skilled and high-skilled),
population of residents (low-skilled and high-skilled), value of imports and exports in the EU and the OECD after
liberalizing trade among all the OECD countries, considering 3 scenarios: MIN, MID and MAX. Source: own
calculations.
In the reference scenario, the overall increase in real GDP by the OECD countries is 1.1 percent,
and comprises 2/3 of what was obtained for liberalizing migration. In contrast to the previous
results, the EU now gains 0.5 percent in terms of real GDP. Taking the upper bound of the
estimates, increases the benefits to 2.2 percent for the OECD and 1.0 percent for the EU.
One can observe an intensification of trade flows either for the EU countries (over 4 percent)
and the OECD countries (17 percent). Additionally, the trade balance for the EU ameliorates
vis-a-vis all the OECD members. The fact is that in 2010 the OECD economies were already
well integrated, and the tariff barriers were rather low. However, the non-tariff barriers were
still substantial. All the changes in real GDPs are smaller (in their absolute values) than the
corresponding values obtained in the migration liberalization scenarios. This would mean that
the potential gains from reducing the trade barriers are significantly lower than the potential
gains or losses from intra-OECD no-visa policy.
Analyzing the country-specific macroeconomic indicators (see Table 2.A2 in Appendix 2.A and
Figure 2.2), one sees all the OECD countries experience a growth in their equilibrium real
wage levels. The macroeconomic gains from trade range from about 0.1-0.3 percent for the
Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy) to up to 4 percent for the traditional
trade countries and above 2 percent for the relatively less integrated countries like Chile, Korea
and Mexico. The mechanism which stands behind these results boils down to a positive price
effect, which concerns mainly those economies whose trade value constitutes a large share of
output. A decline in bilateral tariffs and non-tariff restrictions spurs exports, which indirectly
raises welfare. Simultaneously, the trade liberalization policies lower the prices of imported
goods, which directly reflects higher real wages.
The endogenous process of human migration follows the expected pattern. People flow to the
countries which gain the most from reducing trade barriers. Therefore, the highest increases
in the stock of migrants may be observed in Canada, Switzerland or New Zealand. This phe-
nomenon is dictated by the decision rule that governs the choice of destination, in which individ-
uals compare the wage levels in all possible destinations. The highly developed countries which
do not take advantage of the reduction of tariffs (such as Luxembourg, the UK or the Scandina-
vian countries) are actually becoming relatively less attractive for foreign OECD workers. Such
a result depends on the fact that these economies are already well integrated in the global trade
network, their barriers for trade are low (especially vis-a-vis their major trade partners), and
there is no further room for gains from liberalization. As a consequence, they cannot benefit
23 For the changes in values, see Appendix 2.D.
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FIGURE 2.2: The aggregated consequences of liberalizing trade among all OECD countries.
Source: own calculations.
from zeroing the trade limitations, which in fact causes their relative attractiveness to diminish.
Thus, the liberalization of trade accelerates convergence and reduces the inequality in real wages
among OECD members.
2.5.3 Relations between trade and migration
The final question addressed in the chapter concerns the relations between trade and migration.
I shall investigate whether migration is a substitute for trade (so that the number of migrants
decreases with bilateral trade flows) or whether these two processes are complements (in a sense
that higher migration is followed by a higher trade flow between two particular countries). The
literature does not provide a clear-cut solution to this issue. Depending on the assumptions and
the structure of a model, both situations are possible.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model of international factor movement (see for example Heckscher and
Ohlin 1991 or Feenstra 2003) conjectures that mobility of different factors is substitutive.24
Given that there are no international barriers, trade, migration and capital flows cause the inter-
national equalization of prices, wages and interest rates which, in turn, results in a decrease in the
incentives for factor mobility. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek proposition states that a country’s
export is intensive in the products manufactured using abundant factors, whereas the products
created using scarce factors are mainly imported. Therefore, the indirect trade in factors of pro-
duction (such as migration or FDI) results in the equalization of differences in factor abundance
between countries, which leads to factor price convergence and a reduction in trade.
On the contrary, a departure from the classical assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, may
bring a completely opposite result. For example, Markusen (1983) proves that migration and
trade may be complementary in a system of two economies with different technology endow-
ments. In terms of empirical research, there is a rich literature that supports the conjecture
that migration and trade are complements. A comprehensive literature review may be found
in Felbermayr et al. (2012). The problem is analyzed taking into consideration three potential
mechanisms: information, preference and network channels. Gould (1994) was the first who
addressed this question in a quantitative way. He analyzed the impact of both preference and
24 In the stronger, quantitative sense, which implies its weaker form: through the convergence of factor prices.
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information channels on US imports and exports.25 This paper, as well as others in the field,
emphasizes the role of migration in creating bilateral trade between sending and receiving coun-
tries (both imports and exports). What the authors underline is that both effects help to establish
informal links between the trading partners.26
The proposed general equilibrium model allows to answer the question about the relations be-
tween migration and trade in a framework without endogeneity problems.27 In fact, one is able
to study two types of processes: the reaction of migration to the liberalization of trade cost,
and the reaction of trade to the liberalization of migration cost (without imposing explicit net-
work effects of migration on trade, in the reference scenario). In what follows, I quantify the
direction and the magnitude of relations between bilateral migration and bilateral trade caused
by independent shocks on legal barriers to international exchange. Due to the fact that trade
and migration are endogenous in the analyzed model, both aggregates are driven only by the
general equilibrium forces in the system. In terms of theoretical predictions, one can derive the
following properties.
Proposition 2.1. Keeping all other things unchanged,
(a) a bilateral liberalization of migration between a sending country j and a receiving coun-
try i causes an increase in trade from country j to country i. Migration and trade are
complements.
(b) a bilateral liberalization of trade between a sending country j and a receiving country
i causes a decrease in migration from country j to country i. Migration and trade are
substitutes.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
Having said this, the results suggest that the analyzed multi-country model with endogenous
trade and migration is capable of producing different patterns of relation between trade and mi-
gration, depending on the type of shock imposed in the system of economies.28 The mechanism
behind the first result (complementarity when liberalizing migration) is a consequence of pure
market size effects (that is, the impact of population size in a country on total demand and the
number of varieties consumed). The second result comes from a decrease in prices of goods,
which (apart from the effect on price indexes) changes the overall allocation of resources and
production schemes in both countries. To support the theoretical results, I run a quantitative
experiment to give evidence about their credibility.
25 Similar studies (for different countries) are conducted by, inter alia, Head and Ries (1998) and Wagner et al. (2002)
for Canadian provinces, Combes et al. (2005) for French regions, Tai (2009) for Switzerland, Bruder (2004) for
Germany. A quantitative estimation is provided by Parsons (2012) and Egger et al. (2012). Genc et al. (2012)
conduct a meta-analysis.
26 As Gaston and Nelson (2013) summarize the hitherto findings: “there is strong and consistent support for immi-
gration having a positive effect on trade. [...] However, because these analyzes are never carried out in the context
of a structural analysis that permits an evaluation of the relative price effects that drive the general equilibrium
analysis standard in the trade theoretic accounts, these results neither permit comparison with the trade theoretic
claims, nor do they speak directly (or unambiguously) to the issues of whether trade and migration are substitutes
or complements.”
27 Notice, however, that in this model I treat international exchange as trade in consumption good, which alters the
context of this analysis with respect to the classical analysis of factor exchange.
28 The outcomes of this model are richer than the ones presented by classical international trade literature, i.e. in
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2013). Endogenizing migration has a crucial impact on the behavior of the key
macro variables, and the exact magnitudes of general equilibrium effects are hard to describe analytically. Thus,
in what follows, I turn to a numerical exercise that may depict the generic mechanisms of the model.
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In Table 2.9 the changes in the shares of trade (either imports or exports) are regressed on
the changes in the shares of migration between two countries, assuming two different types
of shocks: exogenous migration liberalization (in the first two columns) and exogenous trade
liberalization (in the last two columns).29 Consider the first two columns of Table 2.9, which
represent the correlation between the changes in shares of trade and migration after imposing
an exogenous shock to migration costs. The outcome suggests that migration and trade are
complementary. This result is in line with the empirical findings reported in the literature, and
supports the conjecture in the Proposition.30 On the contrary, liberalizing trade brings opposite
results (see two last columns of Table 2.9). Now trade and migration are substitutes, which once
again favors the hypothesis in the Proposition.
TABLE 2.9: Regressions of changes in trade share on changes in migration share
Migration liberalization Trade liberalization
Dependent variable: Trade from i to j Trade from j to i Trade from i to j Trade from j to i
Low-skilled from i to j 0.05*** -0.01 -15.11*** -1.16
(0.007) (0.007) (0.643) (0.785)
High-skilled from i to j 0.01*** -0.00 -10.44*** -0.28
(0.003) (0.003) (0.560) (0.641)
Note: The table shows the OLS estimates of regressions: ∆Tradeij(ji) = β0+β1∆Migrationij , where ∆Tradeij
is the change in the share of trade from country j to country i to the total GDP in country i in percentage points, and
∆Migrationij is the change in the share of immigrants from country j in country i to the population in country
i, in percentage points. The regressions are run separately for low and high-skilled workers. Standard errors in
parenthesis. Source: own calculations.
The fact is, that in the last twenty years the majority of exogenous international shocks expe-
rienced by the OECD have been linked to trade in goods. Many countries, among the most
developed economies, decided to sign preferential trade agreements with their most important
partners. Simultaneously, migration between the majority of country pairs is still heavily re-
stricted. Therefore, according to the results, one would expect that migration and trade would
act as substitutes. But, as the large body of empirical research convincingly suggests, this is
generally not the case. The observed complementarity between trade and migration is, conse-
quently, very likely to be caused by additional (i.e. network) effects of migration. The results of
the above-described quantitative exercise may constitute an argument for the presence of such
indirect, additional externalities. However, one has to bear in mind that the effect of complemen-
tarity between migration and trade is also explained by a crude market size effect of migration
propagated through the general equilibrium effects.
2.6 Robustness checks
To verify the results, I relate this approach to some previous works in the field. For a detailed
description of the robustness checks and a full results of all additional simulations, consult Ap-
pendix 2.E. All the numbers (in a condensed form) are presented in Table 2.E2 and are compared
to the reference scenario with a benchmark parametrization, full liberalization of migration and
29 The sample consists of 1122 OECD country pairs. The absolute values of coefficients suggest that after having
liberalized migration, the changes in bilateral trade shares are about twenty times lower than the changes in
migration shares. Conversely, after liberalizing trade, the changes in trade shares are about fifteen times larger
than the changes in migration shares.
30 Notice that in this version of the model I do not account for cost-reducing network effects of migration. This
additional pro-complementary effect is introduced in one of the robustness checks, and increases the values of all
the estimates.
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trade across all the OECD countries, assuming the MID values of policy variables. I start by
running a set of simulations with different values of some crucial parameters (labor elasticities
and the variety elasticity). Sensitivity of the results with respect to the elasticity of substitu-
tion between low and high-skilled workers and the elasticity between natives and immigrants is
rather negligible. Moving the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of consump-
tion good may have a more visible effect on the level of the results, however the value of this
parameter is pinned down near the benchmark value by many empirical studies. Decreasing
(increasing) the elasticity of utility with respect to real wage in the random utility model makes
the results less (more) dispersed. Adding a TFP externality deepens the differences between
winning and losing economies. Congestion effects of migration have little impact on the quan-
titative findings, whereas the network effects of migration (for trade and migration costs) may
bring some important gains for both receiving and, more importantly, sending countries. Brain
waste seems to be a quantitatively less important problem.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter develops a multi-country general equilibrium model which allows to compare the
effects of removing migration barriers with the implications of regional trade agreements. I com-
pute the gains from reducing visa restrictions between the EU and Australia, Canada, Japan,
Turkey, and the US. The conclusion is, that this policy is positive for natives of the EU-member
states only in the case of agreement with Turkey (an increase in their real wages by 0.1-0.3
percent) and Japan (minor gains). The remaining scenarios bring substantial costs for the EU in
terms of total population (which decreases by up to 1.5 percent) and the real wages (reductions
assessed at the level of 0-0.6 percent). Pursuing the contemporary discussions about signing free
trade treaties between the EU and several key partners, the chapter shows that the elimination
of bilateral tariff and non-tariff barriers brings some small (relative to migration), but mutually
positive outcomes. These gains do not exceed 0.25 percent for the EU and 0.6 percent for the
partner countries. In the case of a full liberalization among all the OECD countries, the group
gains 1.6 percent of real GDP after reducing barriers to migration. However, in the sample of
34 OECD members, there are only several winners from the liberalization of migration. Con-
cerning the consequences of intra-OECD trade liberalization, this policy provides a change in
real GDP at the level of 1.1 percent for the OECD. In contrast to freeing migration, all the states
share the gains resulting from the reduction of trade barriers. Comparing these two academic
scenarios, liberalizing migration brings larger, but unequally distributed economic effects. Fi-
nally, considering the theoretical and quantitative results, reducing the costs of labor mobility,
induces growth in bilateral migration and trade. Both phenomena are complementary to each
other. On the contrary, a decrease in bilateral tariff and non-tariff barriers spurs trade, but dimin-
ishes migration. Thus, in this case migration and trade are substitutes. Therefore, the correlation
between these two variables depends not only on the assumptions of the theoretical model, but
also on the type of exogenous shock one imposes in a complex general equilibrium system.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Frédéric Docquier, Francesco di Comite, Jakub Growiec, Witold Jurek, Joël
Machado, Krzysztof Malaga, Fabio Mariani, Luca Pensieroso and Chrysovalantis Vasilakis for
all helpful comments and suggestions. I would like to thank the participants of the International
Trade Seminar at the University of Oxford for invaluable advises on many key elements in the
early version of this study.
62 Migration, Human Capital, and Growth in a Globalized Economy
Appendices
2.A Detailed results of simulations
TABLE 2.A1: The real wage and demographic effects of migration liberalization (MID sce-
nario)
ISO Change in real wage Change in labor force
Code Wi/Pi wli/Pi w
h
i /Pi w
l
−i/Pi w
h
−i/Pi L¯
T
i L
l
i L
h
i L
l
−i L
h
−i
NZL 4.54% 5.18% -0.83% 3.82% -3.71% 10.37% -1.32% -21.15% 28.21% 42.13%
AUS 4.10% 4.38% 3.40% 2.78% 1.22% 12.07% -1.34% -7.86% 34.16% 41.05%
CAN 2.67% 3.19% 1.23% 1.43% -1.17% 6.21% -2.82% -14.80% 37.03% 37.63%
CHE 2.67% 3.84% -0.37% 1.42% -4.30% 8.75% -6.27% -18.21% 50.49% 83.15%
USA 1.69% 1.43% 2.03% -0.29% 0.26% 4.65% -0.37% -1.43% 40.00% 39.74%
ISR 0.88% 0.83% 1.00% 0.02% -0.75% 1.26% -3.46% -15.77% 13.43% 19.56%
AUT 0.01% -0.51% 3.11% -1.26% 2.25% -0.12% -1.28% -9.06% 14.80% 7.45%
ROW 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.07% 0.50% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% -1.39% -9.17%
AVG -0.04% -0.36% 1.14% -0.98% -0.12% -0.65% -2.21% -8.79% 11.66% 18.61%
ESP -0.06% -0.13% 0.18% -0.25% -0.28% -0.18% -0.38% -2.22% 1.95% 7.12%
SWE -0.10% -0.44% 1.23% -0.79% 0.52% -0.29% -0.59% -5.19% 6.52% 9.09%
JPN -0.11% -0.43% 0.59% -1.61% -1.64% -0.54% -0.32% -2.52% 26.31% 52.80%
BEL -0.12% -0.60% 1.24% -0.96% 0.80% -0.13% -0.63% -3.64% 6.88% 5.27%
NOR -0.15% -0.38% 1.04% -0.73% 0.22% -0.45% -0.72% -5.84% 6.37% 10.79%
FRA -0.20% -0.54% 1.75% -0.77% 0.99% -0.67% -0.47% -6.73% 4.13% 8.37%
DNK -0.22% -0.69% 1.46% -1.24% 0.51% -0.85% -0.90% -5.31% 10.76% 14.36%
NLD -0.25% -0.86% 1.53% -1.48% 0.58% -1.31% -1.74% -7.13% 11.35% 12.04%
FIN -0.26% -0.61% 1.34% -0.85% 0.81% -0.91% -0.54% -4.32% 4.52% 6.18%
DEU -0.26% -1.02% 2.58% -1.75% 1.52% -1.38% -1.90% -9.02% 13.78% 11.91%
CZE -0.38% -0.81% 1.91% -0.87% 1.46% -1.18% -0.50% -5.99% 0.67% 2.79%
SVK -0.44% -0.93% 2.09% -0.96% 1.87% -1.40% -0.56% -5.86% 0.05% -1.73%
ITA -0.45% -0.67% 1.33% -0.96% 0.42% -1.63% -1.74% -7.03% 4.15% 11.54%
EST -0.46% -0.87% 0.67% -0.88% 0.36% -1.72% -1.02% -5.13% -0.71% 0.77%
SVN -0.47% -0.87% 0.69% -0.93% 0.35% -1.81% -1.28% -4.35% -0.23% 2.27%
LUX -0.58% -1.13% 0.79% -1.17% 0.41% -2.31% -1.72% -8.01% -0.99% -0.68%
CHL -0.65% -1.19% 3.66% -1.57% 1.40% -2.28% -1.46% -12.16% 6.35% 36.59%
HUN -0.66% -1.32% 1.03% -1.42% 0.51% -2.41% -1.35% -5.87% 0.60% 4.34%
GRC -0.78% -0.85% -0.65% -1.26% -1.44% -2.68% -3.77% -4.44% 4.53% 12.08%
POL -0.85% -1.68% 1.82% -1.73% 1.25% -2.80% -1.41% -7.46% -0.42% 3.52%
IRL -0.88% -1.78% 0.76% -2.09% 0.04% -5.47% -5.35% -11.82% 0.91% 1.70%
ISL -1.02% -1.96% 2.01% -2.23% 0.88% -3.99% -2.86% -11.59% 2.62% 10.58%
KOR -1.27% -2.37% -0.17% -2.57% -1.94% -5.04% -3.33% -7.74% 0.70% 31.93%
TUR -1.30% -1.52% 0.30% -2.17% -1.36% -4.18% -4.22% -10.05% 9.32% 25.61%
PRT -1.35% -1.48% 1.99% -1.74% 0.57% -4.34% -4.43% -22.01% 0.72% 3.32%
GBR -1.39% -2.20% 1.51% -2.50% -0.01% -4.69% -3.77% -17.99% 2.32% 10.79%
MEX -3.20% -3.13% -3.50% -5.79% -6.55% -10.80% -11.29% -11.27% 55.08% 68.69%
Note: The table presents changes in: real wage indexes, real wages of four types of workers, efficient labor composite
and stocks of low/high-skilled natives/foreigners after liberalizing migration, considering MID scenario. AVG is the
simple average of all the OECD countries. ROW stands for the rest of the world. Source: own calculations.
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TABLE 2.A2: The real wage and demographic effects of trade liberalization (MID scenario)
ISO Change in real wage Change in labor force
Code Wi/Pi wli/Pi w
l
−i/Pi w
h
−i/Pi w
h
i /Pi L¯
T
i L
l
i L
h
i L
l
−i L
h
−i
CAN 4.03% 4.16% 3.68% 3.98% 3.53% 1.08% 0.11% 0.33% 3.70% 3.14%
CHE 3.99% 4.05% 3.85% 3.88% 3.71% 1.09% 0.28% 0.44% 3.58% 3.08%
NZL 3.71% 3.76% 3.27% 3.61% 3.18% 1.36% 0.31% 0.87% 3.33% 2.57%
MEX 3.47% 3.46% 3.52% 3.34% 3.39% 0.31% 0.32% 0.20% 2.66% 2.76%
IRL 2.51% 2.53% 2.48% 2.45% 2.40% 0.74% 0.32% 0.38% 2.06% 1.84%
CHL 2.27% 2.28% 2.17% 2.17% 2.09% 0.10% 0.06% 0.17% 2.10% 1.71%
KOR 2.13% 2.13% 2.12% 2.03% 2.04% 0.10% 0.05% 0.07% 2.03% 1.68%
ISR 2.07% 2.13% 1.94% 2.03% 1.87% 0.69% 0.07% 0.18% 1.96% 1.63%
AUS 2.07% 2.09% 2.02% 2.01% 1.96% 0.59% 0.02% 0.08% 1.52% 1.40%
BEL 1.43% 1.42% 1.45% 1.37% 1.40% 0.20% 0.03% 0.05% 1.04% 0.93%
AVG 1.19% 1.20% 1.17% 1.16% 1.14% 0.17% 0.03% 0.02% 0.87% 0.69%
TUR 1.13% 1.13% 1.10% 1.08% 1.07% 0.06% 0.02% 0.02% 1.02% 0.78%
NLD 1.08% 1.08% 1.08% 1.04% 1.05% 0.07% -0.01% -0.03% 0.77% 0.61%
JPN 0.94% 0.94% 0.94% 0.92% 0.93% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.34% 0.14%
ISL 0.93% 0.93% 0.92% 0.90% 0.91% 0.08% 0.02% 0.05% 0.61% 0.37%
USA 0.88% 0.90% 0.86% 0.92% 0.85% -0.02% 0.00% -0.01% -0.34% 0.23%
DEU 0.77% 0.76% 0.78% 0.74% 0.76% 0.04% -0.01% -0.05% 0.45% 0.37%
EST 0.59% 0.59% 0.59% 0.56% 0.57% 0.12% 0.03% 0.00% 0.60% 0.43%
AUT 0.56% 0.55% 0.58% 0.54% 0.57% 0.00% -0.02% -0.11% 0.20% 0.13%
SWE 0.54% 0.54% 0.56% 0.53% 0.55% 0.02% 0.00% -0.03% 0.24% 0.13%
GBR 0.54% 0.53% 0.58% 0.52% 0.56% -0.06% -0.06% -0.23% 0.17% 0.10%
SVK 0.53% 0.53% 0.56% 0.52% 0.55% -0.01% 0.00% -0.07% 0.17% 0.10%
FIN 0.51% 0.51% 0.53% 0.50% 0.52% 0.00% -0.01% -0.04% 0.24% 0.13%
NOR 0.51% 0.51% 0.53% 0.49% 0.52% 0.01% -0.01% -0.03% 0.22% 0.02%
DNK 0.51% 0.50% 0.53% 0.50% 0.53% -0.01% -0.02% -0.05% 0.14% -0.03%
FRA 0.43% 0.42% 0.46% 0.41% 0.46% 0.00% -0.01% -0.09% 0.21% 0.04%
HUN 0.41% 0.40% 0.43% 0.39% 0.42% -0.03% -0.03% -0.07% 0.25% 0.12%
SVN 0.39% 0.38% 0.41% 0.37% 0.40% 0.01% -0.02% -0.03% 0.34% 0.14%
CZE 0.38% 0.37% 0.42% 0.37% 0.42% -0.02% -0.02% -0.10% 0.11% -0.02%
ITA 0.37% 0.37% 0.40% 0.36% 0.40% -0.03% -0.04% -0.09% 0.12% -0.04%
ESP 0.26% 0.26% 0.29% 0.25% 0.30% -0.01% -0.01% -0.03% 0.11% -0.19%
POL 0.17% 0.15% 0.21% 0.15% 0.20% -0.08% -0.06% -0.15% 0.01% -0.04%
GRC 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.18% -0.08% -0.09% -0.06% 0.00% -0.30%
LUX 0.15% 0.12% 0.21% 0.13% 0.22% -0.24% -0.12% -0.20% -0.27% -0.48%
PRT 0.12% 0.11% 0.24% 0.11% 0.22% -0.15% -0.15% -0.51% -0.04% -0.19%
ROW -0.05% -0.06% 0.00% -0.01% 0.04% -0.03% -0.01% -0.11% -0.92% -1.06%
Note: The table presents changes in: real wage indexes, real wages of four types of workers, efficient labor composite
and stocks of low/high-skilled natives/foreigners after liberalizing trade, considering MID scenario. AVG is the
simple average of all the OECD countries. ROW stands for the rest of the world. Source: own calculations.
2.B Detailed model description
In what follows, I summarize the main equations of the model.
Preferences and demand
Individuals solve their utility maximization problem:
max
xsijh(k)
ln
(1− csij)
(
N∑
n=1
∫ Bn
0
xsijn(k)
−1
 dk
) 
−1
+ ξij
 (2.B1)
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under the budget constraint:
N∑
n=1
∫ Bn
0
pin(k) · xsijn(k)dk = wsij , where: wsij =
{
wsi if j = i
ws−i if j 6= i
(2.B2)
The solution, that is the individual demand function, boils down to:
xijn(k) =
pin(k)
−∑N
n=1Bn (τinpn)
1−Xi. (2.B3)
Solving for the indirect utility function:
U sij = ln
[(
1− csij
)
usij
]
+ ξij (2.B4)
where:
usij =
(
N∑
h=1
∫ Bh
0
(
pih(k)
−
P 1−i
wsij
) −1

dk
) 
−1
=
wsij
Pi
, (2.B5)
and
Pi =
[
N∑
n=1
∫ Bn
0
pin(k)
1−dk
] 1
1−
=
[
N∑
n=1
Bn (τinpn)
1−
] 1
1−
. (2.B6)
Production
The production function of firm k in country i is defined as a nested CES function of employed
labor. The upper level production function determines the quantity of efficient high-skilled and
low-skilled components needed to produce a given output yi(k):
yi(k) = Ai ¯`
T
i (k) = Ai
(
θSi
(
¯`h
i (k)
)σS−1
σS +
(
1− θSi
) (
¯`l
i(k)
)σS−1
σS
) σS
σS−1
, (2.B7)
where Ai is the exogenous country-specific level of total factor productivity (in the robust-
ness check it is modeled endogenously as a Lucas externality, so that: Ai = A¯igλi , gi ≡(
Lhi + L
h
−i
)
/LTi ).
31
The lower level production functions define the efficient labor composites for each level of
education, as a CES combinations of native and foreign workers:
¯`l
i(k) =
[
θNi
(
`li(k)
)σN−1
σN +
(
1− θNi
) (
`l−i(k)
)σN−1
σN
] σN
σN−1
,
¯`h
i (k) =
[
θNi
(
`hi (k)
)σN−1
σN +
(
1− θNi
) (
`h−i(k)
)σN−1
σN
] σN
σN−1
.
(2.B8)
31 Consider the following notation for s ∈ {l, h}: Lsi and Ls−i are the numbers of native and foreign workers of skill
s, who reside in country i, so their total supply in country i is: LTi = L
l
i + L
h
i + L
l
−i + L
h
−i. Considering firms’
demand for workers, let: `si (k) be the number of s-skilled natives employed by firm k in country i.
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Firstly, for a given production level yi(k), each firm chooses the optimal combination of high-
skilled and low-skilled efficient composites, that minimizes the total labor cost:
min
¯`h
i (k),
¯`l
i(k)
W hi
¯`h
i (k) +W
l
i
¯`l
i(k)
s.t. Ai
(
θSi
(
¯`h
i (k)
)σS−1
σS +
(
1− θSi
) (
¯`l
i(k)
)σS−1
σS
) σS
σS−1
≥ yi(k).
The first-order conditions determine the optimal demand for efficient low and high-skilled work-
ers in firm k:
¯`h
i (k) =
yi(k)
Ai
(
θSi Wi
W hi
)σS
and ¯`li(k) =
yi(k)
Ai
(
(1− θSi )Wi
W li
)σS
, (2.B9)
where Wi is the aggregate wage index and is defined as:
Wi =
[(
θSi
)σS (
W hi
)1−σS
+ (1− θSi )σS
(
W li
)1−σS] 11−σS
. (2.B10)
Secondly, each firm chooses the optimal combination of native and foreign workers within each
education category, taking the total supply of efficient high and low-skilled labor as given. Firms
solve the following cost minimization for high-skilled workers:
min
`hi (k),`
h
−i(k)
whi `
h
i (k) + w
h
−i`
h
−i(k)
subject to:
s.t.
(
θNi
(
`hi (k)
)σN−1
σN +
(
1− θNi
) (
`h−i(k)
)σN−1
σN
) σN
σN−1
≥ ¯`hi (k).
The optimal labor demands for skilled natives and migrants are then equal to:
`hi (k) =
¯`h
i (k)
(
θNi W
h
i
whi
)σN
=
yi(k)
Ai
(
θSi Wi
W hi
)σS (θNi W hi
whi
)σN
(2.B11)
and
`h−i(k) = ¯`
h
i (k)
(
(1− θNi )W hi
wh−i
)σN
=
yi(k)
Ai
(
θSi Wi
W hi
)σS ((1− θNi )W hi
wh−i
)σN
where W hi is the remuneration of the efficient high-skilled labor composite:
W hi =
[(
θNi
)σN (
whi
)1−σN
+
(
1− θNi
)σN
(wh−i)
1−σN
] 1
1−σN
. (2.B12)
Labor demand and wage index for the low-skilled natives and migrants are derived in a symmet-
ric way. The homogeneity of firms induces that the firm-specific indicators, k, may be dropped.
The above described cost minimization problem determines the optimal unit cost of production
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for each firm:
ci =
whi `
h
i + w
h
−i`
h
−i + w
l
i`
l
i + w
l
−i`
l
−i
yi
=
Wi
Ai
. (2.B13)
The firm’s profit maximization determines the price and quantity produced per firm. Each firm
faces a residual demand curve with a constant elasticity of substitution equal to  and then
chooses the same markup /(− 1) which yields the following pricing rule:
pi =

− 1ci =

− 1
Wi
Ai
. (2.B14)
The output per firm, yi, is determined by the profit maximization and the free entry condition.
Indeed, as long as the profits are positive, new firms will enter the market causing profits to fall,
until they are driven to zero:
pi = (pi − ci) yi −Wifi = 0, (2.B15)
so that:
yi = (− 1)Aifi. (2.B16)
The mass of varieties Bi produced in economy i is a function of country size. Notice that the
total production in economy i is Biyi, therefore:
Biyi = BiAi ¯`
T
i =
−1
 AiL¯
T
i = Bi(− 1)Aifi,
because only the share ( − 1)/ of total labor L¯Ti is devoted to the production purposes (that
is: ¯`Ti ), the rest is employed to cover the fixed costs. The mass of varieties produced in a given
country is then equal to:
Bi =
L¯Ti
fi
. (2.B17)
Aggregating the country-pair-specific flows of goods one obtains a simple representation of
export from country j to country i, as a share of the domestic GDP:
Xij
Xj
=
Xi (Pi/τij)
−1∑N
h=1Xh (Ph/τhj)
−1 . (2.B18)
Migration
Using the explicit form of the utility:
U sij = ln
[(
1− csij
) wsij
Pi
]
+ ξij , (2.B19)
and assuming that ξij ∼ G(0, 1/µ), one can apply the McFadden’s theorem (see McFadden,
1984) to calculate the probability that an agent of type s will emigrate from j to i:
pisij = Pr[U
s
ij = max
n∈N
(
U snj
)
] =
exp
(
U sij
)
∑N
n=1 exp
(
U snj
)
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=
(
(1− csij)wsij/Pi
)µ
∑N
n=1
(
(1− csnj)wsnj/Pn
)µ . (2.B20)
Knowing that for j 6= i:
pisij =
M sij
LTj
=
(
(1− csij)ws−i/Pi
)µ
∑N
n=1
(
(1− csnj)wsnj/Pn
)µ , (2.B21)
and for i = j:
pisjj =
M sjj
LTj
=
(
wsj/Pj
)µ
∑N
n=1
(
(1− csnj)wsnj/Pn
)µ , (2.B22)
I obtain the random utility model equations, which define the endogenous flows of people:
M sij
M sjj
=
pisij
pisjj
=
(
ws−i/Pi
wsj/Pj
(
1− csij
))µ
. (2.B23)
Competitive equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is a set {wsi , ws−i,Wi,W hi ,W li , ci, pi, Pi, Bi, [Xij ]i,j∈N , [M sij ]i,j∈N}i∈N
such that for a set of common parameters {, σS , σN , µ}, a set of country-specific parameters
{θSi , θNi , Lsi , fi, Ai}i∈N and the matrices of country-pair trade costs [τij ]i,j∈N and migration
costs [csij ]i,j∈N , s ∈ {l, h}:
1. Each vector of nominal wages in i ∈ N : wli, whi , wl−i, wh−i is determined by four labor
market clearing conditions:
Lli = L¯
T
i (1− θSi )σS
(
θMi
)σM
(Wi)
σS
(
W li
)σM−σS
(wli)
−σM ,
Lhi = L¯
T
i
(
θSi
)σS (
θMi
)σM
(Wi)
σS
(
W hi
)σM−σS (
whi
)−σM
,
Ll−i = L¯
T
i (1− θSi )σS (1− θMi )σM (Wi)σS
(
W li
)σM−σS
(wl−i)
−σM ,
Lh−i = L¯
T
i
(
θSi
)σS
(1− θMi )σM (Wi)σS
(
W hi
)σM−σS
(wh−i)
−σM ,
(2.B24)
where Lli, L
h
i , L
l
−i, L
h
−i are the exogenous quantities of labor in country i.
2. The zero profit condition pins down the wage index: Wi for i ∈ N .
3. The equilibrium wages and the wage indexes determine: {W hi ,W li , ci, pi}.
4. The mass of varieties is determined by the market size equation.
5. The mass of varieties, the wage indexes and the bilateral trade costs [τij ]i,j∈N , determine
Pi.
6. The trade matrix [Xij ]i,j∈N is determined by the trade gravity equation.
7. The migration matrices [Mij ]i,j∈N are determined by the bilateral migration costs [cij ]i,j∈N
and the random utility model equations.
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Relations between migration and trade
Proof. (Proposition 2.1) In the proof, I will make use of the logarithms of relative migration
and trade flows (2.6 and 2.4 respectively):
ln
M sij
M sjj
= µ ln
(
ws−i/Pi
wsj/Pj
)
+ µ ln
(
1− csij
)
,
ln
Xij
Xjj
= ln
Xi
Xj
+ (− 1) ln
(
Pi
Pj
)
+ (1− )τij .
(2.B25)
(a) Consider a liberalization of migration from country j to country i. Let the bilateral migration
cost csij decrease. Using the logarithm of the migration flow equation (first in 2.B25), it is
straightforward to see that:
∂ ln
Msij
Msjj
∂ ln csij
=
−µcsij
1− csij︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+µ
∂ lnws−i/w
s
j
∂ ln csij︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+µ
∂ lnPj/Pi
∂ ln csij︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
< 0, (2.B26)
where the first element always dominates. An inflow of immigrants (to country i) increases
internal demand, which triggers the GDP level, dampens wages and decreases the price index.
For country j the effects are opposite. Therefore, the first round effect of decreasing migration
cost to country i is an increase in a relative flow of migrants towards country i.
Consider now the logarithm of the equation describing relative flows of trade (the second in
2.B25). Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to csij one gets:
∂ ln
Xij
Xjj
∂ ln csij
=
∂ lnXi/Xj
∂ ln csij︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+(− 1) ∂ lnPi/Pj
∂ ln csij︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
≷ 0. (2.B27)
The positive market size effect related to an inflow of immigrants to country i causes the GDP
to increase and the price index to fall. Depending on the magnitude of both forces, bilateral
trade may be higher or lower. When the general equilibrium effects on wages and labor flows
dominate the price effects, then trade and migration act as complements, if one imposes a
migration shock.
(b) Consider a liberalization of trade from country j to country i. Let the bilateral trade cost τij
decrease. With the equation describing aggregated trade flows, one can show that:
∂ ln
Xij
Xjj
∂ ln τij
= (1− )︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+(− 1) ∂ lnPi/Pj
∂ ln τij︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
∂ lnXi/Xj
∂ ln τij︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0. (2.B28)
The direct effects of liberalizing trade (first element) always dominate, so that the bilateral trade
flow increases.
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In the same vein, consider the impact of trade liberalization on bilateral migration flow from j
to i:
∂ ln
Msij
Msjj
∂ ln τij
= µ
∂ lnws−i/wj
∂ ln τij︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
−µ∂ lnPj/Pi
∂ ln τij︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
> 0. (2.B29)
A decrease in trade cost decreases the GDP level in the receiving country i, which diminishes
wages. Simultaneously, a smaller cost of imports lowers the price index Pi. In country j the
effects are opposite. Therefore, a decrease in bilateral trade cost results in a drop in bilateral
migration, and consequently, migration and trade act as substitutes, if one imposes a trade
shock.
2.C Calibration algorithm and model fit
Considering the fact that the proposed model assumes some multidimensional nonlinear rela-
tions between the key endogenous variables, I choose to analyze its outcomes through the nu-
merical simulations of the properties of the general equilibrium. Therefore, both the calibration
and simulation procedures are conducted iteratively, to restore all the equilibrium conditions in
the system of N = 35 OECD and rest of world economies.
For the calibration, I propose the following algorithm of proceedings. The first step consists in
setting the values of all the exogenously given parameters of the model (described in detail in the
previous section). The full set of parameters contains the country specific shares of high-skilled
/ migrants in producing the value added, the elasticities (these are:  - elasticity of substitution
between varieties, σS - elasticity of substitution between low and high-skilled, σN - elasticity of
substitution between natives and migrants) and the dispersion of EVD distribution µ.
Secondly, using the macroeconomic data, I define the vectors of the exogenous macroeconomic
variables. Actual levels of GDPs are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indi-
cators. The bilateral migration matrices of different skill levels are computed using the DIOC
database provided by the OECD, extended with the UN database and the dataset by Artuc et al.
(2015). The data on bilateral trade values originate from the World Bank’s WITS database.
Then the fixed cost of entry is constructed by using the data from Doing Business Indicators by
the World Bank.32 With these, one is able to determine the wage indexes Wi and the masses of
varieties Bi from the equilibrium conditions.
The next step is the iterative procedure of fitting the TFP residuals Ai and the bilateral trade
costs matrix [τij ] taking into consideration two criteria. Not only does the general equilibrium
of the model have to be ensured (all the equilibrium conditions reduce to a system of N zero-
profit equations which then are solved for the TFP residual), but also the model aspires to have a
close fit to the real trade data. The latter is controlled by the trade cost matrix. What is proposed
is the following loop. First, the solution to the system of N(N − 1) gravity trade equations is
calculated.33 This partial solution is then used to restore the general equilibrium of the model
by iteratively solving N zero-profit equations and fitting the TFP residuals. After computing
32 In detail, I calculate the fixed cost vector as an unweighted synthetic indicator of three standardized variables: the
number of days needed to start a business, the cost of starting a business (as a share of GNP p.c.) and the survival
rate of firms, normalized to the minimal value of 1.
33 I do the computations with the help of nleqslv package in R. The solver of systems of nonlinear equations in
nleqslv is based on Dennis and Schnabel (1996). I use the Broyden method which is an extension of the Newton
method of solving systems of nonlinear equations.
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the endogenous bilateral trade flows, the model trade matrix is compared to the actual trade
matrix and the distance between the two is calculated (which is the sum of squares of differences
between particular entries). The iteration on [τij ] andAi ceases when this distance is minimized.
Furthermore, using the labor market equilibrium conditions, the skill and origin-specific wages
are calculated for every country. Finally, the bilateral migration cost matrices (for low and high-
skilled workers)
[
clij
]
and
[
chij
]
are determined by the random utility model specification, which
completes the calibration.
FIGURE 2.C1: The match of (log) of model variables with (log) of actual variables.
Source: own calculations.
The calibration concentrates on fitting the matrices of global migration and international trade,
allowing wages, prices and masses of varieties to float freely. Therefore, the only restrictions
imposed on these endogenous variables are defined by the random utility migration equations,
gravity trade equations, and the equilibrium conditions which reduce to the system of zero-profit
conditions (taking the exogenous macroeconomic variables and parameters values as given).
In terms of the GDP per capita, the model provides a close matching with actual data (see Figure
2.C1). The R2 of the regression is equal to 0.98 and the slope is 1.02. Then, the TFP residuals
are weakly, positively correlated with the productivity indicator (which in this case is the GDP
per hour worked in PPP USD). As the TFP residual is computed in a way that the general
equilibrium is obtained in the multi-country system, it may capture various characteristics of the
analyzed economies.
Consider the comparison of model trade matrix and actual bilateral trade values. This exercise
allows us to evaluate both the market equilibrium price indexes and the bilateral iceberg trade
costs which are numerically fitted to maximize the Euclidean distance between both trade matri-
ces. The correlation between real and model trade values equals 98.92 percent and is not perfect
due to the fact that I impose the iceberg cost of producing for the home market to be equal to
1, whereas any bilateral cost cannot be smaller than this value (see Figure 2.C2). Thus, I lose
N degrees of freedom in calibrating the trade cost matrix. The regression line that relates both
matrices is: XREALij = 1.0006 ·XMODELij − 0.02 R2 = 0.9892. This means that only 1.08 per-
cent of the real bilateral trade flows is not explained in the calibrated model. This result seems
to be very promising in terms of analyzing the general equilibrium effects of liberalizing both
migration and trade.
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FIGURE 2.C2: The match of (log) of model trade with (log) of actual trade.
Source: own calculations.
2.D Aggregated gains as values
TABLE 2.D1: Aggregated gains from liberalizing migration (changes in variables)
EU OECD
Real GDP Lli L
h
i L
l
−i L
h
−i Imp Exp Real GDP L
l
i L
h
i L
l
−i L
h
−i Imp Exp
MIN -9,388 -4,412 -3,258 1,939 912 -70 -68 19,229 -15,738 -7,928 15,560 8,050 -57 -57
MID -10,885 -5,093 -3,787 2,219 1,067 -80 -77 22,144 -18,054 -9,244 17,856 9,385 -64 -64
MAX -28,259 -21,318 -5,468 9,547 1,170 -179 -170 64,428 -68,252 -13,309 67,582 13,981 -133 -133
TABLE 2.D2: Aggregated gains from liberalizing trade (changes in variables)
EU OECD
Real GDP Lli L
h
i L
l
−i L
h
−i Imp Exp Real GDP L
l
i L
h
i L
l
−i L
h
−i Imp Exp
MIN 1.202 -43 -19 55 10 73 83 7.684 104 8 170 123 539 539
MID 2.281 -82 -37 104 18 146 163 14.805 211 16 314 235 1.036 1.036
MAX 4.643 -169 -76 210 36 302 337 31.028 484 37 603 481 2.117 2.117
Note: The tables provide the changes in the values of real GDP (in millions of USD PPP), population of natives (low-
skilled and high-skilled, in thousands of people), population of residents (low-skilled and high-skilled, in thousands
of people), value of imports and exports (in millions of $) in the EU and the OECD after liberalizing migration,
trade and migration and trade among all the OECD countries, in 3 scenarios: MIN, MID and MAX. Source: own
calculations.
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2.E Robustness checks
Robustness to elasticities
Let us start with different values for the elasticity of substitution between the low-skilled and the
high-skilled workers. In the reference scenario, I assume that σS = 1.75. Consider two border
cases of σLOWS = 0.9 and σ
HIGH
S = 2.6, which are close to +/- 50 percent changes in the
starting value of the parameter. In columns three and four of Table 2.E2, the economic effects
on the natives living in all the OECD countries after a standard MID shock to migration and trade
are reported. A smaller value of σS signifies that the non-college-educated and college-educated
are stronger complements, so that the gains from having a diversified labor force are larger. One
can observe stronger effects on the real wages of migration shocks for those countries, which
experience a net inflow of immigrants. Consequently, countries which encounter a reduction
in population are characterized by an even higher losses. The reverse effect (that is, a less
dispersed distribution of gains) may be observed with an assumption of higher substitutability
between both types of workforce. However, even though the value of σS changes drastically,
the quantitative outcomes do not move more than by +/- 10 percent (with an exception for
New Zealand). Since the value of the elasticity of substitution is consensually estimated at the
level of 1.75 − 2 in the literature, this parameter is certainly not a cause of any confounding
misspecification.
The value of the elasticity between natives and immigrant is far less consensual than the previous
one. Ottaviano and Peri (2012) estimate it at the level of σN = 20, but Borjas (2013) argues that
native and foreign workers are close to perfect substitutes. Therefore, I take the +/-50 percent
deviations in this parameter as a robustness check. Lower values of σN increase the gains from
diversity and magnify the positive effects of higher migration flows. On the contrary, while
forcing substitutability between natives and foreigners, the beneficial impact of larger migration
vanishes. Once again, the quantitative deviations are rather small.
The two former robustness checks were concerned with the structure of production and the labor
market. Their direct impact on the results is working only through migration channels and does
not appear to be severe. Some significant differences in the real wage impact of liberalizing
migration and trade may be found after manipulating the elasticity of substitution between any
two varieties consumed. In the reference scenario I considered  = 4, which is in line with the
empirical findings (both the old and the recently published ones). This element of the model
strongly relates to the gains from trade and the extent to which its value is vulnerable to bilateral
costs of international exchange of goods. This debate is far from over, but as the empirical
evidence suggest, that  for aggregated product structure is probably closer to the lower bound
of its confidence interval. In fact, what I check are both lower and higher values of this figure,
taking +/-50 percent of its value. As expected, lower elasticity,  = 2, means higher gains from
having liberalized trade, which changes the results drastically. The impact of trade makes the
natives in the less integrated economies (such as Mexico, Turkey or Chile) strongly better off by
comparison to the reference scenario. None of the OECD countries loses, and all the changes in
real wages are above 2 percent. Taking  = 6 reduces the positive effects of liberalizing trade,
and makes the natives in the majority of OECD states worse off.
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Alternative parametrization of agents’ utility
The paper by Bertoli et al. (2013) provides some insights about the estimation of the elasticity of
utility with respect to real wage in the random utility model. The authors analyze a simple Roy
model in which agents decide about locating, considering the deterministic (objective) real wage
and stochastic (subjective) taste for migration. This representation leads to a logit probability of
migration, which is then a function of the wage rate. They estimate the core parameter (denoted
by µ in the model) using a nested logit model in logarithms. They find that the elasticity of
utility in respect of wage ranges from 0.501 to 0.756 (depending on the estimation procedure,
the reference value is 0.655).
According to the results by Bertoli et al. (2013) and my own estimations of µ (see Tables 2.1 and
2.2), I run an additional set of simulations assuming a lower value of the elasticity of utility in
respect of the real wage. In line with those findings, I take µ = 0.7. The main country-specific
results are gathered in the eight column of Table 2.E2. Clearly, the qualitative properties are
identical to the benchmark results with µ = 1. However, the magnitudes of the effects are now
somewhat different, and are characterized by lower dispersion. Indeed, the agents are now less
responsive to changes in migration costs, thus fewer people migrate, and so both the benefits for
the winners and the costs for the losers are now reduced.
Similarly, I investigate the other possibility of a higher elasticity of migration with respect to the
real wage ratio. Taking µ = 1.3, one can observe that the spread between the winners and the
losers is now wider; however the quantitative difference in the effect on wages for the majority
of countries is limited to several percentage points.
TFP effects of net migration
Net migration may affect the productivity through a change in the number of highly skilled
professionals. Some recent findings by Peri et al. (2013) provide evidence that the immigration
of scientists, engineers and mathematicians has a strong positive influence on the remuneration
of high-skilled non-migrants in the US, and a slight effect on the less educated. Aubry et al.
(2014) show that the TFP effect plays an important role in the overall impact of net migration
for the natives in OECD countries.
However, there are some confusing arguments about the impact of the high-skilled workers on
the technological progress and productivity. On the one hand, Acemoglu and Angrist (2000)
do not find any relations between the share of tertiary educated workers and the economy-wide
productivity. On the other hand, Moretti (2004a) estimates robust social returns attributed to
high-skilled workers. Therefore, I would like to account for these potential spillovers and endo-
genize the level of TFP in each economy. In doing so I follow Lucas (1988) and write the TFP
function as a product of an exogenously given TFP residual, A¯i, and a concave function of the
high-skilled share in population: Ai = A¯igλi , gi ≡
Lhi +L
h
−i
LTi
. I arbitrarily fix the elasticity of
TFP in respect of the high-skilled share at the level of λ = 0.3.
The results of the robustness check including endogenous TFP levels are presented in column
ten in Table 2.E2. The main difference with the reference results is a larger dispersion of the
quantitative effects. Indeed, the countries which win are the ones that attract relatively more
high-skilled workers. This improves the productivity of all the employed and causes the nominal
wages to rise. On the contrary, the losing countries are generally the ones drained of their
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high-skilled potential. Therefore, the losses for the natives in these economies are even more
pronounced after accounting for endogenous TFP.
The more selective the migration flow is, the greater the differences from the benchmark are.
Therefore, New Zealand, Canada and Switzerland are the main winners. By contrast, the rest of
the countries, (not only the previously losing, but also those which experienced a slight gain in
real wages comparing to the reference scenario) are now encountering significant drops in real
wages, even though the total population rises (consider for example Austria, Germany or the
Netherlands, which are the destinations for many low-skilled immigrants). Therefore, account-
ing for any TFP effects of migration results in a more pessimistic evaluation of the gains from
reducing migration barriers.
Congestion effects of immigration
In this section, I take into consideration the potential negative externalities of higher immigration
inflows. Following Docquier et al. (2015), I assume that the crowding effect (an increase in
population) deteriorates the countries TFP with an elasticity φ = 0.03. This value is equal to
the share of the value added due to land in the production of the developed countries (following
Ciccone and Hall (1996)). In this scenario, the destination countries are penalized, whereas the
sources gain additional productivity effect. Taking the previously reported magnitude of the
congestion effects, the results are not dramatically different (the changes in effects are less than
10 percent in comparison to the benchmark).
Network effects of migration on trade
The literature dealing with the relation between trade and migration provides empirical evidence
that migrants may reduce the bilateral trade costs between the destination and home countries
through two channels. Preference and information channels, which are commonly aggregated
as a single network effect, are the important determinants of the complementary co-movement
of migration and trade. An inflow of immigrants, which increases the probability of recruiting a
foreigner in an exporting firm, reduces the cost of gathering the information about local markets,
affords insights into cultural requirements when doing business, and helps to establish direct
business links. Simultaneously, an immigrant demands more of the products that originate from
his motherland, which spurs the bilateral flow of goods. These two factors cause that, apart
from the earlier investigated market size effects, there is a specific relation between migration
and trade. In this section I would like to account for this.
To begin, I calculate the elasticity of bilateral trade cost with respect to the number of immigrants
to and emigrants from a particular country. I modify the regressions which decompose the
numerically calibrated values of τij’s by introducing the logs of in- and out- migrants between
two particular countries. In Table 2.E1, I summarize the outcomes of estimations.
The results are close to what has been obtained in the previous versions (see Table 2.4). Both
immigrants and emigrants reduce bilateral trade costs, although the effects are limited. All
the estimates suggest that the effect of immigrants is stronger, which is in line with what was
obtained by Parsons (2012). This confirms the conclusions by Gould (1994), who states that the
information channel is more pronounced than the preference channel.
Using these parameters, I run a full liberalization simulation, assuming that bilateral trade costs
decrease with the stock of bilateral immigrants and emigrants (as in Docquier et al., 2015)). The
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TABLE 2.E1: Estimation of legal bilateral trade costs with network effects of migration
Dependent variable: ln τij Dependent variable: τij
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS PPML PPML PPML PPML
Tariff and 0.456*** -0.107 1.047*** 0.676*** 0.160 0.410** 0.819*** 0.893***
non-tariff barriers (0.175) (0.125) (0.163) (0.114) (0.249) (0.184) (0.211) (0.147)
Log emigrants -0.037*** -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.051*** -0.011* -0.029*** -0.019***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Log immigrants -0.062*** -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.053*** -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.046*** -0.057***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Log distance 0.215*** 0.290*** 0.164*** 0.243*** 0.217*** 0.346*** 0.154*** 0.249***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
Border -0.068 -0.021 -0.059 -0.005 -0.128 0.098 -0.107 0.098
(0.064) (0.030) (0.061) (0.028) (0.086) (0.075) (0.083) (0.072)
Language -0.050 -0.103*** -0.059 -0.079*** -0.070 -0.104** -0.072 -0.084**
(0.054) (0.026) (0.051) (0.024) (0.060) (0.042) (0.058) (0.039)
Year2000 -0.171*** -0.098*** -0.215*** -0.175***
(0.030) (0.016) (0.042) (0.024)
Log trade -0.062*** -0.041*** -0.074*** -0.055***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Constant 0.949*** 0.180 2.006*** 1.133*** 1.299*** -0.456*** 2.566*** 1.413***
(0.131) (0.128) (0.140) (0.130) (0.165) (0.160) (0.176) (0.171)
Origin FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Destination FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244
R-squared 0.315 0.873 0.382 0.890 0.190 0.839 0.267 0.877
Note: ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, standard errors in parenthesis. Source: own calculations.
results show that the network effects of migration on trade costs may bring some important gains
for both receiving and, more importantly, sending countries (see Table 2.E2, column 12). Canada
and Switzerland are the best examples of the former states. Considering, for example, the cases
of Turkey, Ireland or Korea shows that the latter instance is also possible. Quantitatively, the
network effects may increase the effects of the liberalization of migration and trade by more that
50 percent.
Network effects of migration on migration
Beine et al. (2011) gives evidence that migration networks have a strong impact on the value
of migration costs. In this robustness check, an additional mechanism is considered, namely
that the bilateral migration costs are functions of the actual numbers of migrants. Therefore, an
inflow of new immigrants has a decreasing effect on the value of migration costs (according to
Beine et al. (2011), the values of semi-elasticities of migration costs with respect to the number
of immigrants are: 0.2 for the low-skilled and 0.05 for the high-skilled). A similar strategy was
implemented by Docquier et al. (2015), who find that network effects on migration costs visibly
increase the gains from liberalizing migration. In the case of current model, the implication of
including migration networks are positive for all countries, for some of them the gains increase
by more than 100 percent. This modification solves one possible source of Lucas critic, the fact
that migration costs are (at least partly) endogenous.
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Brains waste
Many of the high-skilled emigrants take low-skilled occupations in the host countries. This
is more the case with non-OECD immigrants, however one cannot rule out this phenomenon
concerning the intra-OECD migration. Therefore, in the last robustness check, it is assumed
that 10 percent of high-skilled migrants works as low-skilled laborers. The results are negative
for all destinations, however the magnitude of the effect of brain waste on natives’ welfare is
rather small.
TABLE 2.E2: Robustness checks
Code Ref. σS σS σM σM   µ µ λ φ Net. Net. Brain
0.9 2.6 10 30 2 6 0.7 1.3 0.3 0.03 Tr. Mig. waste
AUS 6.15% 6.43% 6.06% 6.86% 5.91% 10.85% 3.10% 4.52% 8.22% 6.82% 5.78% 7.87% 7.04% 5.55%
AUT 0.57% 0.10% 0.67% 0.74% 0.51% 3.22% 0.10% 0.56% 0.58% -1.11% 0.56% 1.44% 0.63% 0.37%
BEL 1.33% 1.16% 1.38% 1.44% 1.30% 3.74% 0.18% 1.36% 1.28% 0.48% 1.33% 3.42% 1.33% 1.22%
CAN 6.83% 7.44% 6.64% 7.49% 6.62% 12.37% 2.71% 5.66% 8.28% 8.46% 6.62% 10.89% 7.30% 5.66%
CHE 6.71% 7.39% 6.49% 7.66% 6.39% 6.69% 3.48% 5.61% 8.03% 9.49% 6.42% 13.03% 7.21% 5.90%
CHL 1.62% 1.16% 1.71% 1.68% 1.61% 11.69% -0.34% 1.84% 1.37% -0.53% 1.68% 3.41% 1.50% 1.50%
CZE 0.00% -0.38% 0.08% 0.04% -0.01% 2.45% -0.22% 0.15% -0.18% -1.37% 0.03% 0.69% -0.05% -0.25%
DEU 0.51% 0.18% 0.60% 0.67% 0.46% 3.14% -0.06% 0.61% 0.40% -1.02% 0.53% 1.57% 0.51% 0.35%
DNK 0.28% 0.09% 0.34% 0.38% 0.26% 3.28% -0.10% 0.38% 0.16% -0.60% 0.30% 1.16% 0.26% 0.22%
ESP 0.19% 0.15% 0.20% 0.24% 0.17% 2.71% 0.00% 0.22% 0.14% 0.04% 0.20% 0.52% 0.17% -0.06%
EST 0.13% -0.06% 0.19% 0.18% 0.11% 3.18% -0.34% 0.30% -0.09% -0.52% 0.18% 0.86% 0.06% -0.31%
FIN 0.26% 0.06% 0.30% 0.30% 0.24% 3.25% -0.15% 0.35% 0.13% -0.63% 0.28% 0.95% 0.22% 0.14%
FRA 0.23% -0.08% 0.29% 0.29% 0.20% 3.11% -0.10% 0.30% 0.13% -0.70% 0.24% 0.84% 0.20% 0.00%
GBR -0.85% -1.34% -0.72% -0.68% -0.91% 3.12% -0.88% -0.33% -1.50% -2.27% -0.71% -0.24% -1.11% -1.45%
GRC -0.64% -0.65% -0.63% -0.51% -0.68% 2.49% -0.45% -0.30% -1.10% -0.73% -0.54% -0.49% -0.83% -0.90%
HUN -0.26% -0.54% -0.19% -0.22% -0.28% 2.44% -0.45% 0.00% -0.59% -1.34% -0.20% 0.35% -0.38% -0.59%
IRL 1.73% 1.56% 1.78% 1.93% 1.66% 4.77% -0.67% 1.98% 1.41% 0.73% 1.87% 4.35% 1.61% 1.32%
ISL -0.06% -0.42% 0.03% 0.05% -0.10% 5.65% -0.74% 0.28% -0.51% -1.62% 0.04% 0.86% -0.23% -0.25%
ISR 2.99% 3.18% 2.94% 3.42% 2.85% 8.37% 0.85% 2.55% 3.55% 3.48% 2.93% 5.36% 3.16% 1.80%
ITA -0.09% -0.34% -0.04% -0.01% -0.11% 2.65% -0.26% 0.10% -0.33% -1.10% -0.03% 0.35% -0.20% -0.18%
JPN 0.84% 0.74% 0.86% 0.90% 0.82% 6.19% -0.01% 0.88% 0.78% 0.42% 0.84% 1.79% 0.83% 0.44%
KOR 0.92% 0.84% 0.95% 1.01% 0.89% 8.45% -0.78% 1.38% 0.35% 0.17% 1.05% 2.99% 0.74% 0.37%
LUX -0.45% -0.67% -0.37% -0.36% -0.48% 2.64% -0.41% -0.24% -0.77% -1.29% -0.37% -0.05% -0.62% -0.96%
MEX 0.55% 0.60% 0.53% 0.70% 0.50% 14.39% -1.64% 1.60% -0.76% 0.69% 0.88% 2.93% -0.07% 0.42%
NLD 0.84% 0.61% 0.90% 0.99% 0.79% 3.50% -0.06% 0.93% 0.72% -0.20% 0.87% 2.30% 0.82% 0.57%
NOR 0.36% 0.18% 0.40% 0.45% 0.33% 2.61% -0.03% 0.42% 0.28% -0.15% 0.36% 1.28% 0.34% 0.14%
NZL 8.36% 10.90% 7.71% 8.93% 8.17% 17.35% 3.61% 6.53% 10.56% 13.38% 8.00% 10.07% 9.13% 7.49%
POL -0.69% -1.11% -0.59% -0.65% -0.70% 2.07% -0.53% -0.36% -1.09% -2.37% -0.62% -0.46% -0.83% -0.93%
PRT -1.26% -2.06% -1.17% -1.16% -1.30% 2.32% -0.89% -0.72% -1.95% -2.87% -1.11% -1.08% -1.61% -1.41%
SVK 0.08% -0.30% 0.16% 0.10% 0.07% 2.16% -0.24% 0.25% -0.13% -1.43% 0.11% 0.81% 0.01% -0.16%
SVN -0.09% -0.28% -0.04% -0.04% -0.10% 2.58% -0.32% 0.10% -0.33% -0.85% -0.04% 0.53% -0.18% -0.30%
SWE 0.45% 0.26% 0.50% 0.55% 0.42% 3.25% 0.01% 0.49% 0.39% -0.20% 0.45% 1.38% 0.45% 0.26%
TUR -0.16% -0.37% -0.12% -0.06% -0.19% 8.38% -0.75% 0.32% -0.74% -1.03% -0.03% 0.74% -0.48% -0.35%
USA 2.52% 2.49% 2.54% 2.85% 2.42% 5.85% 1.27% 1.93% 3.22% 2.34% 2.34% 3.32% 2.82% 1.94%
ROW -0.04% -0.06% -0.04% -0.03% -0.05% -0.54% 0.00% -0.04% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04% -0.09% -0.04% -0.58%
Note: The table provides the percent changes in the real wages of natives in the benchmark scenario and after taking
various values of key parameters, assuming a full liberalization in MID scenario. Source: own calculations.
Chapter 3
Time, Space and Skills in Designing
Migration Policy
Abstract
The chapter proposes a multi-country model of international migration, in which prospective
high-skilled emigrants choose their destination country, preferred type of visa, and the optimal
duration of stay. Combining these elements into a unified theoretical framework provides a
micro-foundation for multilateral resistance to migration. The application of the proposed theory
consists in investigating global demographic implications of decreasing the costs of 6-year visas
for the high-skilled professionals in the EU, calibrated as an introduction of H1B visas. This is
compared with a policy of providing fiscal incentives (reduction of income tax rate) for medium-
term, college-educated foreign workers. The two counterfactuals indicate a significant increase
in the yearly inflows and total stocks of high-skilled immigrants in the EU. The outcomes of
the former policy are driven by “visa-substitution” effect within the group of current emigrants,
while the latter scenario provokes new entries of the previous never-migrants. Both policies
induce the “talent-stealing” effect - losses of skilled migrants by the non-EU states, which is
significantly reinforced by the multilateral resistance to migration.
Keywords: migration policy, temporary migration, discrete choice models, H1B visas.
JEL: F22, J61.
3.1 Introduction
The quality of immigrants emerges as a key objective in determining migration policy in many
destination countries. In the US, the Immigration Act of 1990 established the H1B visa, which is
aimed at attracting well-educated professionals from all over the world for a temporary working
period. Selectivity of immigrants has become one of the most recognizable features of national
migration policies in Australia, Canada or New Zealand. These countries impose immigration
quotas and evaluate the candidates using a point-based system. Despite these restrictions, they
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still attract large waves of highly skilled individuals, which enables them to shape the size and
the structure of incoming workforce.1
Until recently, in contrast, the EU proposed less restrictive regulations, and did not attach great
importance to the quality of immigrants. Such a migration policy often did not meet the needs
of internal labor market and the expectations of potential immigrants. In 2009 the European
Parliament passed a union-wide solution to the problem of Europe’s attractiveness for the edu-
cated immigrants. The European Blue Card (EBC) program is constructed for those high-skilled
non-EU workers, who wish to spend between one and four years in the EU as a professional
employee. This initiative resembles the H1B visa, however, the popularity of both proves to
be drastically different. In 2014, the US issued 316,000 H1B visas (124,000 new issues and
192,000 prolongations), while the efficacy of EBC seems to be disappointing with only 13,000
issues in 2014. One might ask about the causes of this discrepancy. Is it due to the fact that EBC
is a relatively new policy (launched in 2013), and potential candidates are not well informed
about a novel emigration option? Or, conversely, is the EU immanently less attractive than other
rich destinations, and any liberalization of migration policy would never improve it? Finally,
how does the effect of visa liberalization compares to a pecuniary incentive for new high-skilled
immigrants: a tax concession program?2
The observed discrepancy in migration policies in the EU and other rich destinations is the core
motivation for this research. The chapter tries to identify the consequences of reducing this dif-
ference for the global flows of high-skilled migrants. I give quantitative evidence about the effi-
cacy of two migration policies in the EU: an implementation of H1B visa, and an alternative tax
reduction scheme for the college-educated immigrants. Taking the striking difference between
the US and the EU in the effects of visa policies as the reference point, I run a counterfactual
experiment of implementing American resolutions (H1B visas) in Europe, and I compare it to
a fiscal incentive for the high-skilled immigrants. I propose a multi-country model with utility-
maximizing heterogeneous agents, who endogenously decide about the destination of emigra-
tion, the visa to apply for, and the optimal duration of stay, in an environment of imperfect
information. People differ in their subjective preferences towards living in all the possible des-
tinations, and, independently of that, may experience different, unanticipated, random shocks
after having emigrated. Heterogeneity in preferences results in individual-specific choices of
destination country and visa, whereas the heterogeneity in unexpected migration costs differen-
tiates the optimal duration of stay. In this framework, I quantify the new distribution of migrants
across 35 richest destinations, resulting from counterfactual migration policy liberalizations for
the high-skilled workers in the EU.
Along with the quantitative results, this study contributes to the theoretical literature on mod-
eling international migration. This is the first approach towards enriching a classical discrete
choice model (with many sending and receiving countries) in the vein of McFadden (1973),
with agents’ decisions about the duration of stay, inspired by Djajic´ (2014a). For a simplified
version of this model I provide closed-form solutions for the probabilities of emigration and
the distribution of duration of stay. Since the full model becomes relatively complex at some
1 Recent literature documents that international migration brings a non-trivial impact on the welfare of natives in the
sending and the receiving countries (Aubry et al., 2014, Docquier et al., 2015). An important role in this process
is played by the selection of migrants regarding their education level (Grogger and Hanson, 2011).
2 This particular immigration policy is motivated by the fact that some European countries actually provide a re-
stricted tax concession program. For example, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden offer tax
exemptions for foreign researchers and scientists (following the CES IFO report on: Tax concessions for brain-
power - Tax policy as a measure in the competition for brainpower, and the OECD (2011)). In my counterfactual
simulations I propose a more liberal approach, that is a reduction in income taxation for all college-educated
immigrants, not only the tertiary-educated ones.
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level, I solve it numerically. Furthermore, following Bertoli and Moraga (2013), the proposed
theoretical framework gives a micro-foundation for multilateral resistance to migration (MRM),
by relaxing the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom (as a consequence of a non-
trivial correlation structure between discrete choice options).3 In this framework, I experiment
with alternative visa policies in the EU.4 I focus on the way the migration policy affects the desti-
nation choices of migrants (geographical dimension), the duration of stay (time dimension), and
the selection of migrants with respect to their education levels (skill dimension). The theoretical
and numerical outcomes show that a simultaneous consideration of these three factors enables
to single previously overlooked economic effects out. Moreover, neglecting MRM due to disre-
garding some of those dimensions may bring a significant bias in the quantitative evaluation of
counterfactual migration policies.
Considering the numerical outcomes of the simulations, I give evidence that the proposed mod-
ifications of the EU’s migration policy may have a visible impact on the supply of skilled labor.
Implementing an H1B visa in the EU increases the yearly flows of college-educated workers
by 3 percent, and the total stocks 6.1 percent. This policy improves the relative attractiveness
of medium-term visas in Europe, therefore, it induces the “visa-substitution” effect: the current
migrants with short-term and long-term visas are now more prone to substitute them for cheaper
medium-term visas within the same destination. However, the H1B policy has no impact on the
absolute attractiveness of Europe: no new never-migrants are invited. Additional flows are pro-
cured by the “talent-stealing” effect: some of the current migrants in non-EU countries decide
to migrate to the EU. In terms of the tax concession policy, the aggregated flows of high-skilled
immigrants in Europe increase by 10.6 percent, while total stocks change by 5.6 percent. In this
case, the “visa-substitution” effect is quantitatively less important, while the “talent-stealing”
effect remains sizable. The main economic force that determines the high raise in inflows, is
the augmentation of the absolute attractiveness of Europe, which induces a strong “new-entry”
effect of previous never-migrants.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next Section I briefly summarize the ref-
erence literature. The third Section presents a general overview of the model, and the analytical
solution to its simplified version with one visa. This is followed by a description of multi-visa
models, in Section 4. Section 5 discusses data used, as well as numerical procedures of calibra-
tion and simulations. Section 6 analyzes the results of counterfactual simulations and Section 7
concludes.
3.2 Related literature
The proposed theoretical approach contributes to three important strands of literature on in-
ternational migration. First, the study relates to the literature on migrants’ location choice in
multi-country systems. Then, since I explicitly model decisions about the duration of stay, I re-
fer to the literature on temporary and return migration. Finally, since the core of the model is
the computation of the effects of redesigning visa portfolios and implementing fiscal incentives,
I refer to the broad literature on migration policy.
3 Multilateral resistance to migration allows for complex interdependencies among the choice options. In particular,
with MRM, a change in the attractiveness of a third country (caused by an increase in net income, or a reduction
in bilateral migration costs), can have an indirect impact on the relative ordering of preference towards emigrating
to any two distinct destinations.
4 The model considers 178 sending countries and 35 developed destinations: 28 EU members, Australia, Canada,
Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the US.
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A large body of research in international migration concentrates on explaining the motives for
choosing particular destination countries. To describe the location decisions at the macro level,
both theoretical and empirical papers exploit the random utility maximization (RUM) model
proposed by McFadden (1973). Empirical contributions by Grogger and Hanson (2011), Beine
et al. (2011) or Belot and Hatton (2012) give evidence on the main drivers of destination choice
in the framework of logit model. Docquier and Machado (2015) and Docquier et al. (2015) make
use of this model to quantify the consequences of reducing barriers to migration in a global con-
text. All of these approaches consider only permanent immigration, and assume independence
across the choice options. In a nutshell, the economic situation in a third country has no impact
on the relative odds of emigrating to any two destinations. Evidence by Bertoli and Moraga
(2013, 2015) suggests, however, the contrary. According to their findings, the interdependence
across decisions is a substantial factor that determines the incentives to migrate, the overall size,
and the composition of migration flows. This multilateral resistance to migration creates a chal-
lenge for both empirical and theoretical modelers. Considering the econometric models, follow-
ing the seminal paper by Bertoli and Moraga (2013), the correlations across choice options are
structured in individuals’ preferences, following McFadden (1978). Depending on the model
specification, these relations can be controlled using origin-time, destination-time, or origin-
nest dummies (Beine et al., 2015, Beine and Parsons, 2015, Bertoli et al., 2013, Ortega and
Peri, 2013). However, the theoretical literature lacks in a micro-based explanation to this phe-
nomenon. In response, the model introduces the time dimension of migration decisions, which
by definition, imposes correlations across the choice options, and provides a micro-foundation
for multilateral resistance to migration.
The time dimension in people’s decisions about international migration has been introduced
to theoretical models of migration in the early works by Djajic´ and Milbourne (1988), Djajic´
(1989), Galor and Stark (1990), Dustmann (1993), and Borjas and Bratsberg (1996). These
papers also treat the choice of the length of the period spent abroad as a solution to the utility
maximization problem. A representative person cares about the life-cycle utility which depends
on the level of wages or the total stock of financial, or human capital.5 More recently, Dust-
mann and Weiss (2007), Adda et al. (2014), and Dustmann and Görlach (2015) mention four
mechanisms that bring incentives for deciding to migrate temporarily.6 Furthermore, Dustmann
and Görlach (2015) provide a thorough analysis of hitherto state of literature on temporary mi-
gration and construct a theoretical model which incorporates these potential motives for earlier
return. Dustmann et al. (2011) proposes a two-skill, two-country model to account for specific
selection and return patterns. They conclude that people have more incentives to stay in a coun-
try that rewards more their main skill, so that in aggregated terms, temporary migration is a
source of “brain circulation”.7 The fact that temporary migrants may bring significant positive
5 Nakajima (2014) proposes an alternative theoretical setup assuming that each immigrant is characterized by a
“homesickness” parameter - a disutility of living abroad. Using the data from Mexican Migration Project Survey,
the author finds that people return earlier because the gains from staying longer in the US are not large enough to
compensate for their homesickness.
6 These factors are: (1) high preferences for consumption in home country when the wages are low, (2) high
purchasing power of the currency of destination country in the home country, (3) a vanishing wage differential
between host and source countries, when the immigrant accumulates human capital, and finally (4) an accelerated
human capital accumulation in the destination country.
7 A relatively new strand of literature emphasizes the “brain circulation” process which is a direct consequence of
return migration. This approach is a complement rather than a substitute to the well-developed notions of “brain
drain” and “brain gain”. In the case of “brain drain”, emigration necessarily causes impoverishment of the sending
countries, because those who decide to leave the country of birth are the well-educated workers (Docquier and
Rapoport, 2012). The positive selection of out-migration causes negative economic effects for the sources, since
the benefits are transferred to the destinations along with the flow of human capital. An immediate response to
this theory is the concept of “brain gain” which stresses the fact that in the poorer countries, rational economic
agents would invest in their education in order to increase their chance to emigrate. This process, in the long run,
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spillovers for the sending countries is highlighted, among others, by Dustmann and Görlach
(2015). Bijwaard and Wahba (2014) empirically confirm that such a process takes place, and the
high-earners are more likely to return home.
In support for distinguishing between temporary and permanent migrants, some studies give
evidence about differences in characteristics and economic behaviors between the two groups.
Considering, for example, the accumulation of financial resources, various strategies (condi-
tional on migrant’s duration of stay) are reported by Djajic´ and Vinogradova (2015), Dustmann
and Mestres (2010a,b), Kırdar (2009). Thanks to the availability of micro-level data, some au-
thors managed to quantify the properties of the actual distribution of the length of stay, and the
factors which make people migrate temporarily (Aydemir and Robinson, 2008, Bijwaard, 2010,
Bijwaard et al., 2014, Bijwaard and Wahba, 2014, Dustmann, 2003, Pinger, 2010). In terms
of theoretical modeling, the works by Djajic´ (2014a,b) propose two-countries, continuous-time
models in which the decisions about the duration of stay are endogenized. In fact, the majority
of papers that consider the time dimension in migration decisions disregard the choice of loca-
tions, and analyze a dyad of a sending and a receiving country. This chapter differs from the
previous ones by developing a theoretical model in which people select both location and the
time period spent abroad.
The question of designing an efficient migration policy in the developed regions still remains
opened (Czaika and De Haas, 2013). Countries, which experience a sizable inflow of new
immigrants (Canada, Australia, New Zealand), proposed a selective visa policy that depends
on a point system of evaluating the candidates for visas. However, recently they turn to the
US pattern of employer-sponsored visas for the high-skilled (Koslowski, 2014), which proves
to be a successful way of attracting highly productive talents (Peri et al., 2013). Martín and
Venturini (2015) evaluate the current state of EU’s visa policy. Noticing its simplicity and
underdevelopment, they propose a unified and comprehensive modification at the EU level.
The relation between temporary flows of people and migration policy is analyzed by Thom
(2010). By simulating a two-country model, the author concludes that more restrictions leads
to a smaller gross flow of Mexicans to the US. However, the stock of immigrants may rise due
to an increase in the average length of stay of those who decide to emigrate. Constant and
Zimmermann (2011) point out that people decide to migrate temporarily (and circularly) when
the barriers for mobility decline. In a multi-country context, Giordani and Ruta (2013) and De la
Croix and Docquier (2012) suggest the possibility of coordination failures in terms of designing
international migration policies which lead to a Pareto-dominated outcomes. In conclusion, they
express the need for a global coordination in migration policy.8
3.3 Decisions about destination and the duration of stay
I start with introducing a general version of the model. The ex ante decision (which is reached
before migrating), is analyzed below. At this stage agents know their individual preferences
towards living in different countries j ∈ N , represented by random components: εj , and the
expected (or equivalently, anticipated) country-pair-specific cost of migration from i to j: xji.
would eventually provide strong positive effect for the developing economies. Finally, considering the fact that
not all migrants are permanent, the returnees are expected to bring their human, social and entrepreneurial capital
home. This process is broadly referred to as “brain circulation”.
8 Works by Facchini and Mayda (2008), Facchini et al. (2011), Facchini and Willmann (2005) treat migration policy
as endogenous and dependent on various factors. They try to determine the causes of different migration policies,
and relate them to external interest groups, strategies of politicians, or lobbyists.
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These variables includes legal (in particular: visa) and psychological, sociological, as well as
cultural costs. The ex post decision (reached after migrating) is subject to additional informa-
tion. The values of unforeseen costs of living abroad (denoted by ρji) are revealed, and force
individuals to modify their decisions about the duration of stay. The latter is analyzed in the next
subsection.
Consider an economic agent, who currently lives in country i and considers moving to country
j ∈ N .9 Each individual is economically active for one period which lasts 1 unit of time,
equivalent to 50 years.10 She can choose any of N destinations grouped in the choice set N ,
including her homeland i. Receiving countries differ in the levels of net wages (denoted by
vj) and in the expected costs of migration, (labeled by xji(d¯)), dependent on the authorized
maximal duration of stay d¯ ∈ [0, 1].11 Furthermore, each country j ∈ N provides an individual
offer of visas for the prospective immigrants. Assume that there are Dj types of permissions
of stay in a destination j, and each migrant selects her preferred option d¯ ∈ Dj . Assuming
her ex ante decision to be binding, an immigrant would spend time d¯ abroad and return to her
homeland for the remaining part of her life: 1− d¯.
People have heterogeneous preferences towards living in each receiving country. Consequently,
the utility component related to living in state j ∈ N is augmented with an agent-specific
random term εj , which represents the taste for living in country j.12 Assume that εj is an
iid stochastic variable distributed according to the Gumbel’s distribution. In this vein, this
approach refers to the literature which uses the discrete choice random utility maximization
(RUM) model.13
All the above-mentioned values are known to the agent ex ante, that is before the actual moving.
What is not revealed to the individual, is the unanticipated migration cost, ρji, which enters the
utility function quadratically. This element represents the unforeseen cultural, social and institu-
tional aspects of living abroad for a migrant from i to j, in contrast with the expected migration
cost xji(d¯), known ex ante.14 Having no experience in being a part of a foreign society, an agent
predicts that emigration may be either detrimental for his lifetime utility (positive value of ρji),
or beneficial (ρji < 0), if the lifestyle in the destination country suits them better. Therefore,
she forms an ex ante (before emigration) expectation of the value of this parameter. I consider
9 This model describes only the behavior of high-skilled individuals. However, a model with many types of agents,
differentiated with respect to their education level, is a straightforward extension. In fact, the previous versions of
the model considered two education levels (low- and high-skilled), which boiled down to indexing all the variables
with superscripts: s ∈ {L,H}, and considering the skill-specific environments separately, at the same time.
10 Time in this model is assumed to be continuous, however I consider the states of the world in two discrete point:
the reference point t = 0 and the terminal point: t = 1. The period is assumed to last for 50 years, normalized to
unity.
11 These costs are known to every potential emigrant, and are identical across all individuals, who move from i to
j. They may relate to some objective discrepancies between the source and the destination country, i.e. distance,
differences in culture, or social norms. Additionally, since this foreseen migration costs is specific to a particular
type of visa, it incorporates all legal barriers to migrate.
12 Individual heterogeneity may be linked to personal qualities of an agent, her ability to assimilate, specific qualifi-
cations (language skills), or simply reflect the preferences.
13 The theoretical consequence of this assumption is the possibility to represent the choice probability as a logit. An
alternative would be to use the Gaussian distribution, which would lead to choice probabilities defined as probits.
The unquestioned advantage of the first solution is its simplicity when it comes to solving the model with many
choice options. In practice, considering the further modifications of the reference model and their calibration
strategies, εj could be distributed according to any continuous distribution defined on R. However, I decide to
keep the assumption about Gumble’s distribution to directly compare the results with classical migration models.
14 The concept of unforeseen migration cost may be illustrated with all random events that take place after emigrat-
ing, and cannot be ex ante internalized by individuals, i.e. satisfaction from a new job, social networks in the host
country, or even nostalgia for the homeland. This additional migration cost is the second source of heterogeneity
across agents.
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a situation in which ρji is distributed according to a probability density function ρ¯(·) defined
on R. Since ex ante people have neutral expectations about the unforeseen circumstances after
migration (all other foreseeable factors are captured by xji(d¯)), a necessary requirement is that
E[ρ¯ji] = 0. Thus, ex ante the expected value of the unforeseen migration cost does not influence
the choice of destination and visa type. In this way, ρji brings the second source of heterogeneity
across agents. In brief, the model considers people having “bad” draws of unexpected migration
costs, characterized by ρji > 0 (where ρij is the realization of a random variable ρ¯ij , indepen-
dent of individual preferences towards different destinations, εj), and those who assimilate well
in the host country, with: ρji < 0.
After entering the labor market in country i, an individual compares the expected, ex ante, gains
in each country j, represented by a linear, random utility function (considered, among others,
by Grogger and Hanson, 2011)15:
E[Uji(d¯)] = d¯
(
α
(
vj − xji(d¯)
)
+ εj − d¯E[ρ¯ji]/2
)
+ (1− d¯) (αvi + εi) . (3.1)
In order to reach their decisions about future location, individuals compare the levels of net
wages across all destination j ∈ N .16 They also consider their individual tastes towards liv-
ing in foreign countries and potential costs ascribed to moving (both tangible and non-tangible
ones). In details, α is the marginal utility of income, and vj is the net wage (gross wage in USD
PPP reduced by mandatory income taxes in destination j). xji(d¯) stands for expected, bilateral
migration cost of moving from i to j, for a period of length d¯, determined by the receiving
country visa policy: d¯ ∈ Dj . The legal part of this cost is the main policy instrument of the
destination authority targeted at influencing the total flows of high-skilled immigrants. Addi-
tionally, as stated before, the utility depends on the individual preferences: ε’s, and the expected
value of the unforeseen migration cost equal, by assumption, to 0. Finally, the ex ante decision
boils down to selecting the preferred destination country j∗ and the duration of stay d¯∗ defined
by the visa portfolioDj∗ . The agent chooses fromK =
∑N
j=1Dj options, and takes the optimal
ex ante decision:
(j∗, d¯∗) = argmax
j∈N , d¯∈Dj
E[Uji(d¯)]. (3.2)
After reaching a new destination country, agents discover the exact value of the unforeseen
migration cost ρji. Their ex ante measure of utility (3.1) is therefore modified by considering
the actual realization ρji of the random variable ρ¯ji. Given that the return cost is incorporated
in the expected migration cost xji, the agent has to re-optimize the decision about the length of
her stay by defining the time after which she would like to return to her homeland.17
Formally, the ex post utility for an immigrant from i to j, who acquired a visa of duration d¯∗ is:
Uj∗i(d¯
∗, d) = d
(
α
(
vj∗ − xj∗i(d¯∗)
)
+ εj∗ − dρj∗i/2
)
+ (1− d) (αvi + εi) . (3.3)
15 Linear utility assumes constant marginal utility of income. At the other extreme, the log-utility would impose
decreasing marginal utility of income, and might lead to different quantitative and qualitative results.
16 I explicitly assume that prospective emigrants do not face credit constraints. This is credible for the high-skilled
individuals, following Djajic´ et al. (2013), who give evidence that credit constraint are vital for migration decisions
of the low-skilled, low-earning agents.
17 The model assumes that people have no incentives to move to any other foreign country. Additionally, there is
no option to overstay temporary visas. The second limitation may be implemented with an additional (monetary
and psychological) utility cost connected with becoming an illegal resident. Therefore, only those who have
strong preferences towards the host country (but not strong enough to apply for a visa with longer duration)
would prolong the duration of temporary visa. Since the problem of overstaying is mainly related with low-skilled
migrants, overstaying is not explicitly modeled in this chapter.
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Notice that this utility function is defined for a given destination j∗ and a given visa type d¯∗
determined in the ex ante decision problem (3.2). Eventually, each individual reconsiders her
emigration strategy by selecting the optimal duration of migration spell (expressed now by d ∈
[0, 1]), through the maximization of her ex post (after emigration) utility:
d∗ = argmax
d∈[0,1]
Uj∗i(d¯
∗, d) (3.4)
The optimal, ex post duration is an interior solution, d∗ ∈ (0, 1), if and only if at the moment d an
individual is indifferent between staying abroad and returning home (possible only if ρji > 0).
In contrast, when ρji ≤ 0, an immigrant will certainly stay until the expiration date of visa:
d∗ = d¯∗.
3.3.1 A model with one, permanent-stay visa
This subsection focuses on a simplified version of the general model. The aim is to obtain
analytical solutions for the ex post aggregates which describe migrants’ durations of stay across
destinations. To start with, assume that only one type of visa is available in every receiving
country. Suppose that this visa offers a permission to immigrate permanently. Therefore, a
person may decide to stay at home (equivalent to setting d¯∗ = 0) or to emigrate to any country j
(so that d¯∗ = 1 and j∗ = j). Determining the ex ante duration of stay is, thus, a discrete choice
from N available options:
∃j ∈ N : α (vj − xji) + εj > αvi + εi ⇒ d¯∗ = 1 & j∗ = j,
∀j ∈ N : α (vj − xji) + εj ≤ αvi + εi ⇒ d¯∗ = 0 & j∗ = i.
(3.5)
All in all, individuals select destinations with the highest expected utility, and immediately move
there (or stay in their country of birth). Therefore, each of them faces a standard discrete choice
problem analyzed by McFadden (1984), so that the probability to choose a destination j by an
agent born in country i is equal to:
piji =
exp [α (vj − xji)]∑N
k=1 exp [α (vk − xki)]
. (3.6)
Notice that the result (3.6) implies that the ratio of probabilities to emigrate to any two distinct
destinations j, k ∈ N fulfills the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom:
piji
piki
= exp [α (vj − xji − vk + xki)] . (3.7)
IIA imposes that the relative odds of emigrating to countries j and k are solely functions of the
characteristics of these two destination. Equivalently, adding another destination would influ-
ence all the other choice probabilities in the same way, so that the relation between any two of
them would remain unchanged. In this setup, there is no correlation between two particular op-
tions, as the axiom states: the relative chances of selecting any two possibilities are independent
of other (irrelevant) ones.
The second key simplification of the model concerns the distribution of unforeseen costs of
living abroad: ρ¯ji. Consider the simplest density function that fulfills the demanded requirement
(zero expected value): a symmetric two-point distribution. Assume that ρ¯ji can take two possible
values: −ρji or ρji, with equal probabilities. Now, the ex post decision reached by a permanent
Chapter 3. Time, Space and Skills in Designing Migration Policy 85
migrant determines the optimal duration of stay. Being granted a visa, a person may stay in the
receiving country as long as she wants. By solving the maximization problem (3.4), one gets:
Proposition 3.1. The optimal, ex post duration of migration is given by:
d∗ =
{
min
{
ρ−1j∗i (Vj∗i + εj∗ − εi) ; 1
}
, if ρj∗i > 0,
1, if ρj∗i < 0,
(3.8)
where Vj∗i ≡ α(vj∗ − xj∗i − vi) is the net value of migration.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
A temporary migrant is characterized by 0 < d∗ < 1, whereas a permanent migrant sets d∗ = 1.
This division depends only on the comparison of objective amenities between two destinations
and on the subjective preferences towards living in home and foreign country. In fact, when
ρji > 0, d∗ is a random variable with tractable statistical characteristics. Consider the prob-
ability that a person characterized by ρji > 0 moves abroad for a period shorter than a given
δ ≤ 1.
Pr [d < δ] = Pr
[
ρ−1ji (Vji + εj − εi) < δ
]
= Pr [ρjiδ + εi > Vji + εj ] =
eρjiδ
eρjiδ + eVji
.
(3.9)
This probability increases in ρji, because the higher the realization of unforeseen migration
cost, the lower the propensity to stay in a foreign country. On the contrary, greater discrepancy
between remunerations in destination and source, Vji, decreases the chance that a randomly
chosen individual returns to the homeland. What one obtains is a well-defined CDF of the
random variable d∗, with a support on R. Let it be labeled by F (·), while the associated PDF be
represented by f(·).
Corollary 3.2. When ρji > 0, for a given δ ≤ 1, the probability of staying for a period shorter
than δ (the CDF of the duration of stay) is:
F (δ) =
eρjiδ
eρjiδ + eVji
. (3.10)
The PDF of the duration stay, defined ∀ d ∈ R, is:
f(d) =
ρjie
ρjid+Vji(
eρjid + eVji
)2 . (3.11)
Proof. The CDF is derived in equation (3.9). The PDF is the first derivative of the CDF.
However, in what follows, I focus only on those individuals who decide to migrate, so that
necessarily d > 0. The probability of such an event is given by:
Pr [Vji + εj > εi] =
eVji
1 + eVji
. (3.12)
The positive sign of d is guaranteed by agent’s ex ante decision about emigration to country j (if
it had not been the case, then country j would have never been considered as a potential destina-
tion for emigration). Therefore, I restrict the analysis to conditional probabilities, densities and
moments, knowing that for sure: d > 0. Consequently, for a given δ ∈ [0, 1] the probability that
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a person stays in the destination country for a period shorter than δ (conditional on emigrating),
is given by:
Pr [d < δ|d > 0] = 1 + e
Vji
eVji
∫ δ
0
ρjie
ρjit+Vji(
eρjit + eVji
)2dt = eρjiδ − 1eρjiδ + eVji . (3.13)
This function defines the conditional CDF of migration duration, defined on R++. I will refer
to this distribution as Fd>0(·). The associated PDF is expressed by fd>0(·).
Corollary 3.3. When ρji > 0, for a given δ ≤ 1, the probability of staying for a period shorter
than δ conditional on emigrating (the CDF of the positive duration of stay) is:
Fd>0(δ) =
eρjiδ − 1
eρjiδ + eVji
. (3.14)
The PDF of the duration stay, conditional on emigrating, defined ∀ d ∈ (0;∞), is:
fd>0(d) =
ρjie
ρjid(1 + eVji)
(eρjid + eVji)2
. (3.15)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
According to equations (3.14) and (3.15), a higher unforeseen cost leads to shorter durations of
stay (the mass of probability is concentrated on the left hand side, see Figure 3.1, Panel A and
C). Conversely, if the net value of migration Vij rises, then the length of a period spent abroad
increases, which is depicted by a shift of probability density towards the right hand side, see
Figure 3.1, Panel B and D.
ρji = 3 ρji = 5 ρji = 7 ρji = 5 ρji = 5 ρji = 5
Vji = 2 Vji = 2 Vji = 2 Vji = −1 Vji = 2 Vji = 5
FIGURE 3.1: Comparative statics of conditional distributions of durations of stay, with respect
to unforeseen migration costs ρ and net value of migration V .
Source: own calculations.
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The group of individuals with ρji > 0, is divided into a sub-group of temporary immigrants,
and a sub-group of permanent residents. Using the defined conditional density, the probabilities
that a random migrant falls into either of two sub-groups are given by:
Proposition 3.4. The probability of being a temporary migrant is given by:
Pr [d < 1|d > 0] = Fd>0(1) = e
ρji − 1
eρji + eVji
. (3.16)
The probability of being a permanent migrant is given by:
Pr [d ≥ 1|d > 0] = 1− Fd>0(1) = 1 + e
Vji
eρji + eVji
. (3.17)
Proof. The consequence of the definition of conditional CDF of duration.
Finally, let us aggregate the total number of foreign workers for different origins, destinations
and status. Consider a single wave of immigrants flowing from country i to country j 6= i in
the beginning of a period (call it wave t = 0, the subscript is omitted). In time τ ∈ (0, 1)
the total stock of workers originating from this wave is denoted by: Nji(τ). A temporary
migrant is a person who returns to her home country earlier than after 50 years (his duration
of migration spell is d∗ < 1). A permanent migrant stays in the destination country for all her
life. Let the stock of individuals from the first group be labeled by: N˜ji(0), whereas the second:
Nˆji(0). Therefore, right after emigrating, when τ → 0, the total stock of foreign workers
originating from i and residing in j is: Nji(τ) = N˜ji(τ) + Nˆji(τ). Notice that when τ → 1
all the temporary workers return home, and the only foreign labor force left are the permanent
immigrants. Consequently, the number of non-native citizens from the analyzed wave is equal
to: Nˆji(τ). In aggregated terms, the total stock of employees from a particular wave t = 0,
living in country j at period τ is equal to the sum of natives and foreigners, who decided to
immigrate:
Lj(τ) =
N∑
i=1
Nji(τ). (3.18)
The share of permanent migrants goes to one if the ratio of wages between destination and
source country tends to infinity. Similarly, if the unforeseen costs are growing, then all the po-
tential migrants stay for a short period of time and the fraction of permanent stayers diminishes
completely. According to the previous notations:
N˜ji =
eρji − 1
eρji + eVji
Nji
2
, Nˆji =
(
1 + eVji
eρji + eVji
+ 1
)
Nji
2
. (3.19)
The key question from the point of view of the destination country is the actual labor force that
is attracted during a period of one generation. One can calculate this number using the density
of the average duration of stay of all migrants. Of course, permanent migrants fully contribute
to the host country’s labor supply, so their weight in the aggregate is 1 (taking the units of
the generation period, 50 years). Therefore they provide exactly: Nˆji units of labor. More
computation is required to determine the labor force of temporary migrants, since everyone stays
in the destination country according to her individual optimal decision about d∗. In consequence,
a temporary migrant does not participate in the foreign labor market for the whole period, but
individually decides about her optimal duration of stay. Knowing the country-pair-specific,
conditional distributions of durations of stay (derived in Proposition 3.4), it suffices to compute
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the following conditional expectation: Ed>0[d∗|d∗ < 1]. After summing up temporary and
permanent migrants, one arrives at an expression that (multiplied by the total, gross migration
flow: Nji) represents the effective labor supply in country j originating from country i during
one period of time.
Proposition 3.5. The total labor force in country j immigrating from country i (expressed in the
number of foreigners available for the period of one generation, 50 years) is equal to:
Lji(Vji, ρji) =
Nji
2
(
1 + eVji
ρjieVji
ln
(
1 + eVji
1 + eVji−ρji
)
+ 1
)
. (3.20)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
Some asymptotic properties of Lji function with respect to its arguments are depicted in the
following:
Corollary 3.6.
lim
ρji→0
Lji(Vji, ρij) = Nji, lim
Vji→∞
Lji(Vji, ρji) = Nji,
lim
ρji→∞
Lji(Vji, ρji) = Nji/2, lim
Vji,t→−∞
Lji(Vji, ρji) = Nji
(1− e−ρji)
ρji
,
lim
ρji→0
Lji(−∞, ρji) = Nji, lim
ρji→∞
Lji(−∞, ρji) = Nji/2.
(3.21)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
When the unforeseen cost goes to zero, or the ratio between remunerations in destination and
source is infinitely large, then all the migrants become permanent residents. On the contrary,
when ρji goes to infinity, all the temporary migrants leave immediately from the hosting country.
Infinitely small value of Vji implies that the overall labor supply of migrants becomes a function
of ρji only, in such a way that the previously stated properties are preserved.
3.4 Multi-destination and multi-visas model
In this Section, I solve a multi-country model of migration in which each destination offers
several visa options. Considering a version with two visas (a permit for a temporary and a per-
manent stay), I show that the model violates the IIA axiom and provides a micro-foundation for
multilateral resistance to migration. Additional assumptions concerning countries’ visa policy
allow to solve this model analytically. Then, I describe the multi-destination three-visas model.
Due to computational complexities, there is no closed-form solution of this extension. However,
in the next Section, this version of the model is going to be calibrated and simulated using nu-
merical methods, so that I will be able to verify that the properties of reduced form models can
still be observed.
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3.4.1 Model with two types of visas
Consider a system of N countries: state i, from which people emigrate, and states 1, ..., N
which, along with country i, that are the potential destinations. Each state is characterized by
a certain level of net wage labeled by vj . Workers may choose to apply for a temporary visa,
which allows to stay for a period
[
0, d¯t
]
, d¯t < 1 or a permanent visa with d¯p = 1. The costs
of living with these permissions are respectively: xji(d¯t) and xji(d¯p), if one wants to emigrate
from country i to country j ∈ {1, ..., N}. I explicitly assume that xji(d¯p) > xji(d¯t) for j 6= i.
Otherwise, nobody would acquire a temporary visa. When an agent decides to stay in state i,
she pays no migration costs, so that: xii(d¯t) = xii(d¯p) = 0. Consequently, the ex ante expected
utilities ascribed to every possible decision are as follows:
E[Uii] = αvi + εi,
E[Uji(d¯t)] = d¯t
(
α
(
vj − xji(d¯t)
)− d¯tE[ρ¯ji]/2 + εj)+ (1− d¯t) (αvi + εi) ,
E[Uji(d¯p)] = α
(
vj − xji(d¯p)
)− E[ρ¯ji]/2 + εj . (3.22)
As before, ex ante E[ρ¯ji] = 0 ∀j, i ∈ N . According to the former definition, utilities are no
longer independent, and, in general, do not fulfill the standard IIA axiom. These correlations re-
sult from the fact that temporary migrants consider wages in the source and the host economies
as the determinants of lifetime migration choices. Thus, one cannot use the theorem by McFad-
den (1984) in calculating the choice probabilities. To make the solution of these computations
as simple as possible, without losing the main result, some additional assumption have to be
imposed:
Proposition 3.7. If allN destination countries offer the same duration of temporary visas (equal
to d¯t) and the differences in permanent and temporary migration costs are identical across des-
tinations: ∆ = xji(d¯p) − xji(d¯t) = xki(d¯p) − xki(d¯t) for j 6= k, i, j, k ∈ {1, ..., N}, then the
unconditional probabilities of emigrating to a particular country j 6= i are equal to:
P [E[Uii] = max] =
eαvi∑N
k=1 e
α(vk−xki(d¯t))
,
P [E[Uji(d¯t)] = max] =
eα(vj−xji(d¯t))∑N
k=1 e
α(vk−xki(d¯t))
− e
α(vj−xji(d¯t))∑
k 6=i eα(vk−xki(d¯
t)) + e
α
(
vi+
∆
1−d¯t
) ,
P [E[Uji(d¯p)] = max] =
eα(vj−xji(d¯t))∑
k 6=i eα(vk−xki(d¯
t)) + e
α
(
vi+
∆
1−d¯t
) .
(3.23)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
In order to make those probabilities comparable with a standard case that fulfills IIA, consider
the following ratios:
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Corollary 3.8. For any destination j 6= i the ratios of probabilities of emigrating and staying
are:
P [E[Uji(d¯t)] = max]
P [E[Uii] = max]
=
eα(vj−xji(d¯t))
(
e
α∆
1−d¯t − 1
)
∑
k 6=i eα(vk−xki(d¯
t)) + e
α
(
vi+
∆
1−d¯t
) ,
P [E[Uji(d¯p)] = max]
P [E[Uii] = max]
=
eα(vj−xji(d¯p)−v1)
(∑
k 6=i e
α(vk−xki(d¯t))
)
∑
k 6=i eα(vk−xki(d¯
t)) + e
α
(
vi+
∆
1−d¯t
) .
(3.24)
Proof. The result is obtained by dividing second and third equations by first equation in (3.23).
The ratios of probabilities of moving to j (either temporarily or permanently) and staying in i
are dependent not only on the economic and policy variables describing those two countries,
but also on the characteristics of all the other N − 2 options. Clearly, the IIA property is not
maintained, and adding further choice options would alter the relative odds of selecting one of
N destinations. Introducing a second dimension of individuals’ choice (not only the destination
but also different durations of stays) automatically results in implicit relations with temporary
options. Indeed, computing the coefficient of correlation between the utility of staying and the
utility ascribed to temporary emigration to j, one observes that:
cor(E[Uii],E[Uji(d¯t)]) = cor(εi, d¯tεj + (1− d¯t)εi) = 1− d¯t, (3.25)
since period 1 − d¯t is spent in home country. In consequence, an agent who has a strongly
negative attitude towards living in her country of birth (a low value of εi) would be more inclined
to emigrate rather than to stay. Similarly, a person with a strong preference towards a particular
foreign destination, would like to emigrate permanently rather than temporarily.
Consider a situation in which the value of xji(d¯p) − xji(d¯t) = ∆ = const for i 6= 1. As-
suming ∆ = 0 is equivalent to reducing the model to a version with a permanent visa only.
Consequently, the choice probabilities are identical to the classical ones which satisfy the IIA
property:
P [E[Uii] = max] =
eαvi∑N
k=1 e
α(vk−xtki(d¯t))
,
P [E[Uji(d¯t)] = max] =
eα(vj−xji(d¯t))∑N
k=1 e
α(vk−xki(d¯t))
− e
α(vj−xji(d¯t))∑
k 6=i eα(vk−xki(d¯
t)) + eαvi
= 0,
P [E[Uji(d¯p)] = max] =
eα(vj−xji(d¯t))∑
k 6=i eα(vk−xki(d¯
t))
,
and finally:
P [E[Uji(d¯p)] = max]
P [E[Uii] = max]
= eα(vj−xji(d¯
p)−vi).
As long as ∆ > 0 (the policy makers offer temporary and permanent visas), the multilateral
resistance term remains in the ratio of probabilities, and the model violates the IIA axiom. The
magnitude of dependencies between options is explicitly computable through the elasticities of
choice probabilities with respect to country’s characteristics. Consider the choice probabilities
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when ∆ = 0:
piji ≡ P [E[Uji] = max] = eVji/
N∑
k=1
eVki ,
where, for simplicity I take: Vki ≡ α
(
vk − xki(d¯t)
)
. Similarly, assume a simplifying notation
concerning the odds of selecting a temporary visa when ∆ > 0:
Pji ≡ P [E[Uji(d¯t)] = max] = eVji/
N∑
k=1
eVki︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡piji
− eVji/
∑
k 6=i
eVji + eViiC(∆)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡pji
= piji − pji,
where: C(∆) ≡ e(α∆)/(1−d¯t). It is straightforward to show that:
Proposition 3.9. When a host country offers temporary, as well as permanent visas (∆ > 0), then
the model exhibits multilateral resistance to migration. The elasticities of choice probabilities
with respect to any country-specific characteristic: yi are:
E
Pji
j ≡
∂Pji
∂yj
yj
Pji
=
∂Vji
∂yj
yj
(
piji(1− piji)
piji − pji −
pji(1− pji)
piji − pji
)
=
∂Vj
∂yj
yj (1− piji − pji) ,
EPlij ≡
∂Pli
∂yj
yj
Pli
= −∂Vji
∂yj
yj
(
pilipiji − plipji
pili − pli
)
.
(3.26)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
In contrast to the classical case with IIA axiom, the cross elasticities are l-specific, so they take
different values for all the options l ∈ N .18 Since one observes an asymmetric change in choice
probabilities after an external shock, the IIA property is not maintained.
Let us now move to the ex post decisions about the duration of stay. The solution to problem
(3.4) has the following form:
Proposition 3.10. The optimal, ex post duration of migration is given by:
d∗ =
{
min
{
ρ−1j∗i
(
Vj∗i(d¯) + εj∗ − εi
)
; d¯
}
, if ρi∗ > 0,
d¯, if ρj∗i < 0,
(3.27)
for the temporary (permanent) migrants, taking d¯ = d¯t (d¯ = d¯p).
Notice that: Vj∗i(d¯) ≡ α(vj∗ − xj∗i(d¯)− vi).
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Finally, one can explicitly represent the distributions of durations of stay (by visa type) in the
same way as it was done in a model with one visa type. However, in contrast to what has
been concluded before, the overall distribution of duration of stay (concerning the all types of
high-skilled immigrants) will now be a combination of two distributions: of the temporary and
18 Following Train (2009), the elasticities of choice probabilities in a model with IIA are equal to: Epijij =
∂Vji
∂yj
yj(1 − piji) and Epilij = − ∂Vji∂yj yjpiji. The cross elasticity for every l is constant, so that the choice proba-
bilities change identically (symmetrically) after a shock. This proves the IIA property.
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permanent immigrants. Therefore, this aggregated distribution of duration of stay may not be
(and typically is not) unimodal.
3.4.2 A model with three visas
For the purpose of a better representation of visa policies in the analyzed host countries, the
last modification of the model considers three types of visas: a short-term one, a medium-term
residence permit and a permanent staying permission. This general classification of visas is very
close to what is proposed by the main destination countries for immigrants.19
As it can be concluded from the summary of visa policies in Appendix 3.B, authorities prefer
to classify immigrants into short (duration of stay of 1 years), medium (6 years) and long-term
(permanent) category. Therefore, the final version of the model differentiates between three
types of visas in each destination. The definitions, mechanisms and properties of such a model
are in line with what has been presented in the case of two visas, except for the fact that now
there are two temporary visas: a one with duration of dt1 = 1/50, and a one with duration that
ranges: dt2 = 6/50. This brings a further complication to the correlation structure among all
the emigration options.
Each ofN countries issues two types of temporary visas and a permanent visa. For each i, j ∈ N
their costs are equal to: xji(d¯p) > xji(d¯t2) > xji(d¯t1). The ex ante expected utilities of
migration from country i to j are:
E[Uii] = αvi + εi,
E[Uji(d¯t1)] = d¯t1
(
α
(
vj − xji(d¯t1)
)− d¯t1E[ρ¯ji]/2 + εj)+ (1− d¯t1) (αvi + εi) ,
E[Uji(d¯t2)] = d¯t2
(
α
(
vj − xji(d¯t2)
)− d¯t2E[ρ¯ji]/2 + εj)+ (1− d¯t2) (αvi + εi) ,
E[Uji(d¯p)] = α
(
vj − xji(d¯p)
)− E[ρ¯ji]/2 + εj .
(3.28)
As before, ex ante E[ρ¯ji] = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N . For this version I restrain from presenting the ana-
lytical results due to their complexity and lack of additional insights in comparison to what was
presented in the former subsections.
Consequently, the applied modeling strategy is designed as follows. I develop a multi-country
model with 178 sending states and 35 destinations. Accounting for multidimensional correla-
tions between the utilities ascribed to different target states (in line with the fact that the IIA
axiom is not satisfied), I investigate the world-wide equilibrium outcome of altering migration
policies in the group of European Union countries. The aim of the counterfactual exercise is
to quantify the long-run consequences for the most developed regions of the world of different
migration policies in the EU. The mechanisms of this model are identical to what has been pre-
sented in the previous sections, but now one has to frame these analytical results in the context of
three visa types per destination. Therefore, each individual faces a choice set of: 1+3·35 = 106
options (staying at home, or emigrating to one of 35 destinations with one of three visas). Then,
each discrete option is characterized by its own continuous distribution of duration of stay, which
then is aggregated at the country-pair level.
19 In what follows, I will concentrate only on those host countries which will be considered in the calibration and
simulation exercises: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the US, Switzerland, Iceland, Norway and 28 EU states.
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3.5 Numerical solution of the model
The purpose of calibration is to compute (expected and unforeseen) migration costs by fitting
the moments observed in the data. After completing this step, I introduce alternative migration
policies, and solve the model for the new equilibrium. The outcomes are: new flows and stocks
of immigrants, and the distributions of durations of stay for country pairs.
3.5.1 Data
The calibration of the model is based on the data for 2013. Each country j ∈ N is characterized
by a uniform, gross wage for the high-skilled workers. I compute them for 178 countries in the
sample, using the data on skill premiums for 52 countries, the shares of tertiary educated for 144
countries from the Barro-Lee database (Barro and Lee, 2013), and several explanatory variables
from the WDI by the World Bank.20 With the estimated parameters, I compute the predicted skill
premiums, and, using the data on GDP per capita in PPP, I calculate the wage rates for the whole
sample of 178 states. Finally, taking the country-specific data on income taxation (originating
from the yearly tax reports by Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Pricewaterhouse Coopers), I compute
the net-of-income-tax wages, vj . For the marginal utility of net income, α, I take the value of
0.05, following Grogger and Hanson (2011). The full sample of 178 countries is presented in
Table 3.E1, whereas the data on net wages for high-skilled workers are gathered in Table 3.E2..
Another set of observables concerns the yearly flows of migrants from 178 sources to 35 desti-
nations with a distinction between people who come with temporary (short and medium-term)
visas and those who obtain permanent residence permits.21 The gross flows of migrants aggre-
gate individual, discrete-choice decisions about the destination country and the selected visa.
Therefore, along with net wages, they determine the visa-specific, expected costs of migration,
xji(d¯).
In order to be able to estimate the parameters which define the distribution of durations of stay
(that is the country-pair-specific unforeseen costs: ρji), one needs empirical counterparts of
the probabilities of staying, when migrating from any source i to any destination j. To this
end, I calculate conditional and unconditional probabilities of staying for each pair of countries.
I use the DIOC database provided by the OECD, and the data set published by Abel and Sander
(2014) to compute these values. A detailed description of the computation procedure can be
found in Appendix 3.D.
3.5.2 Calibration algorithm
Considering the complexity of interdependencies between the utilities ascribed to different des-
tinations and durations of stay, I decided to calibrate the model using a Monte Carlo method.
One needs to determine the values of country-pair-specific and visa-specific migration costs,
labeled by xwji for all the sources and destinations considered: j, i ∈ {1, ..., N}, and three types
of visas: w ∈ {t1, t2, p}. Additionally, to be able to define the agents’ aggregated behavior in
20 In the extrapolating regression I consider indicators, which reflect the levels of development and education in the
analyzed countries. For this purpose, I selected: the share of high-skilled, urban population rate, pupil-teacher
ratio, and High tech exports a percent of GDP.
21 For a detailed description of sources for the data on gross flows of migrants by visa type, please consult Appendix
3.C
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terms of their preferred length of stay, I have to specify the country-pair-specific distribution of
duration of stay which is dependent on the value of unforeseen migration cost: ρji.
The initial step is the calculation of xwji. From the data describing the yearly inflows of immi-
grants for different visa types, I firstly compute the probabilities of emigration from each source
country to any destination. Then, for a given sending country i ∈ {1, ..., N} I separately con-
duct a Monte Carlo experiment. I draw 250,000 realizations of vectors of random components
εj from Gumbel distribution, for all the 35 potential hosts j. These 35-dimensional vectors rep-
resent 250,000 potential migrants who have random tastes towards each destination. Starting
with the initial values for migration costs, I iteratively compute the utilities ascribed to each and
every migration option (3.28), and the simulated probabilities of emigration to any state with
a particular visa type. Finally, using a conservative updating rule, I modify the actual values
of xwji’s. The algorithm stops when the simulated probabilities of emigration are close to their
empirical counterparts (the difference between each pair is less than 10−5). With the values of
migration costs in hand, one can predict the flows of migrants (by duration of visa) between any
two country pairs. Figure 3.E1 presents the comparison of the aggregated skill-specific and visa-
specific flows for 35 destinations (actual data versus model outcomes). Using the constructed
average durations of stay, I compute total stocks of immigrants, as if the yearly flows of migrants
were equal to the values from year 2013, over the whole 50-year period.
The second part of the calibration procedure tackles with the unforeseen migration costs. For
each source i and each destination j I try to fit the conditional and unconditional probabilities
of staying calculated using the DIOC and Abel and Sander (2014) databases (in fact I consider
here only those country pairs, for which I have at least two data points). Initially, I draw 250,000
realizations of the difference between the random components: εj − εi from the logistic distri-
bution. These values represent 250,000 migrants from country i to country j. Then, I define
the potential values of ρji to be between 0.01 and 20, with step 0.01. For each of these steps,
I calculate the simulated distribution of duration of stay of migrants from i to j. After sorting
the immigrants with respect to their preferred visa type, I compute their actual durations of stay,
after discovering the value of ρji. In this way, the simulated distribution of lengths of stays is
constructed, and the counterparts of empirical probabilities of staying can be calculated. At the
end, the value of ρji ∈ [0.01; 20] which minimizes the Euclidean distance between the simulated
and empirical probabilities is chosen as the best estimation. For those country pairs, for which
the data on probabilities of stay are not sufficient, I extrapolate the values of ρji using the esti-
mations from a cross-section regression with gravity variables, and origin and destination fixed
effects (see Table 3.E5). Figure 3.E2 depicts the distributions of estimated values of ρji’s for 35
receiving countries. More attractive destinations (i.e. Canada or the US) are generally charac-
terized by lower values of unforeseen migration costs, than the less popular ones (i.e. Bulgaria
or Romania).
3.5.3 Simulation algorithm
Each of the simulations starts with defining a new migration policy (either modifying visa costs,
or providing fiscal incentives for immigrants). In the first counterfactual scenario, I assume that
in all the EU countries the costs of 6-year visas are reduced to the levels that are observable in
the US (where H1B visa is a well-known, well established policy device).22 In describing this
22 Apart from the legal part, the expected migration costs comprise of non-reducible part related to geography, social
cohesion of migrants or cultural and social differences. An identification of importance of the main determinant of
these elements is proposed in Table 3.E4. From these estimates, I also compute the legal visa costs for all countries,
by investigating the destination-visa specific fixed effects that capture all the formal burdens on immigrants.
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procedure, let me concentrate on a particular destination country - Germany (see Figure 3.2).
The black points represent the average visa costs in the US (considering the 1-year, 6-year and a
permanent visa). The light gray points depict the very same values for Germany in the reference
scenario. It is clearly visible, that the 6-year visa is relatively cheap in the US, and relatively
expensive in Germany (which imposes a convex visa cost function for the US, and a concave
one for Germany). The goal is to decrease the cost of a 6-year visa in Germany (point X) in a
way that imposes the relative cost structure from the US. To achieve this, I reduce this cost (to
point Y), such that the ratio of difference in the costs of 6-year and 1-year visas (ADEU ) to the
difference in the costs of 50-year and 1-year visas (BDEU ) is the same as in the US (and equal to
AUSA/BUSA). This procedure is followed for all the other European destinations (computing
all the country-pair-specific migration costs separately), and its outcomes are depicted in the
Figure 3.3.
FIGURE 3.2: Reduction of visa costs to the H1B level - example of Germany
FIGURE 3.3: Visa costs in the reference, and in the counterfactual H1B scenarios in Europe
The second counterfactual policy is considering fiscal exemptions for high-skilled immigrants,
instead of migration costs. Considering a briefing by CES-IFO, and following the report OECD
(2011), I decided to implement an additional, 10 percent fiscal incentive (FI) in the EU economies.
This means, that high-skilled migrants, who come with a 6-year visa pay a 10 p.p. lower income
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tax, than other citizens. Consequently, the group of medium-term professionals has a higher net
wage in comparison to short-term immigrants and permanent stayers.
With new migration policies in the EU, I run another Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the
counterfactual yearly flows of workers. In doing so, I take the modified migration costs and net
wages as given, for the H1B simulation, and reference migration costs, and counterfactual net
wages for the FI simulation. The unforeseen migration costs stay unchanged. For each of 178
sending countries I draw 2,000,000 realizations of the vectors of stochastic preferences towards
35 destinations and compute the optimal migration decisions for these values. This enables to
calculate the probabilities of migration, and the actual flows of migrants for each country-pair
and visa type.
Another Monte Carlo simulation targets the issue of fitting new duration distributions for each
pair of sending and receiving countries. 2,000,000 realizations of the differences of random
components εj − εi are drawn, and the optimal durations of stay are determined, according to
Proposition 3.10 in the case of three visas. The only things left to calculate are the average
durations of stay, which determine the counterfactual stocks of immigrants.
3.6 Consequences of alternative migration policies
This section presents the demographic implications of counterfactual migration policies in the
EU. The first part considers an introduction of H1B visas in all the EU member states. In
the next subsection, I propose a tax concession mechanism for the high-skilled immigrants.
Then, I consider a scenario in which migrants obtain a wage premium after returning to their
homelands. Finally, I discuss the quantitative importance of multilateral resistance to migration.
3.6.1 Introduction of H1B visa in the EU
A decrease in migration costs, equivalent to the one of H1B visas in the US, for the medium-
term (6-year) immigrants to the European Union, has a substantial impact on the flows and
stocks of migrants all over the world (for detailed results see columns labeled with H1B in Table
3.E6, for the ranking see Figure 3.E3a). Considering Europe as a whole, an introduction of H1B
immigration policy brings 30,000 new high-skilled immigrants every year. Simultaneously, the
total number of foreign professionals increases by 800,000, that is 6.1 percent of the reference
stock of high-skilled workers. Due to the loss of relative attractiveness, non-EU destinations
(mainly the US, Australia and Canada) encounter a slight loss in the number of well-educated
foreigners, not exceeding 1 percent of the reference stock. Thus, an implementation of a more
liberal visa policy for high-skilled workers allows Europe to “steal the talents” from the currently
popular destinations. The biggest winners of this policy in terms of total stocks are Poland,
Germany, the UK (more than 100,000 high-skilled workers), and less popular destinations in
terms of the relative change in stocks (Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovenia).
The effects with respect to yearly inflows of immigrants are also heterogeneous across EU-
members. The countries which gain the most are: Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Italy.
The only EU-member that loses highly skilled immigrants due to the H1B policy, is France.
A possible explanation for this result could be the fact that France is already characterized by low
migration costs for the well-educated candidates (which can be observed in Figure 3.2). There-
fore, an H1B policy defined in the proposed counterfactual scenario, brings almost no change to
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the 6-year visa costs. Since other destinations significantly drop the barriers for medium-term
immigrants, France is becoming relatively less attractive, and people substitute this destination
for other European countries.
The results gathered in Table 3.E6 show that the changes in total stocks are not driven mainly by
new inflows. The “new-entry” effect of the proposed H1B policy (that is attracting the current
non-migrants from all sources) is almost null. Conversely, the impact on aggregate numbers of
high-skilled workers is resulting from visa switching of the current immigrants. For the short-
term migrants (who have relatively high preferences towards living in the destination countries,
but are at the threshold between 1Y and 6Y visa) and some permanent stayers (who have rel-
atively low preferences towards the destination, and are at the threshold between 6Y and 50Y
visa), a cheaper 6-year visa is an encouragement to choose a new H1B emigration option. Thus,
without a huge number of new entries, some EU members (such as Sweden, Czech Republic,
Estonia, or Poland) manage to visibly increase the number of high-skilled workers. To prove
this “visa-substitution” property, consider the structures of immigration flows and stocks by visa
types (see Figures 3.E4 and 3.E5). In the reference scenario (first row of graphs), short-term im-
migrants constitute sizable parts of total inflows and stocks. In contrast, after implementing the
H1B visa, the European countries experience a significant drop in the share of those migrants in
both flows and stocks. For the permanent migrants the directions of the effects are similar, but
the magnitudes are smaller.
To conclude, the results of the proposed experiment call for a serious discussion about the future
of European migration program. Simple (and possibly cheap for the national budgets) solutions,
like reducing the costs of visas for the medium-term, high-skilled candidates (similar to the
European Blue Card program), might attract and retain talented foreign workers, which would
have a non-trivial implication for the European economy. With such an open and liberal attitude
towards attracting well-educated professionals, Europe could successfully compete for talents
with other popular destinations (through the “talent-stealing” effect), and increase the stock of
highly skilled workers (as a consequence of “visa-substitution” effect).
3.6.2 Implementation of fiscal incentives in the EU
The alternative migration policy proposed in this chapter, is a tax concession program for the
high-skilled immigrants in the EU. Instead of changing visa costs for the medium-term candi-
dates, I propose an augmentation of their net wage through a decrease in income tax rates by 10
p.p. in all member countries. The detailed results (see columns labeled with FI in Table 3.E6)
for the stocks of high-skilled immigrants are similar to the case of H1B visa. In general, the EU
experiences an increase in the total stock of high-skilled workers by 5.6 percent. Considering
the ranking of countries (see Figure 3.E3b), significant differences relative to the H1B scenario
may be observed for France, which is winning, and for Poland, that is losing high-skilled work-
ers when applying the FI. While the former is caused by binding of the FI policy in France (and
inefficacy of the H1B), the latter shows that in Poland the main barrier for the prospective high-
skilled immigrants is the legal migration costs, not the low level of wages (the same is true in
the case of Croatia, Bulgaria, and Latvia). Therefore, the H1B counterfactual is generally more
beneficial for the countries with high visa costs (and harmful for the states with already well
liberalized visa policy), whereas the contrary may be stated about the FI scenario. However, the
majority of EU-members are between the two extremes, and both policies have similar impacts
on the number of foreign professionals.
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The tax concession brings a substantial increase in yearly flows of new high-skilled immigrants
to Europe. The total inflow goes up by 10.6 percent, without a significantly stronger negative
effect for the non-EU destinations. Even though the “talent-stealing” effect is still present, (be-
cause the FI improves the relative attractiveness of Europe comparing to other destinations), its
magnitude is lower than in the case of H1B visas. The main impact comes from the improvement
of EU’s absolute attractiveness. This means that with higher net wages, Europe is capable of
attracting some never-migrants from the third countries (a yearly flow of almost 70,000 people),
which brings rise to the “new-entry” effect. Simultaneously, the proposed migration policy has
a small influence on the structure of inflows and total stocks, relative to the reference scenario
(see Figures 3.E4 and 3.E5). This means that the “visa-substitution” effect is far less pronounced
then in the case of FI.
All in all, the tax exemption for the prospective high-skilled immigrants to the EU may be
considered as a close substitute for the introduction of H1B visas. The overall outcomes, in
terms of the numbers of immigrants, are very close in both cases. The main difference between
the two policies is the relative importance of three channels through which the total effects are
arising. In the case of H1B policy, the “visa-substitution” effect for the current immigrants drives
the results, whereas the FI works through inviting new immigrants from the third countries - the
“new-entry” effect. This convinces, that only the FI improves the absolute attractiveness of
Europe, whereas the relative attractiveness of EU members changes in a similar way in both
cases (the two scenarios have the same magnitude of the “talent-stealing” effects from other
popular destinations).
The discrepancy between the two proposed migration policies may be of great importance for
the policy makers and the authorities in the EU. If a country would like to reduce the number of
short stayers, and increase the average duration of stay of immigrants, it should choose the H1B
visa policy. Conversely, if the authorities want to keep the structure of migrants constant, they
should go for the tax concession policy. The former policy may bring significant fiscal cost in the
long-run (due to pension expenditures for the medium and long-term foreign workers), whereas
the latter causes an immediate burden on national budgets (through a decrease in tax collection
from the current immigrants). Both policies are, nonetheless, expected to fuel national budgets
with new tax incomes. An important quantitative question that remains to be answered, but is
beyond the scope of this chapter, is the net fiscal effect of both policies in the short- and the
long-term.
3.6.3 Accounting for the return premiums
Following the findings by Dustmann et al. (2011) and Dustmann and Görlach (2015), in this sec-
tion, I propose a modification that includes the skill accumulation process for migrants. Since
I do not consider heterogeneity of agents with respect to their skill level, this skill upgrading
process is assumed to be reflected in the wages earned by emigrants, who decide to return to
their home countries. The gains of returning migrants are assumed to be proportional to the
duration of their stay, and the difference in wage levels in the destination and sending countries.
The return premium (RP) is set to be equal to 20 percent of the net wage difference (destina-
tions less source), if a person decides to return just before the end of 50-year migration spell,
and proportionally lower, if the duration is lower. Comparing the reference scenarios with and
without RP, it can be stated that people tend to stay shorter when accounting for return bonuses
(see Figure 3.E6). This effect confirms the intuition about the utility maximizing agents, who
return home faster due to the expected higher wages at home.
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The results of H1B and FI counterfactual policies with return premiums are depicted in Table
3.E7 and in the Figures 3.E3c, d. Quantitatively, both the flows and stocks of high-skilled
migrants are now higher after implementing both migration policies (comparing to a reference
state of the world with RP). Therefore the overall effects are reinforced due to the reduced form
the skill accumulation. Two economic processes drive these results. Firstly, those who already
migrated, reduce their duration of stay, due to a bigger reward to returning. Secondly, people
are more prone to emigrate due to a shift in wages, conditional on their return. Since the latter
implication dominates, both flows and stocks of migrants are positively affected comparing to
the outcomes of both policies without the RP. Qualitatively, the ranking of countries for both
H1B and FI counterfactuals is slightly changed. Since the differences in RP are small across
European destinations, one observes only minor modifications in the order of states.
3.6.4 Multilateral resistance to migration
This subsection comments on the importance of multilateral resistance to migration in the overall
results. To provide the quantitative results, I simulated the model assuming that all the agents
decide only about the destination country (as in the classic RUM model with a permanent visa),
so that the choice options are independent. Then, people randomly decide about the duration of
their visa, according to the actual distribution of visas for all the country pairs. The reference,
and the two counterfactual scenarios are computed using the above described procedure. In
this way, I am able to neutralize the multilateral resistance to migration (MRM), which is the
consequence of correlation between the utilities ascribed to discrete choice options.
The comparison of the aggregated results with and without the MRM is depicted in Figure 3.E7.
The solid bars (left hand side axis) represent changes in the flows of immigrants, while the
dashed bars (right hand side axis) give the results for stocks (in both cases the values are differ-
ences between model with MRM, and without MRM). The results show that MRM strengthens
the positive effects of both migration policies for Europe. Consequently, the lack of MRM would
benefit the non-EU countries, through lower losses of high-skilled workers. Indeed, due to corre-
lations between migration options, agents are more responsive to migration shocks, when MRM
is allowed. This concerns mainly the current migrants, who can substitute between the destina-
tions more easily. The above mentioned phenomenon gives rise to a stronger “talent-stealing”
effect, discussed with the previous results. In contrast, without MRM, all choice options are in-
dependent, so that a positive shock in migration policy is followed by a smaller response from the
current emigrants, thus the “talent-stealing” effect is partially neutralized. The above exercise
gives evidences that it is relevant to consider both geographical and time dimension of agents’
decisions, when conducting multi-country migration policy experiments. Omitting either of two
elements (destination or duration choices) dampens the multilateral resistance to migration, and
might have substantial consequences for the quantitative evaluation of the simulated policies.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter introduces a novel approach towards modeling international migration in the con-
text of many source and destination countries, with endogenous choices of the length of stay.
I propose a model in which people have heterogeneous tastes for living in different host coun-
tries, and may experience unforeseen costs after emigrating. The individual preferences govern
the discrete choice of destination and the type of visa to apply for, while the unexpected mi-
gration costs determine the continuous decisions about the optimal duration of emigration spell.
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Since agents compare lifetime benefits from living temporarily or permanently in all the avail-
able destinations, the random utility ascribed to each possibility may be correlated with other
options. Hence, the choice probabilities are not independent and the decision rule does not fulfill
the IIA axiom, which provides a micro-foundation for multilateral resistance to migration.
Beyond the theoretical contribution, the chapter quantifies the outcomes of implementing two
migration policies targeted at the high-skilled individuals in the European Union. Introducing an
H1B visa in Europe (a preferential 6-year visa for the college-educated) increases the total stock
of high-skilled immigrants in the EU by 6.1 percent (800,000 people). The main winners are big
EU-members, whereas the non-EU countries like the US, Canada or Australia are losing their
high-skilled immigrants. This is the consequence of “talent-stealing” effect which is explained
by an increase in the relative attractiveness of the EU states after liberalizing legal migration
barriers. However, the major importance may be ascribed to the “visa-substitution” effect: since
the medium-term visas are now cheaper, the current short-term and permanent immigrants are
more prone to choosing a 6-year emigration option.
The above results are compared to an alternative migration policy in the EU: a fiscal incentive for
the high-skilled, medium-term immigrants. In this case, the change in total stock of immigrants
is similar to the previous case (5.6 percent, over 700,000 people), but one observes a higher
number of inflowing professionals. This is the consequence of “new-entry” effect, which works
through an increase in the absolute attractiveness of European countries (through reducing the
income taxes and increasing net wages of prospective high-skilled immigrants). Simultaneously,
the “visa-substitutions” effect is of less importance, while the “talent-stealing” effect remains
unchanged.
The study provides also two additional results. With a help of a reduced form exercise, I compute
the consequences of both migration policies, when emigrants are subject to a wage premium
after returning to their home countries. The quantitative results (in terms of changes in yearly
flows and total stocks of skilled immigrants) are more pronounced: a return bonus decreases
the average duration of stay, but, at the same time, more people emigrate. Qualitatively, the
relative ordering of countries with respect to their gains in labor, is slightly changed, in reference
to the benchmark case. Finally, I calculate the difference in flows and stocks of immigrants
in the EU when multilateral resistance to migration is ruled out. This scenario shows, that
independence between choice options favors the non-EU states which do not implement the
analyzed policy reforms. Therefore, not accounting for multilateral resistance to migration in
international context (by disregarding either destination or duration choices of agents) may result
in a downward biased quantification of the impact of migration policies.
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Appendices
3.A Proofs of the properties of the model
Proof. (Proposition 3.1) Consider a migrant from country i to country j, characterized by ρji >
0. Taking the first derivative of equation 3.3 with respect to duration d:
∂Uj∗i(d¯
∗, d)
∂d
= Vj∗i + εj∗ − εi − d∗ρj∗i = 0
Therefore: d∗ = ρ−1j∗i (Vj∗i + εj∗ − εi). Since: d∗ ≤ 1, then: d = min
{
ρ−1j∗i (Vji + εj∗ − εi) ; 1
}
,
if ρji > 0.
Consider now the situation when ρj∗i < 0. From the fact that a person did emigrate, one knows
that the marginal gains in the host country exceed the marginal gains in the sending country:
Vj∗i + εj∗ − εi > 0. On top of that: −dρj∗i > 0, so that the total instantaneous utility ascribed
to emigration is greater than the instantaneous utility associated with staying at home. Thus,
there are no incentives for an agent to leave the destination country throughout the duration of
stay. In consequence the maximization program hits the corner solution, so that: d∗ = 1.
Proof. (Corollary 3.3) The conditional PDF, defined for d > 0 is equivalent to the unconditional
PDF divided by the probability that d > 0, equation 3.12:
fd>0(d) =
ρjie
ρjid+Vji(
eρjid + eVji
)2 · 1 + eVjieVji = ρjieρjid(1 + eVji)(eρjid + eVji)2 . (3.A1)
The conditional CDF for a given δ is simply an integral from 0 to δ of fd>0(d):
Fd>0(δ) =
∫ δ
0
ρjie
ρjit(1 + eVji)
(eρjit + eVji)2
dt = (1 + eVji)
∫ eρjiδ+eVji
1+eVji
1
k2
dk
= (1 + eVji)
(
1
1 + eVji
− 1
eρjiδ + eVji
)
=
eρjiδ − 1
eρjiδ + eVji
,
(3.A2)
where the change of variables: k ≡ eρjit + eVji,t was made.
Proof. (Proposition 3.5) The expected, conditional duration of stay (for the temporary migrants
characterized by ρji > 0) is calculated from the definition:
Ed>0[d|d < 1] =
∫ 1
0
tdFt>0(t)dt =
∫ 1
0
t
ρjie
ρjit(1 + eVji)(
eρjit + eVji
)2 dt
=
1 + eVji
ρjieVji
ln
1 + eVji
1 + eVji−ρji
− 1 + e
Vji
eρji + eVji
.
(3.A3)
These people constitute a fraction of 1/2 of total gross inflow of migrants. The rest of people
(that is temporary migrants characterized by ρji < 0 and the permanent migrants) is staying
until the expiration of their visa, so their average duration of stay is d = 1. Consider a gross
inflow of immigrants equal to Nji people. Now adding all the groups (temporary, nostalgic,
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permanent nostalgic and non-nostalgic people respectively), I get the aggregated labor force
which is present in the host country during the 50-year period:
Lji(Vji, ρji) =
Nji
2
(
1 + eVji
ρjieVji
ln
1 + eVji
1 + eVji−ρji
− 1 + e
Vji
eρji + eVji
)
+
Nji
2
1 + eVji
eρji + eVji
+
Nji
2
=
Nji
2
(
1 + eVji
ρjieVji
ln
(
1 + eVji
1 + eVji−ρji
)
+ 1
)
.
(3.A4)
Proof. (Corollary 3.6) In computing the limits, whenever there appears an undefined symbol
(i.e. 0 · ∞, 0/0 or∞/∞), I write .= to inform that the L’Hôpital’s rule is used.
lim
ρji→0
Lji(Vji, ρij) =
Nji
2
 lim
ρji→0
ln
(
1+eVji
1+eVji−ρji
)
ρjie
Vji
1+eVji
+ 1

.
=
Nji
2
(
lim
ρji→0
1 + eVji
eVji
· e
Vji−ρji
1 + eVji−ρji
+ 1
)
= Nji,
lim
Vji→∞
Lji(Vji, ρji) = lim
Vji→∞
Nji
2
(
1 + eVji
ρjieVji
ln
(
1 + eVji
1 + eVji−ρji
)
+ 1
)
=
Nji
2
(
1
ρji
· ln(eρji) + 1
)
= Nji,
lim
ρji→∞
Lji(Vji, ρji) = lim
ρji→∞
Nji
2
(
1 + eVji
ρjieVji
ln
(
1 + eVji
1 + eVji−ρji
)
+ 1
)
=
Nji
2
,
lim
Vji→−∞
Lji(Vji, ρji) =
Nji
2
 lim
Vji→−∞
ln
(
1+eVji
1+eVji−ρji
)
ρjie
Vji
1+eVji
+ 1

.
=
Nji
2
(
lim
Vji→−∞
1− e−ρji
1 + eVji−ρji
· (1 + e
Vji)
ρji
+ 1
)
=
Nji
2
(
1− e−ρji
ρji
+ 1
)
.
Additionally, concerning the third limit, one can state that:
lim
ρji→0
Lji(−∞, ρji) = lim
ρji→0
Nji
2
(
1− e−ρji
ρji
+ 1
)
.
= lim
ρji→0
Nji
2
(
e−ρji + 1
)
= Nji,
lim
ρji→∞
Lji(−∞, ρji) = lim
ρji→∞
Nji
2
(
1− e−ρji
ρji
+ 1
)
=
Nji
2
.
Proof. (Proposition 3.7) Let us concentrate on calculating the probability of choosing to stay
in the homeland, that is: P [U¯ii = max], where, for simplicity, I take i = 1. Therefore, all the
source-destination-specific variables are now denoted with a subscript i, instead of i1.
P [U¯1 = max] = P [∀i ∈ {2, ..., N} U¯1 ≥ U¯ ti ∧ U¯1 ≥ U¯pi ] =
P [∀i ∈ {2, ..., N} αv1 + ε1 ≥ dt
(
α(vi − xti) + εi
)
+ (1− dt)(αv1 + ε1)
∧ αv1 + ε1 ≥ α(vi − xpi ) + εi] =
P [∀i ∈ {2, ..., N} αv1 + ε1 ≥ α(vi − xti) + εi ∧ αv1 + ε1 ≥ α(vi − xpi ) + εi].
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Noticing that ∀i ∈ {2, ..., N} xpi > xti, one can reduce the number of events only to the tempo-
rary migration inequalities:
P [∀i ∈ {2, ..., N} αv1 + ε1 ≥ α(vi − xti) + εi].
The left and right hand sides of the inequality are iid, so one can use the McFadden’s theorem
to compute the logit probability:
P [U¯1 = max] =
eαv1∑N
k=1 e
α(vk−xtk)
(3.A5)
Moving to the probability of temporary migration to a given destination i ∈ {2, ..., N}, taking
that j is a counter which represents all other possible foreign countries: j ∈ {2, ..., N} ∧ j 6= i,
one obtains that:
P [U¯ ti = max] = P [U¯
t
i ≥ U¯1 ∧ U¯ ti ≥ U¯pi ∧ U¯ ti ≥ U¯ tj ∧ U¯ ti ≥ U¯pj ] =
P [dt
(
α(vi − xti) + εi
)
+ (1− dt)(αv1 + ε1) ≥ αv1 + ε1∧
dt
(
α(vi − xti) + εi
)
+ (1− dt)(αv1 + ε1) ≥ α(vi − xpi ) + εi∧
dt
(
α(vi − xti) + εi
)
+ (1− dt)(αv1 + ε1) ≥ dt
(
α(vj − xtj) + εj
)
+ (1− dt)(αv1 + ε1)∧
dt
(
α(vi − xti) + εi
)
+ (1− dt)(αv1 + ε1) ≥ α(vj − xpj ) + εj ] =
P [α(vi − xti) + εi ≥ αv1 + ε1 ∧ αvi + εi ≥ α(vi − xti) + εi
∧ α(vi − xti) + εi ≥ α(vj − xtj) + εj∧
dt
(
α(vi − xti) + εi
)
+ (1− dt)(αv1 + ε1) ≥ α(vj − xpj ) + εj ] =
P [α(v1 − vi + xti) ≤ εi − ε1 ≤ α
(
v1 − vi − d
t
1− dtx
t
i +
1
1− dtx
p
i
)
∧
εi − εj ≥
max
{
α(vj − xtj − vi + xti);α
[
dt(xti − vi)− (1− dt)v1 + vj − xpj
]
− (1− dt)(ε1 − εi)
}
].
Consider a situation that the first argument of the max function is the greatest one. This leads
to:
α(vj − xtj − vi + xti) ≥ α
[
dt(xti − vi)− (1− dt)v1 + vj − xpj
]
− (1− dt)(ε1 − εi)
⇐⇒ α
(
v1 − vi − 1
1− dtx
t
j + x
t
i +
1
1− dtx
p
j
)
≥ εi − ε1.
(3.A6)
But, by the assumption made in the Theorem, one obtains that this inequality is equivalent to
the inequality (taken from the first module of the probability): εi − ε1 ≤ α(v1 − vi − dt1−dtxti +
1
1−dtx
p
i ). By comparing the deterministic values one gets that:
α
(
v1 − vi − d
t
1− dtx
t
i +
1
1− dtx
p
i
)
=
(
v1 − vi − 1
1− dtx
t
j + x
t
i +
1
1− dtx
p
j
)
⇐⇒ xpi − xti = xpj − xtj .
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Therefore, the inequality in 3.A6 cannot be reversed, provided that the measure of the set of
solutions is not zero. Finally, one arrives at the probability equal to:
P [α(v1 − vi + xti) ≤ εi − ε1 ≤ α
(
v1 − vi − d
t
1− dtx
t
i +
1
1− dtx
p
i
)
∧
εi − εj ≥ α(vj − xtj − vi + xti)] =
P [ε1 ∈
[
εi − α
(
v1 − vi − d
t
1− dtx
t
i +
1
1− dtx
p
i
)
; εi − α(v1 − vi + xti)
]
∧
εj ≤ εi − α(vj − xtj − vi + xti)]
Rewriting it in a way that εi is the integrated variable, and keeping in mind that ε1 and εj are
independent Extreme Value Type I random variables, one can calculate the exact value of the
probability by solving the integral:
P [U¯ ti = max] =∫ +∞
−∞
N∏
j=2
e−e
−εieα(vj−x
t
j−vi+xti)
e−e−εi
(
eα(v1−vi+x
t
i)−eα
(
v1−vi− d
t
1−dt x
t
i+
1
1−dt x
p
i
)) e−e−εie−εidεi =
1∑N
j=2 e
α(vj−xtj−vi+xti) + eα(v1−vi+xti)
− 1∑N
j=2 e
α(vj−xtj−vi+xti) + eα
(
v1−vi− dt1−dt xti+
1
1−dt x
p
i
) =
eα(vi−xti)∑N
k=1 e
α(vk−xtk)
− e
α(vi−xti)∑N
k=2 e
α(vk−xtk) + eα(v1+
1
1−dt (x
p
i−xti))
.
The same algorithm leads to calculation of P [U¯pi = max] =
eα(vi−x
t
i)∑N
k=2 e
α(vk−xtk)+e
α(v1+
1
1−dt (x
p
i
−xt
i
))
.
Proof. (Proposition 3.9)
EPii ≡
∂Pi
∂yi
yi
Pi
=
∂Vi
∂yi
yi
Pi
 eVi∑N
k=1 e
Vk
−
(
eVi∑N
k=1 e
Vk
)2
− e
Vi∑N
k=2 e
Vk + eV1C(∆)
+
(
eVi∑N
k=2 e
Vk + eV1C(∆)
)2 =
∂Vi
∂yi
yi
Pi
[
pii − pi2i − pi + p2i
]
=
∂Vi
∂yi
yi
(
pii(1− pii)
pii − pi −
pi(1− pi)
pii − pi
)
.
EPji ≡
∂Pj
∂yi
yi
Pj
=
∂Vi
∂yi
yi
Pi
[
− e
VieVj
(
∑N
k=1 e
Vk)2
+
eVieVj
(
∑N
k=2 e
Vk + eV1C(∆))2
]
=
∂Vi
∂yi
yi
Pi
[−piipij + pipj ] = ∂Vi
∂yi
yi
(−piipij + pipj
pii − pi
)
.
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3.B Visas by destination country
The most desired country for immigration, the United States, provides about 90 types of tem-
porary visas, as well as green-cards for permanent immigrants. To apply for a particular type of
temporary visa, a potential immigrant has to fulfill specific requirements connected with her ed-
ucation level, purpose of stay, international status (refugees) or affiliation (representatives). Not
all the visas allow to work in the US, for example the widely popular B visas are issued only
for short business or touristic visits. The potential duration of stay ranges from 1 year (in the
case of D - crew visas, H-1A and H-2 - worker visas, P - athletes visas or Q - cultural exchange
visas) to indefinite length of stay (as it is for the E - trade business partners visas or NATO -
representatives visas). However, the most popular US visas which are issued for working pur-
poses are the medium-term ones. The F-1 student visa allows the beneficiary to take full-time
studies and to have a part-time job (or a full-time internship) during the period of stay (which
mainly does not exceed 6 years). In 2013 the US issued more than 500,000 such permits. The
J-1 “exchange visitor” visa for teachers and scholars, which can be extended up to 7 years, was
the second popular type of permission in 2013 with over 310,000 applications. Finally, the H1-
B visa program for high-skilled workers is constantly gaining popularity among professionals
across all the countries. US companies are allowed to employ foreign highly educated workers
for a period of 3 years. In fact, the majority of H1-B workers decides to prolong their stay for
another 3 years. In 2014, the total number of accepted new applications was 124,326, whereas
191,531 workers continued their employment.23 All in all, over 1.2 million immigrants out of 2
million new entrants to the US in 2013 were the medium-term temporary workers.
Australia, Canada and New Zealand have unified approaches towards immigration. On the one
hand, these states introduce temporary migration offers that rely on a demand-driven process
in which national firms invite specific workers (the duration of stay is generally restricted from
1 to 5 years like in the US H1-B program, but all occupations are considered). On the other
hand, they provide permanent migration programs whose main pillar is a point system - the
preferential channel for the well-educated candidates. In the first case, immigrants are granted
visas on the basis of the contract signed with hosting company. Thus, the duration of stay is
limited, but may vary across industries, firms and regions. Considering the permanent migration
channel, in order to be qualified, an applicant has to provide information on her education and
professional achievements along with a proof of proficiency in official languages. The selection
process concentrates on choosing those candidates who either have outstanding scores or are
ready to be employed in strategic industries. In this way, Australia, Canada and New Zealand
remain the main competitors for the US in the game of attracting global talents.
The EU (along with EEA countries) has a less restrictive immigration policy and shows an
attitude far less oriented towards high-skilled workers. Any person from a third country may
become eligible to enter the Schengen Area for a temporary stay of 3, 6 or 12 months. Then, after
the expiration of current permission, one might prolong it for another period. An alternative,
temporary migration option, introduced in 2009 by the European Parliament, is the European
Blue Card Program. This device is targeted at high-skilled non-EU candidates who wish to work
in the EU. The main restriction is connected with the salary of beneficiary, which has to be “at
least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary paid in the Member State concerned”.24 The Blue
Card program is still at its early stages and is not commonly used by the potential residents (in
23 Over 72 percent of all new applications originated from India, 6.5 percent from China. 64 percent of the benefi-
ciaries worked in the computer-related industry, the rest were mainly architects, mathematicians, physicians and
medical doctors. For further details, consult the US Department of Homeland Security report:
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/H-1B/h-1B-characteristics-report-14.pdf
24 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/living_and_working_in_the_internal_market/l14573_en.htm
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2014 the EU granted about 13,000 documents, almost 90 percent of them concerned Germany).
After 5 years of continuous living, working legally and paying taxes a non-EU worker may apply
for a long-term immigrant status.25 Finally, a long-term immigrant may apply for a citizenship
after at least 5 years of long-term status.
3.C Data sources
For the US, I use the data from the 2013 Report of the Visa Office on the non-immigrant visas.
This rich dataset provides the numbers of all visas (by type) issued each year for people origi-
nating from every country in the world. Additionally, I gather the data on permanent immigrants
(by country of origin and cause of immigration). Both reports are available on the Visa Office
web page.26.
In the case of Australia, I use the data on temporary work visa grants published by the Depart-
ment of Immigration and Border Protection for years 2012-2013.27 From this dataset I extract
the number of visas issued for the short term business visitors and working holidays (less than 1
year), and temporary skilled workers (less than 6 years). Then, using the Australia’s Migration
Trends 2012-2013 report, I collect the numbers of permanent immigrants to Australia for ten
most popular sources and for all the OECD countries.28 For the rest of countries, which consti-
tute approximately 15 percent of total inflows, I estimate the yearly flows using current stocks
of immigrants.
In terms of New Zealand, I take the data on flows of work permits issued by the government
in 2012-2013.29 The applications in the published dataset are divided into 90 categories, each
of them characterized by a specific duration of stay (ranging from 1 year to indefinite). Addi-
tionally, using the data on flows of new permanent residents (divided into 22 categories), it is
possible to define the yearly flows of immigrants to New Zealand.
Concerning Canada, I collect the available data from Facts and Figures 2013: Immigration
Overview database, provided by Research and Evaluation Branch, Citizenship and Immigration
Canada (CIC).30 For the temporary immigrants, Canada proposes two types of visas: Interna-
tional Mobility Program work permit, and Temporary Foreign Worker Program work permit.
The numbers of new inflows for both categories by citizenship are available for top 50 sending
countries. The rest, which constitutes less than 5 percent, is estimated using the structure of
current stocks of immigrants. CIC publishes also the number of new permanent residents for the
full set of source countries.
The UK provides a comprehensive dataset with country-specific flows of immigrants consider-
ing 24 types of visas. Using the immigration statistics published by Home Office I can compute
the number of short and medium-term immigrants coming to the UK in 2013.31 Finally, using
25 In general, this status equalizes the treatment of immigrants to the one of natives in terms of social benefits,
access to education or traveling across the EU. Detailed regulations are subject to a specific member-country
legislations. For further details consult:
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l23034_en.htm
26 The data are available in pdf and xls formats:
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/law-and-policy/statistics.html
27 The access to the data on stocks and flows of temporary workers to Australia is restricted, and they are published
in protected xls files: http://www.immi.gov.au/media/statistics/statistical-info/temp-entrants/subclass-457.htm
28 The report is available on-line: http://www.immi.gov.au/pub-res/Documents/statistics/migration-trends-2012-13.pdf
29 See: http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/statistics/
30 The resources are published on: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/menu-fact.asp
31 Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/migration-statistics#data-tables
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the data on granted permanent settlements and citizenships, I compute the inflow of permanent
immigrants.
For the EU 27 and three EEA countries, I collect the data on first issued residence permits
from Eurostat. Having no other information, I assume that people who applied for 3-month
and 6-month permissions are short-term immigrants (less than 1 year). Simultaneously, those
who obtained a 12-month residence permit are classified as medium-term immigrants (tempo-
rary, more than 1 year). Eurostat publishes also the data on citizenships granted, which are the
reference for an inflow of permanent immigrants.
In terms of immigrants’ skills, using the above mentioned datasets, I extracted the inflows of
high-skilled immigrants for Australia, the UK, New Zealand, and the US. The skill structure of
inflows to other countries was assumed to be equal to the one in the current stock (taken from the
DIOC database, OECD). Table 3.E3 presents the data on yearly flows and stock of immigrants
by visa type in 35 receiving countries.
3.D Computation of probabilities of staying
In the first strategy, I collect the data from Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC)
created by the OECD.32 There are three sets of data for three reference years: 2000, 2005 and
2010. For each package, I extract the number of immigrants who arrived to the host country 0-5
years ago, 5-10 years ago, 10-20 years ago and earlier than 20 years ago. The key assumption
made in this calibration procedure is about invariability in time of the duration distribution. If
one accepts this limitation, it is simple to compute the above mentioned conditional probabilities.
Consider the stock of immigrants from country i to country j, whose actual length of stay in
the year 2010 was between 5 and 10 years. This means that all of them must have emigrated
between year 2000 and 2005, thus they must have been registered in the year 2005 as immigrants
from i to j with a duration of less than 5 years. However, in the group 0-5 in year 2005 there
are also people who decided to leave the destination country before 2010. These persons are
registers in 2005, but they are not registered in 2010. Assuming that the only cause of leaving
is returning to the home country (disregarding re-emigration to other countries and deaths), the
probability of staying at least 5-10 years, conditional on having stayed at least 0-5 years is equal
to the ratio of the stock of immigrants in group 5-10 in 2010 to the stock of immigrants in group
0-5 in 2005.33 Similarly, I compute the conditional probability of staying 10 years or more
conditional on being in a 0-10 years group ten years before. I take the quotient of the stock of
immigrants in group 10-20 in year 2010 to the stock of immigrants in group 0-10 in year 2000.
The third empirical moment to fit is the probability of staying at least 20 years conditional on
staying at least 10 years ten years before. Once again, I take the ratio of the stock of immigrants
in group >20 in year 2010, to the stock of immigrants in groups 10-20 and >20 in year 2000.
The main problem with DIOC database is the fact that it is constructed using a random rounding
procedure from national censuses, or the Labor Force Survey. As a consequence, the consistency
32 Data and metadata are available at: http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm
33 An important comment is that in the data provided by DIOC, the exact duration of stay of people in not explicitly
given. Therefore, hypothetically, a group of 0-5 immigrants could be composed from new immigrants only or just
from those who stayed 4 years and 11 months (if from that time the gross inflow of new immigrants was zero).
As a solution to this problem I calculate the average duration of stay in each group (for 0-5 years and 5-10 years
separately) according to the endogenous distribution of the duration of stay, which is being calibrated. In this way,
I force all the conditional moments to be dependent on the structure of distribution and provide its best fit without
imposing additional constraints.
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of data from one release to another is not perfect, in a sense that the number of stayers in later
groups may be larger than the number of stayers in the earlier groups. This leads to the values
of conditional probabilities greater than one. When encountering such problem, I drop these
observations. The final number of observations is 3880 values (out of 8316 data points), which
gives 46.7 percent of data coverage.
Considering the above mentioned problems, and the fact that there are many missing observa-
tions, I decided to reinforce the set of observables with the values of unconditional probabilities:
the shares of stayers in groups 0-5, 5-10 and 10-20 in year 2010 to the total flows of immigrants
who came in years 2005-2010, 2000-2010 and 1990-2000 respectively. The latter, country-
pair-specific data for the whole 196 × 196 country matrix are provided by Abel and Sander
(2014). They estimate the gross flows of immigrants in 5-year intervals using the data on stocks
of migrants, population of countries and births and deaths statistics.34 Apart from controlling
for values greater than one, one also has to notice that the unconditional probability of being in
group 0-5 (that is the unconditional probability of staying at least the average number of years in
group 0-5) is greater than the respective value for 5-10 years, which, in turn, exceeds the value
for 10-20. The share of acceptable data equals 54.8 percent. All in all, for each of 2,772 country
pairs I obtain one to six data points which characterize the distributions of duration of stay.
34 The outcomes of this estimation procedure, that is four matrices of 5-year flows from 1990 to 2010, are available
on-line as supplementary materials: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/343/6178/1520/suppl/DC1
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3.E Additional figures and tables
TABLE 3.E1: Sample and country codes
Code Country Code Country Code Country
AFG Afghanistan GHA Ghana NOR Norway
AGO Angola GIN Guinea NPL Nepal
ALB Albania GMB Gambia, The NZL New Zealand
ARE United Arab Emirates GNB Guinea-Bissau OMN Oman
ARG Argentina GRC Greece PAK Pakistan
ARM Armenia GRD Grenada PAN Panama
AUS Australia GTM Guatemala PER Peru
AUT Austria GUY Guyana PHL Philippines
AZE Azerbaijan HND Honduras PNG Papua New Guinea
BDI Burundi HRV Croatia POL Poland
BEL Belgium HTI Haiti PRT Portugal
BEN Benin HUN Hungary PRY Paraguay
BFA Burkina Faso IDN Indonesia QAT Qatar
BGD Bangladesh IND India ROU Romania
BGR Bulgaria IRL Ireland RUS Russian Federation
BHR Bahrain IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. RWA Rwanda
BHS The Bahamas IRQ Iraq SAU Saudi Arabia
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina ISL Iceland SDN Sudan
BLR Belarus ISR Israel SEN Senegal
BLZ Belize ITA Italy SGP Singapore
BOL Bolivia JAM Jamaica SLB Solomon Islands
BRA Brazil JOR Jordan SLE Sierra Leone
BRB Barbados JPN Japan SLV El Salvador
BRN Brunei Darussalam KAZ Kazakhstan SOM Somalia
BTN Bhutan KEN Kenya SRB Serbia
BWA Botswana KGZ Kyrgyz Rep. SSD South Sudan
CAF Central African Rep. KHM Cambodia STP São Tomé and Principe
CAN Canada KOR Korea, Rep. SUR Suriname
CHE Switzerland KWT Kuwait SVK Slovak Rep.
CHL Chile LAO Lao PDR SVN Slovenia
CHN China LBN Lebanon SWE Sweden
CIV Côte d’Ivoire LBR Liberia SWZ Swaziland
CMR Cameroon LBY Libya SYR Syrian Arab Rep.
COD Congo, Dem. Rep. LCA St. Lucia TCD Chad
COG Congo, Rep. LKA Sri Lanka TGO Togo
COL Colombia LSO Lesotho THA Thailand
COM Comoros LTU Lithuania TJK Tajikistan
CPV Cabo Verde LUX Luxembourg TKM Turkmenistan
CRI Costa Rica LVA Latvia TLS Timor-Leste
CUB Cuba MAR Morocco TON Tonga
CYP Cyprus MDA Moldova TTO Trinidad and Tobago
CZE Czech Rep. MDG Madagascar TUN Tunisia
DEU Germany MDV Maldives TUR Turkey
DJI Djibouti MEX Mexico TZA Tanzania
DNK Denmark MKD Macedonia, FYR UGA Uganda
DOM Dominican Rep. MLI Mali UKR Ukraine
DZA Algeria MLT Malta URY Uruguay
ECU Ecuador MMR Myanmar USA United States
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. MNE Montenegro UZB Uzbekistan
ERI Eritrea MNG Mongolia VCT St. Vincent and the Gr.
ESP Spain MOZ Mozambique VEN Venezuela, RB
EST Estonia MRT Mauritania VNM Vietnam
ETH Ethiopia MUS Mauritius VUT Vanuatu
FIN Finland MWI Malawi WSM Samoa
FJI Fiji MYS Malaysia YEM Yemen, Rep.
FRA France NAM Namibia ZAF South Africa
FSM Micronesia, Fed. Sts. NER Niger ZMB Zambia
GAB Gabon NGA Nigeria ZWE Zimbabwe
GBR United Kingdom NIC Nicaragua
GEO Georgia NLD Netherlands
Source: ISO.
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TABLE 3.E2: Net wages and fiscal burden
Code Net wage Ratio of Code Net wage Ratio of Code Net wage Ratio of
in USD PPP net/gross in USD PPP net/gross in USD PPP net/gross
AFG 7,951.36 98.66% GHA 13,266.66 85.74% NOR 51,064.28 70.92%
AGO 14,958.29 84.04% GIN 6,627.41 88.66% NPL 7,834.08 99.00%
ALB 20,950.98 90.27% GMB 5,659.97 77.66% NZL 33,575.45 81.54%
ARE 120,530.17 100.00% GNB 6,176.26 80.00% OMN 74,200.01 100.00%
ARG 37,332.66 75.21% GRC 24,711.51 74.00% PAK 11,646.91 92.98%
ARM 7,240.38 74.11% GRD 20,422.39 85.00% PAN 39,930.90 91.66%
AUS 40,433.62 78.25% GTM 34,931.27 95.00% PER 20,428.80 89.30%
AUT 39,158.69 68.61% GUY 15,593.77 77.64% PHL 11,158.24 79.98%
AZE 28,189.99 86.00% HND 19,996.10 91.15% PNG 4,052.60 78.00%
BDI 4,148.66 95.38% HRV 29,363.66 73.23% POL 30,460.14 82.00%
BEL 31,319.63 59.80% HTI 3,304.85 86.26% PRT 46,013.82 69.92%
BEN 6,398.46 70.00% HUN 28,000.02 84.00% PRY 19,191.68 90.00%
BFA 6,447.83 79.66% IDN 20,012.24 90.99% QAT 216,535.78 100.00%
BGD 11,308.55 85.00% IND 17,090.45 85.40% ROU 31,207.31 84.00%
BGR 19,121.54 90.00% IRL 50,341.63 70.61% RUS 27,669.88 87.00%
BHR 82,544.59 100.00% IRN 24,521.96 75.00% RWA 7,908.89 75.30%
BHS 42,526.73 100.00% IRQ 33,020.36 85.87% SAU 81,741.55 100.00%
BIH 18,598.32 90.00% ISL 26,001.55 54.46% SDN 14,764.06 85.00%
BLR 29,557.35 88.00% ISR 35,693.38 85.01% SEN 7,239.37 83.98%
BLZ 17,988.89 85.28% ITA 38,674.05 70.85% SGP 192,706.83 90.10%
BOL 9,716.00 87.00% JAM 17,924.82 86.24% SLB 7,954.34 90.00%
BRA 58,019.84 76.27% JOR 28,549.05 97.58% SLE 5,475.17 70.89%
BRB 17,827.40 76.64% JPN 35,591.73 69.82% SLV 17,615.86 85.37%
BRN 117,606.98 100.00% KAZ 35,485.63 90.00% SOM 5,791.69 90.00%
BTN 16,438.94 95.18% KEN 11,287.74 81.07% SRB 21,111.79 85.00%
BWA 39,372.59 88.89% KGZ 6,941.65 90.00% SSD 7,405.16 85.00%
CAF 4,249.31 80.00% KHM 16,163.00 96.55% STP 7,658.22 75.00%
CAN 41,629.35 82.85% KOR 46,310.80 87.37% SUR 22,759.55 73.25%
CHE 74,174.99 81.36% KWT 129,177.10 100.00% SVK 26,238.74 81.00%
CHL 45,253.41 93.39% LAO 13,215.24 84.23% SVN 29,941.58 73.23%
CHN 14,981.27 82.93% LBN 31,184.03 94.99% SWE 35,753.90 66.05%
CIV 11,056.94 76.56% LBR 2,093.19 78.50% SWZ 16,582.93 77.42%
CMR 12,681.17 86.81% LBY 44,996.13 91.86% SYR 12,471.83 85.00%
COD 2,698.12 89.05% LCA 18,539.99 83.58% TCD 5,835.29 65.85%
COG 10,819.00 72.98% LKA 19,716.77 94.20% TGO 4,574.21 72.00%
COL 39,743.86 90.69% LSO 7,848.40 78.00% THA 34,692.31 94.99%
COM 5,000.45 100.00% LTU 29,090.47 85.00% TJK 6,245.08 90.00%
CPV 13,137.35 83.50% LUX 96,047.65 78.42% TKM 25,002.60 90.00%
CRI 29,617.37 97.77% LVA 24,088.46 76.00% TLS 8,100.27 96.19%
CUB 23,325.71 80.00% MAR 18,288.17 88.83% TON 8,982.34 74.00%
CYP 35,972.45 87.99% MDA 7,256.94 87.91% TTO 44,759.46 75.00%
CZE 25,325.71 78.00% MDG 6,254.33 80.89% TUN 19,274.80 81.54%
DEU 35,857.26 66.16% MDV 24,210.59 100.00% TUR 35,487.84 77.63%
DJI 9,229.53 90.00% MEX 40,616.14 80.94% TZA 12,164.79 85.08%
DNK 39,332.64 64.65% MKD 22,508.13 90.00% UGA 6,696.35 80.59%
DOM 24,115.92 96.94% MLI 6,517.81 70.00% UKR 8,802.07 83.00%
DZA 27,183.16 75.20% MLT 52,175.83 82.30% URY 36,610.30 90.15%
ECU 23,325.97 98.90% MMR 12,603.28 96.61% USA 62,212.03 86.24%
EGY 27,358.27 85.69% MNE 25,471.15 91.00% UZB 11,156.98 81.38%
ERI 5,168.64 70.00% MNG 30,583.78 90.00% VCT 20,000.34 90.00%
ESP 35,141.02 74.74% MOZ 6,540.14 88.47% VEN 38,721.73 92.74%
EST 24,502.15 79.00% MRT 11,344.64 70.00% VNM 11,832.32 93.13%
ETH 6,752.75 87.96% MUS 40,499.86 85.00% VUT 10,242.57 100.00%
FIN 58,356.62 86.86% MWI 5,432.47 78.20% WSM 13,784.35 94.86%
FJI 22,135.53 96.91% MYS 44,683.12 90.44% YEM 12,009.98 85.00%
FRA 44,941.10 81.88% NAM 28,530.42 83.25% ZAF 40,079.82 79.40%
FSM 9,796.94 90.00% NER 2,861.70 70.00% ZMB 19,615.75 84.02%
GAB 38,046.45 77.08% NGA 12,625.50 87.67% ZWE 9,964.13 90.47%
GBR 43,983.47 75.79% NIC 11,966.26 97.71%
GEO 13,505.22 80.00% NLD 49,636.20 80.09%
Source: World Bank, and own calculations based on Barro and Lee (2013).
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TABLE 3.E3: Yearly inflows and total stocks of immigrants (by visa type)
Code
Flow Stock
1Y 6Y 50Y Total 1Y 6Y 50Y Total
EUR 246,945 426,740 294,356 968,041 238,561 2,299,216 10,490,861 13,028,638
AUT 6,218 12,634 785 19,638 6,058 66,213 25,617 97,888
BEL 1,856 11,836 4,812 18,503 1,802 67,026 204,186 273,014
BGR 2,117 1,825 377 4,320 2,037 9,286 11,375 22,698
CYP 3,189 3,243 907 7,339 3,093 17,449 27,068 47,609
CZE 2,009 6,864 202 9,074 1,859 36,452 6,630 44,940
DEU 37,809 64,858 30,455 133,122 36,293 351,853 1,017,105 1,405,251
DNK 2,367 7,954 523 10,843 2,279 42,079 19,329 63,687
ESP 12,241 54,290 16,685 83,215 11,849 303,865 708,586 1,024,301
EST 762 991 52 1,805 739 5,421 2,042 8,201
FIN 1,987 4,445 1,594 8,027 1,911 24,177 54,732 80,820
FRA 7,452 97,294 21,651 126,398 6,947 519,637 806,627 1,333,211
GBR 42,091 37,468 167,022 246,581 39,926 187,638 5,762,345 5,989,909
GRC 3,837 2,487 1,286 7,611 3,787 14,720 60,555 79,063
HRV 1,240 683 203 2,126 1,192 3,651 6,257 11,100
HUN 2,949 5,911 4,440 13,300 2,856 31,692 136,542 171,090
IRL 11,108 13,747 11,753 36,608 10,841 73,911 462,246 546,997
ITA 16,822 28,738 6,590 52,150 16,394 160,809 250,328 427,531
LTU 1,090 1,059 22 2,171 1,046 5,729 702 7,478
LUX 1,456 4,929 1,683 8,067 1,424 28,727 76,589 106,740
LVA 2,181 443 36 2,660 2,116 2,489 1,136 5,741
MLT 4,566 3,326 370 8,263 4,424 18,145 11,370 33,939
NLD 18,475 18,007 6,083 42,564 17,989 95,617 224,042 337,649
POL 51,326 2,412 705 54,442 50,389 13,410 22,374 86,173
PRT 2,044 7,203 3,577 12,824 1,897 36,927 117,378 156,203
ROU 1,417 5,901 11 7,329 1,349 30,512 368 32,228
SVK 1,192 1,559 103 2,854 1,165 8,704 3,713 13,581
SVN 1,459 978 154 2,591 1,417 5,490 5,150 12,058
SWE 5,684 25,657 12,274 43,615 5,482 137,589 466,469 609,541
AUS 464,039 98,917 156,884 719,840 460,228 588,201 6,638,961 7,687,390
CAN 92,483 62,615 149,367 304,465 90,615 359,186 5,643,203 6,093,005
CHE 13,809 39,489 8,021 61,319 13,405 207,025 259,733 480,163
ISL 1,043 809 88 1,940 1,012 4,439 3,021 8,472
NOR 3,062 15,138 2,134 20,334 2,991 83,728 86,657 173,376
NZL 268 31,051 15,002 46,320 232 177,891 655,205 833,328
USA 31,668 695,216 277,553 1,004,437 28,077 3,837,517 11,618,245 15,483,839
ALL 853,316 1,369,975 903,406 3,126,696 835,121 7,557,203 35,395,887 43,788,211
Note: The table provides the numbers immigrants in 35 destination countries (the EU as a whole: EUR, and all 35
destinations: ALL). First (last) four columns present the flows (stocks) of migrants by visa types and total sums.
Source: Destination country publications (flows) and DIOC, OECD (stocks).
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FIGURE 3.E1: Data (X axis) versus model outcomes (Y axis) for the yearly flows of short-
term (first row), medium-term (second row), long-term (third row) high-skilled immigrants in
35 destination countries. First (second) column represents the values in number of people (in
logs of the number of people).
Source: own calculations.
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FIGURE 3.E2: Histograms of the computed values of unforeseen costs of living abroad, ρij .
Each figure presents the empirical distribution of the parameters for a particular destination
country, and all 177 sending states.
Source: own calculations.
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TABLE 3.E4: Decomposition of the expected migration costs, x
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Border -0.616*** 0.562*** 0.555*** 0.401*** 0.162
(0.180) (0.144) (0.144) (0.0924) (0.143)
Language -3.297*** -1.554*** -1.530*** -1.141*** -1.173*** -0.896***
(0.0804) (0.0665) (0.0673) (0.0458) (0.0688) (0.0554)
Colony 2.243*** 1.194*** 1.191*** 0.714*** 1.158*** 0.856***
(0.156) (0.125) (0.125) (0.0885) (0.121) (0.0850)
Distance (log) 0.484*** -0.0707*** -0.0555** 0.336*** -0.329*** 0.191***
(0.0282) (0.0232) (0.0240) (0.0172) (0.0364) (0.0348)
Networks (log) -0.594*** -0.596*** -0.404*** -0.723*** -0.515***
(0.00581) (0.00585) (0.00529) (0.00743) (0.00844)
GDP ratio -0.0362** -0.00706 0.511***
(0.0149) (0.0101) (0.0506)
Constant 4.786*** 11.72*** 11.65*** 4.346*** 11.05*** 6.379***
(0.242) (0.205) (0.207) (0.214) (0.419) (0.398)
Observations 18,585 18,585 18,585 18,585 18,585 18,585
R-squared 0.103 0.426 0.426 0.770 0.493 0.810
Destination FE NO NO NO YES NO YES
Source FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: own calculations.
TABLE 3.E5: Extrapolation of unexpected migration costs, ρ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Language -0.138 -0.276 -0.338 -0.261
(0.275) (0.322) (0.292) (0.346)
Legislation -0.0575 -0.195 0.225 0.158
(0.211) (0.231) (0.226) (0.243)
Networks (log) -0.0272 0.0498 -0.129** -0.00140
(0.0418) (0.0482) (0.0541) (0.0756)
Distance (log) -0.389*** -0.241* -0.653*** -0.261
(0.104) (0.141) (0.121) (0.191)
GDP ratio -0.159** -0.469 -0.208*** -1.698*
(0.0769) (0.329) (0.0799) (0.877)
Border -0.671 -0.714 -0.678 -0.666
(0.586) (0.596) (0.582) (0.595)
Constant 6.747*** 7.164* 9.493*** 8.275***
(0.922) (3.786) (1.435) (2.700)
Observations 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826
R-squared 0.015 0.170 0.062 0.209
Origin FE NO YES NO YES
Destination FE NO NO YES YES
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: own calculations.
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TABLE 3.E6: The results of H1B and FI simulations as deviations from the reference
Code
H1B FI
∆ flow ∆% flow ∆ stock ∆% stock ∆ flow ∆% flow ∆ stock ∆% stock
EUR 29,157 3.0% 800,432 6.1% 102,382 10.6% 727,125 5.6%
AUT 553 2.8% 20,765 21.2% 3,063 15.6% 18,662 19.1%
BEL 443 2.4% 7,716 2.8% 2,561 13.8% 16,422 6.0%
BGR 175 4.1% 6,879 30.3% 66 1.5% 848 3.7%
CYP 539 7.3% 12,302 25.8% 342 4.7% 3,415 7.2%
CZE 22 0.2% 5,422 12.1% 308 3.4% 4,467 9.9%
DEU 7,319 5.5% 148,384 10.6% 9,453 7.1% 108,418 7.7%
DNK 233 2.1% 7,931 12.5% 1,832 16.9% 12,994 20.4%
ESP 900 1.1% 33,589 3.3% 9,207 11.1% 72,239 7.1%
EST 13 0.7% 1,841 22.4% 26 1.5% 660 8.1%
FIN 245 3.0% 7,447 9.2% 1,281 16.0% 10,558 13.1%
FRA -2,026 -1.6% -4,401 -0.3% 22,575 17.9% 129,259 9.7%
GBR 8,530 3.5% 132,469 2.2% 26,063 10.6% 157,738 2.6%
GRC 490 6.4% 14,761 18.7% -98 -1.3% 1,819 2.3%
HRV 127 6.0% 4,278 38.5% -13 -0.6% 485 4.4%
HUN 420 3.2% 11,815 6.9% 361 2.7% 2,749 1.6%
IRL 1,645 4.5% 35,289 6.5% 5,669 15.5% 30,212 5.5%
ITA 2,594 5.0% 64,411 15.1% 2,398 4.6% 38,249 8.9%
LTU 154 7.1% 3,978 53.2% 21 1.0% 1,060 14.2%
LUX 233 2.9% 6,082 5.7% 4,090 50.7% 26,506 24.8%
LVA 236 8.9% 7,624 132.8% 4 0.2% 372 6.5%
MLT 649 7.9% 15,983 47.1% 447 5.4% 5,461 16.1%
NLD 2,672 6.3% 59,688 17.7% 4,523 10.6% 24,760 7.3%
POL 2,373 4.4% 164,167 190.5% -1,300 -2.4% 523 0.6%
PRT 104 0.8% 3,255 2.1% 2,403 18.7% 14,270 9.1%
ROU 81 1.1% 4,483 13.9% 752 10.3% 4,953 15.4%
SVK 106 3.7% 4,041 29.8% 101 3.5% 1,071 7.9%
SVN 262 10.1% 5,484 45.5% -15 -0.6% 622 5.2%
SWE 63 0.1% 14,753 2.4% 6,262 14.4% 38,331 6.3%
AUS -9,968 -1.4% -54,233 -0.7% -12,146 -1.7% -20,204 -0.3%
CAN -4,139 -1.4% -24,142 -0.4% -4,605 -1.5% -30,377 -0.5%
CHE -711 -1.2% -3,366 -0.7% -1,698 -2.8% -6,787 -1.4%
ISL -6 -0.3% 169 2.0% -31 -1.6% 137 1.6%
NOR -322 -1.6% -1,671 -1.0% -958 -4.7% -4,469 -2.6%
NZL -831 -1.8% -5,584 -0.7% -771 -1.7% -7,005 -0.8%
USA -12,886 -1.3% -77,693 -0.5% -13,238 -1.3% -75,679 -0.5%
ALL 293 0.0% 633,912 1.4% 68,935 2.2% 582,741 1.3%
Note: The table provides the changes in the numbers immigrants (counterfactual less reference) in 35 destination
countries (the EU as a whole: EUR, and all 35 destinations: ALL). First (last) four columns present the results after
introducing an H1B visa in the EU (a fiscal incentive, FI in the EU). Source: own calculations.
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TABLE 3.E7: The results of H1B and FI simulations as deviations from the reference, with
return premiums
Code
H1B RP FI RP
∆ flow ∆% flow ∆ stock ∆% stock ∆ flow ∆% flow ∆ stock ∆% stock
EUR 42,330 3.6% 1,033,057 8.0% 114,592 9.7% 971,689 7.6%
AUT 977 3.9% 22,861 19.7% 3,352 13.5% 18,794 16.2%
BEL 80 0.4% 4,594 1.7% 2,645 11.6% 18,677 6.9%
BGR 411 8.1% 8,258 33.5% 455 8.9% 1,152 4.7%
CYP 386 4.3% 14,327 29.2% 147 1.6% 4,006 8.2%
CZE 294 2.6% 5,643 10.5% 466 4.1% 3,791 7.0%
DEU 13,131 7.9% 203,092 14.0% 12,312 7.4% 145,498 10.0%
DNK 162 1.2% 11,498 16.3% 1,977 14.2% 16,950 24.1%
ESP 769 0.7% 37,673 3.7% 9,156 8.7% 85,955 8.5%
EST 83 3.9% 2,470 31.3% 283 13.4% 3,715 47.2%
FIN 771 8.0% 10,946 13.3% 2,068 21.4% 19,594 23.8%
FRA -4,465 -2.9% -11,883 -0.9% 23,412 15.2% 147,717 10.8%
GBR 11,382 3.9% 180,760 3.2% 28,723 9.7% 246,243 4.3%
GRC 823 9.9% 17,160 22.4% -64 -0.8% -544 -0.7%
HRV 386 14.6% 6,003 48.5% 203 7.7% 1,264 10.2%
HUN 145 0.9% 8,345 4.8% 8 0.1% 465 0.3%
IRL 3,061 6.7% 64,046 12.1% 6,679 14.7% 40,434 7.6%
ITA 4,131 6.5% 84,883 19.1% 3,186 5.0% 51,244 11.5%
LTU 44 1.6% 3,387 36.8% -182 -6.6% 648 7.0%
LUX 359 3.4% 6,053 6.2% 4,822 45.9% 36,261 37.3%
LVA 0 0.0% 8,071 104.0% -297 -8.6% -320 -4.1%
MLT 583 5.7% 21,830 59.8% 236 2.3% 7,263 19.9%
NLD 4,820 9.1% 89,703 26.4% 5,788 10.9% 31,722 9.3%
POL 3,118 5.2% 181,972 196.0% -1,275 -2.1% 1,871 2.0%
PRT -39 -0.2% 8,793 5.5% 2,576 15.8% 19,468 12.3%
ROU 1 0.0% 4,560 11.1% 372 3.9% 4,007 9.8%
SVK 31 0.9% 6,342 43.2% 271 7.6% 1,836 12.5%
SVN 360 11.5% 7,288 55.8% 258 8.2% 1,618 12.4%
SWE 521 1.0% 24,383 4.2% 7,012 13.1% 62,357 10.6%
AUS -16,659 -1.8% -51,063 -0.7% -18,991 -2.1% 5,208 0.1%
CAN -5,360 -1.4% -17,165 -0.3% -4,922 -1.3% 3,474 0.1%
CHE -955 -1.2% -13,408 -2.5% -3,666 -4.5% -24,338 -4.5%
ISL -277 -10.8% -1,358 -13.9% 186 7.2% 1,420 14.6%
NOR -699 -2.8% -3,467 -1.9% -1,688 -6.8% -11,576 -6.3%
NZL -1,095 -1.8% -28,358 -3.5% -607 -1.0% -16,104 -2.0%
USA -21,641 -1.7% -192,662 -1.3% -20,415 -1.6% -110,137 -0.7%
ALL -4,355 -0.1% 725,575 1.7% 64,489 1.7% 819,635 1.9%
Note: The table provides the changes in the numbers immigrants (counterfactual less reference) in 35 destination
countries (the EU as a whole: EUR, and all 35 destinations: ALL). First (last) four columns present the results after
introducing an H1B visa in the EU (a fiscal incentive, FI in the EU), when the return premiums are accounted for.
Source: own calculations.
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FIGURE 3.E3: The results of simulations
Changes in stocks (black bars, left axis) and flows (gray lines, right axis) of high-skilled im-
migrants (counterfactual less reference) after introducing: a) H1B visas in the EU, b) fiscal
incentives in the EU, c) H1B visas in the EU with return premium, d) fiscal incentives in the EU
with return premium. Source: own calculations.
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FIGURE 3.E4: Composition of migrants flows and stocks
The actual compositions of migrants with respect to their duration of visa, in flows. First figure represents the
reference scenario, second figure: the composition after introducing an H1B visa in the EU, and the third figure: the
composition after introducing a fiscal incentive in the EU. Source: own calculations.
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FIGURE 3.E5: Composition of migrants flows and stocks
The actual compositions of migrants with respect to their duration of visa, in stocks. First figure represents the
reference scenario, second figure: the composition after introducing an H1B visa in the EU, and the third figure: the
composition after introducing a fiscal incentive in the EU. Source: own calculations.
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FIGURE 3.E6: The effects on average durations of stay after including return premiums
The graph present the average durations of stay by destination countries and visa types. The broken lines show
the reference scenario, whereas the solid lines depict the reference scenario with return premiums. Source: own
calculations.
FIGURE 3.E7: The effects of multilateral resistance to migration
The figure shows the changes in flows (solid bars, left axis) and stocks (striped bars, right axis) of high-skilled
migrants due to multilateral resistance to migration. Source: own calculations.
Conclusion
This PhD thesis presents some recent developments in quantitative economic theory of inter-
national migration. I propose three models of world economy, which enable to answer key
questions about how global flows of people impact the economies of the developed countries.
The first Chapter analyzes the variation in natives’ welfare due to recent net flows (and total net
stocks) of migrants. The main contribution of this article is the quantification and the comparison
of the main channels which determine the economic impact of migration: the market size effect,
the labor market effect and the fiscal effect. Observing significant interdependencies among
these elements, we find that the market size effect (which has been understudied in the literature)
can substantially affect the well-being of natives in the OECD states. Moreover, both labor
market and fiscal effects might reach significant magnitudes when the inflow of migrants is large
and selective enough. Our results give evidence that a positive net migration flow is followed
by a welfare gain in a receiving country, although natives in the host states have rather negative
attitudes towards newcomers.
The second Chapter proposes a policy of further integration between the EU and five key part-
ners in terms of international trade and migration. I evaluate the welfare consequences of liberal-
izing the flows of goods and people between those country pairs. Hypothetically, the EU citizens
would lose after freeing migration to Australia, Canada and the US due to a sizable outflow of
workers. Simultaneously, a trade agreement would always be beneficial for both parties. An im-
portant contribution of this paper is the quantification of relations between trade and migration
in a general equilibrium model. I provide conditions for substitutability and complementarity
between these two phenomena, and conclude that liberalizing migration (trade) causes the latter
(the former) co-relation.
The third Chapter presents a novel model of international migration, in which agents individu-
ally choose the destination, visa type, and the duration of stay. The contribution of this paper
to the literature on international migration comprises in developing and solving a model that
violates the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom, and gives micro-foundations for
the multilateral resistance to migration. The developed theoretical framework is used to quan-
tify the demographic implications of alternative migration policies in the EU. I conclude that
a visa policy targeted at the high-skilled immigrants, as well as a tax concession program for
the college-educated, may attract new waves of professional workers. Since the two policies
act through different macroeconomic channels, by providing current and new immigrants with
various incentives, they are expected to have different short- and long-term impacts on fiscal
budgets.
An interesting research question could also be the quantification of the extent to which migrants
may influence on labor markets and national pension systems, especially in those countries that
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suffer from serious aging processes. Immigrants, who come to the host states as regular can-
didates, compete with nationals on local labor markets. However, natives and immigrants have
different individual motives for their economic behavior (in terms of job acceptance, bargaining
power, labor market participation and aversion to being unemployed). The efficacy of utilization
of incoming work force (which depends not only on the institutions of the receiving country, but
also on the individual characteristics of immigrants, i.e. their reservation wages and the potential
to assimilate) is decisive in terms of the social and economic outcomes. Various scenarios are
possible: fiscal authorities financing unsuccessful immigrants through benefits, and immigrants
being net contributors to fiscal scheme. The sign and the magnitude of the overall effects of
immigration on local labor markets and public finances (worker-group-specific unemployment
rates and net fiscal contributions) are crucial issues debated in many developed economies
Furthermore, since the European Union strives at attracting new waves of highly skilled foreign
workers (through implementing novel, skill-biased migration policies like the European Blue
Card program), three important questions arise: Is a skill-selective migration policy a remedy
for the EU to insure positive outcomes from immigration? What would be the preferred mi-
gration policy, if the EU citizens could explicitly vote for it? Which policy is optimal for the
EU citizens, and which one is feasible from the political economy perspective? The literature
lacks a quantitative answer to these questions, which would provide a comparison between the
optimal migration policy (visa policy and other fiscal or labor market incentives) from the point
of view of the welfare of domestic citizens in the receiving countries, and the political economy
outcomes, when people are allowed to vote and endogenously decide on the level of migration
costs and benefits for the foreign workers.
Finally, until now, there is no global study of the influence of current and past migration flows
on cross- and within-country inequality. Although contemporary migration patterns reveal the
features of brain drain (exodus of high-skilled emigrants from poor to rich countries) and brain
gain (intensification of skill acquisition in poor sending states, due to migration opportunities),
the literature provides mixed evidence on which force dominates. The literature does not give
quantitative evidence about international migration being a source of convergence or divergence
in earnings, income, and wealth.
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